stance, in the first of them, the five curtains shall be coupled together, each one to her sister,' is the strict translation, but each one to the other' is the meaning. And it requires no knowledge of Hebrew to perceive that the principle which justifies the substitution of the word another' in all these passages is that the meaning is not an other, but the other, or rather that, according to our common way of speaking, we might use the compound word oneanother. And it is equally easy to perceive that this principle does not justify, or rather that it is not possible to make, a similar change in the words thou shalt not take a wife to her sister.'

It is hardly worth while to say any more on this point: we will only add that Dr. Pusey says that the opinion of the Jews themselves was, as it still is, against this interpretation, and against the prohibition, with the exception of a small and modern sect called the Karaites, of whom, he adds, that they have very little weight.' Dr. Adler, their chief rabbi here, says that these marriages are considered among them proper and even laudable;' and that 'to the best of his knowledge not a single opinion can be met with throughout all the rabbinical writings which would even appear to throw any doubt on the legality or propriety of the marriage.' (Report, App. 35.) He also utterly condemns, as a question of Hebrew criticism, the marginal translation we have been speaking of. As the Jews are against the prohibition, of course we are told that we are not to learn our duty from them. But if these anti-Jewish theologians insist on our learning our duty from the law of Moses, it does not seem very unreasonable to inquire how that law was understood, in a case of nothing more than inference at the best, by those to whom it was given, and who must have understood it better than we can guess at it. And we may surely ask why we are to take for granted that, in giving to the words of the law their plain and natural meaning, they had corrupted it, and how it came to pass that, if they had done so, they were not rebuked for this as well as their other corruptions of moral laws, and that the true meaning of the law was not

restored in this important matter by the only authority that could restore it?

Again, we are told with great solemnity, that if we refuse to reckon the wife's relations as equivalent to a man's own relations we rebel against the express declaration of Scripture that a man and his wife are one flesh.' We do not expect that any answer will satisfy persons who seriously believe that a question relating to the law of marriage is to be determined from a figurative expression which is applied to a different subject in every place in the Bible where it occurs. But not only do common sense and universal experience reject this paradox of a man being as nearly related to his wife's relations as to his own, but those who propound it shew that they either do not really believe or do not understand it. For if they did, they must consider marriage with a sister-in-law much worse than with a niece, a sister-in-law being equivalent to a sister: whereas marriage with a niece is constantly held out in terrorem, as a sort of climax of the abominations that will follow if we once infringe the sanctity of Archbishop Parker's Table. They must also hold marriage with a wife's sister-in-law as absolutely unlawful, being equivalent to marriage with her sister. This last objection to their theory has been frequently pointed out; but, as far as we have seen, none of them have thought it worth notice: except that Archdeacon Hale, when he was obliged to answer the question, after a little hesitation boldly cut the knot in the only way in which it can be cut, by saying, that though that marriage is not prohibited, yet his own impression is against it. Perhaps the commissioners were satisfied with finding that he could suggest no better way of defending the law upon this ground than by shewing that it did not go far enough. But they might have gone on and asked him whether his objection extends, as it clearly ought to do, to marriage with a sister-inlaw's husband's sister, and so on ad infinitum. And this absurdity is just such a result as might have been expected from an attempt to wrest the words of Scripture to a purpose for which they were not intended.

The only remaining argument for the prohibition on scriptural grounds is, that since a wife's sister is as near as a brother's wife, and a brother's wife is specifically mentioned, therefore the wife's sister, as well as the brother's wife, are included in the general and perpetual condemnation of marriages between those who are 'near of kin' at the beginning of the chapter. And by way of enforcing this argument, and shewing how abominable the connexion must be, it is added, that the translation ‘near of kin to him' is not strong enough, and that it ought to be flesh of his flesh.' As Dr. Pusey says this is the literal translation, we are quite content to take it so. But still the question remains, How is it proved that these general words at the beginning of the chapter do comprehend all the particular cases of relationship afterwards specifically prohibited? And there are three ways of determining this question. The first is to take for granted, that as some of the after-mentioned marriages are manifestly forbidden on account of the nearness of kin between the parties, therefore all that are mentioned are to be taken as specimens of the degree of proximity to which the general prohibition was meant to extend. On this we may remark incidentally, that a wife's sister is at least as nearly related to a man during the wife's life as after it, and yet marriage with her was not prohibited during the wife's life on account of her relationship to the man, but for the inferior and temporary reason of the probable quarrelling between the women while polygamy was allowed; which was of course greater, as well as a more probable, evil between sisters than between strangers in that situation. Another method of determining the meaning of the Hebrew words in question, which has been proposed under the cover of a considerable name,* is to pronounce learning thrown away,' and to refer us to the best of our dictionaries, Johnson's,' for the meaning of the words ‘kin, kindred.' On this we do not propose to make any remark. But there is a third method which appears to have some advan

a

tages over either of the others, and that is to ascertain if we can the proper meaning and application of the words in this passage by seeing how they are used in others.

It

Now it appears that the whole expression here translated flesh of his flesh' is not used anywhere else in the Bible; but that one nearly similar, only inferior in strength, in fact more corresponding to the translation near of kin to him,' is used in a few other places. And in none of those places is even that weaker expression applied to any but very near blood relations; and moreover, where relations by affinity are intended, as in several passages in the Book of Ruth, an expression of an entirely different kind is used. The distinction is thus represented in the Septuagint in the passage in question the expression is, δικεια σαρκός αυτου; the other expression for near blood relations is xs only; for relations by affinity, yvus. happens that the instances in which the expression for near of kin' is used are near at hand; for in several of the cases in this 18th chapter the women who are prohibited are described as near of kin-not to the man, but to his father, mother, or wife; the relations thus described being sisters of the father or mother, and only the lineal relations of the wife. Again, in the 21st chapter, there is actually a definition of the meaning of the words: There shall none of the priests be defiled for the dead among his people, except for his kin that is near to him, that is, for his father and for his mother, and for his son and for his daughter, and for his brother and for his sister [if] a virgin.' Of course for the purpose of the marriage-law it includes all lineal relations; and if any one wishes to extend the term to a niece as well as an aunt, by virtue of the 19th verse of the 20th chapter, we have not the least objection, indeed we have no doubt that they were intended equally to be prohibited; all that we are contending for is, that the proper meaning and scriptural use of the words in question, as is the strict and legal use, even of the English words, is entirely against the application of them to

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any relations by affinity. Certainly in nothing but the loosest language can a stepmother or stepdaughter be spoken of as 'near of kin,' much less flesh of a man's flesh,' and yet they are expressly forbidden, obviously for the very reason that they are not included in the general prohibition. It is of no use for us to speculate why some cases that are clearly included in the general prohibition are afterwards specifically mentioned, since repetitions are much too frequent in the Bible for any argument to be raised upon that: in fact there is a repetition even among the specific prohibitions; for 'thy father's wife's daughter begotten of thy father is necessarily included in thy sister, the daughter of thy father or the daughter of thy mother.'

As a proof of the carelessness, to say the least of it, with which this question has been treated, we observe that one writer after another has gone on repeating that marriage with a daughter is nowhere prohibited, unless we allow the doctrine of analogy or inference. We should be glad to know how a man can marry his daughter without violating the prohibition against marrying a woman and her daughter.

Not

only that, but as there is no question that a daughter is near of kin,' and 'flesh of a man's flesh,' there are no less than two clear prohibitions of marriage with a daughter without resorting to this doctrine of analogy: a doctrine for which no scriptural authority has been or can be produced, but which has only been invented by ourselves as a foundation for certain prohibitions similar in kind to some that are contained in the Mosaic law, but which are not included in the general condemnation of marriages with near of kin, and are more remote than that case of affinity mentioned by St. Paul,—not, observe, as a merely positive prohibition like some of the Mosaic ones, but as a thing contrary to the law of nature, and therefore including all of equal degree, that is (to use an incorrect but intelligible and comprehensive term), all lineal relations by affinity. We are not saying that none of the prohibitions founded on this principle of analogy are justifiable; but we do say, that it is monstrous to tell us that we are not

to give a verse in the Bible its obvious and natural meaning, merely because, if we do, it will appear to be inconsistent with a principle invented by ourselves for the purpose of including certain cases which we think ought to be prohibited.

There is one more argument of a religious character which it is proper to notice, as well on account of its novelty as of its wonderful comprehensiveness, and also by way of a warning to people against admitting a doctrine which would justify any considerable number of persons in requesting the legislature to prohibit everything which they happen to think contrary to the will of God. One party demands the prohibition of marriages which they disapprove of: another party will be content with nothing less than the abolition of Sunday travelling, either of human beings, letterbags, or electricity, and the prohibition under heavy penalties of all theatrical performances, except at Exeter Hall. These gentlemen say, that as it is doubtfulthat is, as all mankind are not agreed whether certain marriages are lawful, they ought to be prohibited, by way of making sure that they are not a national sin. But first of all they forget that a national sin is not what a nation allows individuals to do, so long as they do not injure others by doing it, but what it does as a nation. It is not a national sin that we do not punish adultery by law, though nobody doubts that it is an individual sin. A legislative prohibition of public worship would be a national sin, of course of the most flagrant kind. And if we are to talk about national sins, it is worth consideration that a legislative restriction (except for the public advantage) of a liberty given by God is only next door to a legislative prohibition of a duty enjoined by God. The old maxim was, Quod dubitas ne feceris. This new maxim is, Quod dubitas ne permiseris. St. Paul said, 'He that doubteth is damned [condemned] if he eat; but then he said also, Let not him that eateth not judge him that cateth;' with much more to the same effect. To which we will add no words of our own, but only these most wise and pertinent words of Jeremy Taylor:To add more [prohibitions] out of

fear, is either to be wiser than the lawgiver, or to suspect him to be apt to quarrel by unknown measures and secret rules of interpretation.' And again, 'It were good if standing in the measures of the divine law we should lay a snare for no man's foot, by putting fetters on his liberty without just cause, but not without great danger.'-Rule of Conscience.

Next after the theological objections naturally follow the ecclesiastical, which all come to this, that the prohibition has been the law of the Church of England ever since the Reformation, having been then enacted with the concurrence of Cranmer and those who acted with him, and since adopted by Convocation, and upheld by many eminent divines. We cannot tell what the bishops, who in 1835 confirmed all the marriages of this kind which had previously been celebrated contrary to the law of the realm and of the Church, may think of their predecessors, who in 1533 declared invalid one of those marriages twenty years after it had been celebrated according to the existing law of the realm and of the Church (which allowed the dispensation). Possibly they agreed with Bishop Taylor, that 'learned men upon that occasion gave too great testimony with how great weakness men that have a bias do determine questions, and with how great a force a king that is rich and powerful can make his own determinations.' It is no business of ours to condemn so great and honest a man as Cranmer for this weakness; probably very few of us, with the same bias, would have done any better in the same circumstances. But we must nevertheless ask any one who appeals to the judgment of Cranmer and the Reformers, what he supposes would have been their judgment if it had so happened that Anne Boleyn had been Henry's deceased wife's sister, instead of being the supplanter of his brother's widow, and the Pope had been unreasonably tardy in granting him the required dispensation to marry her? Does any man in his senses believe that there would not have been just the same appeals to the word of God as the only sure test-just the same complaints of the Church of Rome having multiplied unlawful prohi

bitions though it granted unlawful dispensations, and yet a somewhat different result? And if the wife's sister' had not been in the Table made by Queen Elizabeth's archbishop, Parker, (as perhaps it would not if her mother had been Henry's wife's sister) does anybody imagine that we should have found great divines writing tracts to prove that it ought to have been there? or that the 99th canon would have added it to those already in the Table set forth by Authority?'

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If it is asked how it came into the Act 25 Hen. VIII. c. 7, and the subsequent acts which adopted the prohibitions of that act, since it was not required for his purpose, and is not forbidden in Scripture, as the others are which are there mentioned, the answer is curious enough: viz. that it was inserted under the notion that it is forbidden in Leviticus, xviii., not inferentially, but expressly, that is of course in the eighteenth verse. This is sufficiently clear, without going into other matters, from the words of the act itself, which enumerates exactly those marriages which are expressly prohibited in that chapter, with the addition of this single one; and speaks of them all as plainly prohibited and detested by God's law,' not including a single one of those which are most plainly to be inferred, or rather which are most plainly included without resorting to inference, not even a daughter. Improbable as this account of the matter may seem, now that it is understood by all who have read any of the publications on the subject, that the only verse in which the wife's sister is mentioned is relied on, not by the advocates of the prohibition, but by the opponents of it, it would not have appeared at all improbable a few years ago, when nine out of ten of those who were shocked at the proposal to allow such marriages, if they had been asked their reason, would have replied that they are expressly forbidden in the Bible; indeed, so lately as a year ago, no less a person than the Archdeacon of Middlesex, who stated that he had always had a strong impression against relaxing the prohibition, though he was not prepared to state all the reasons for it, said he thought this eighteenth verse was one of the

grounds of the prohibition. And there is no doubt that the prejudice that still exists against relaxing the prohibition has grown up, with the greater number of those who feel the prejudice, under that old notion that it was contained in the Bible; and now that is exploded, it is sought to be defended on totally different grounds: as usual, the opinion comes first, and the reasons are invented afterwards.

The fact evidently was, that the scriptural prohibitions were introduced into the act of Henry VIII. simply to save appearances, by professing to recognize a general rule in which the marriage with a brother's wife was expressly included, and it answered the purpose perfectly well to put down in the act just those degrees which they found mentioned in Leviticus; and the framers of it were the less likely to go out of their way to examine the exact nature of the Levitical prohibition of the wife's sister, because retaining it obviously added force to the prohibition of the brother's wife. It has nothing to do with the main question before us, but it is gratifying to find that Cranmer was no party to this job, but sincerely wanted to get a real and bonâ fide marriage law established, by extending the prohibition to all the cases which he believed (though we do not agree with him as to all of them) were intended by God to be prohibited, but his advice was not taken. It is very remarkable that the legislature of this kingdom has never deliberately considered the question of the prohibited degrees— indeed never considered them at all. We see what was done and how it was done at the Reformation; and thus the law remained for 300 years, and as we have explained before it was practically no law at all. In 1835 there was no discussion of what were or ought to be the prohibited degrees: they were left to the courts of law to find out as they could; and in fact the Court of Queen's Bench had to determine, after a long argument (in Chadwick's case), whether this very marriage of a wife's sister was within the prohibited degrees or not. We do not mean to say that there could be much real doubt upon that point; seeing that it only requires some attention to the

various repeals and revivals of the first marriage act, in the times of Henry VIII. and his three successors, to see that this marriage, at any rate, was within the statutory prohibitions in force at the passing of the act of 1835.

As to the other ground that was taken, though it was quite right in Mr. Badely to make the best of it, as well as the statutable ground, in arguing the case, there can now, after Lord Denman's judgment, be no longer any doubt that the canons, and still less Archbishop Parker, had no authority or power whatever to make any new prohibitions. Indeed the judgment of Lord Hardwicke, L. C. J., in Middleton v. Croft (2 Strange, 1056), to which Lord Denman assented, was conclusive enough upon that point, as well as that of the Privy Council (which is an ecclesiastical court) in Escott v. Mastin (Stephens's Laws of the Clergy, App.). The distinction (which appears to be little understood) between the law of the canons and the old canon law, which, as Lord Hardwicke said, was adopted as the law of the realm by the Act 35 Hen. VIII. c. 16, is clearly pointed out in that case of Middleton v. Croft; for there, although the Court of King's Bench allowed the Ecclesiastical Court to proceed against a clandestine marriage, so far as it was against the old canon law, yet they prohibited the court from proceeding also upon the ground that the marriage was bad by reason of having been celebrated before eight o'clock in the morning, 'a regulation only introduced by the canons of 1603;' and that very regulation was afterwards introduced in an effectual manner by an act of parliament.

The whole of that judgment is well worth reading, but we can only afford space for one more extract from it :

There are many things of an ecclesiastical nature which no canon can touch, as the degrees of consanguinity, &c. These are matters that have always been regulated by the legislature.'

It is just as reasonable to say that this law must not be altered without the consent of a convocation, as it would be to say that if a convocation had endorsed the Royal Marriage Act, or any other of the