other, so much so, that the whole colonial belief of some men seems to be founded solely on the idea of a similitude between the relations of a mother country and a colony, and those of a parent and child.

Hence it is argued, that the colony ought to be governed by the mothercountry until it is able to govern itself; and hence the same philosophers look upon the separation of the colonies ultimately as a matter of political necessity; so that this foolish simile, by which we seem to have governed our colonies, is not without danger. For observe the dangerous doctrine involved. The right of the people to be ruled by those laws only to which they have given their free assent is made to depend on numbers, not upon its advantage to the State. This right, on the contrary, is treated as if it were injurious to the State, and were only to be admitted when extorted by force. Whereas, can any sound reason be given why, if five Englishmen settle down in a distant part of the empire, they should be deprived of this privilege of sharing the Government any more than fifty thousand?

In the new scheme for the government of the Australian colonies, this adolescentic principle has been allowed to enter in the most mischievous manner. The even partially free institutions which the other communities are to enjoy are to be withheld from Western Australia, until the present civil list is guaranteed out of the colonial revenues. It is argued, that until the colony can support her own government she ought not to govern herself. England, it is said, pays so much towards the government of the colony, and has, therefore, a right to govern it. The mother-country ought to get something for her money, so she takes out the change in despotism. That was exactly the argument used in respect to the Cape. We paid 1,500,000l. for you; give us so much of your moral respectability in return by receiving our vagabonds.' Now there cannot be a better instance than this provision of the Bill, of the manner in which, in our government of the colonies, we trample under foot all our most cherished notions of constitutional right.

The main object of free institutions is to maintain a check upon the public expenditure; to see that the public money is not paid away in sinecure offices, or to incompetent officials. This is the principle upon which we manage our own affairs. But when we manage the affairs of the Western Australians for them, we say, 'Such and such a government establishment is good for you. It is for your benefit that the salaries should be so and so; therefore, until you guarantee that you will secure such a sum every year for ever as will defray these expenses, we cannot permit you to manage your own affairs.'

The first great objection, therefore, which we bring against the Government scheme is, that it makes a money bargain of those privileges which in England we have been taught from our childhood to believe are the most sacred guarantees of liberty.

Again, a measure such as this bill professes to be, such as the country was led to expect it would be, from the speech by which it was introduced, ought to contain, in broad, general, and intelligible terms, the basis of the constitutional law by which the colonies are to be governed.

It ought, first, to state simply the nature of the constitutions which it is about to give to the colonies; secondly, to define clearly the powers which these legislatures are to possess, and the limits within which they are to act; thirdly, it ought to specify the subjects which are reserved from their control, as peculiarly concerning the honour and interest of the empire; fourthly, it ought to state explicitly how far it is competent to the legislatures thus organized to change their own constitutions.

Now, let us see how far the proposed measure satisfies these conditions.

In the first place, it is encumbered with a large number of clauses, enacting laws for the several colonies in respect to their own internal and purely local affairs. For example, there are several clauses expounding the mode in which a kind of district municipal council is to be formed, the mode in which it is to be elected, the powers it is to have, and so on. These districts were originally con

templated in the constitutional Act of New South Wales in the 5th and 6th of Victoria. They turned out to be most miserable failures, as they were likely to be, seeing that they were constructed by persons living fifteen thousand miles distant from the country, who had never been in the country, and who were very partially informed as to what was going on there. Of course they were failures. The clauses in the present bill first amend the clauses of the old bill, whether for better or for worse, who knows?- most certainly not three men in the House of Commons. The amended clauses are then extended to all the Australian colonies.

Now, when we say we are going to give free institutions to the colonies, do we mean it, or do we not? If we do, and that they are to be allowed to manage their own affairs, then why, in the name of common sense, engage in a most elaborate piece of legislation about matters wholly concerning them, and about which we know absolutely nothing? But, it is said, There are clauses which enable them to change all this. Exactly so: the bill is crowded with clauses doing what is sure to be wrong, which necessitates the introduction of a new set of clauses to enable the local legislatures to set it right again. Could it not occur to our legislators that if the colonies want district councils they would make them, and would have the advantage, at any rate, of knowing what they were making?

The first nine clauses in the Government bill specify the nature of the constitutions which it is proposed to give to the colonies. The principal feature is, that there is to be but one House of Assembly, of which two-thirds are to be elected by the people, and one-third nominated by the Crown. The advantage of one or two Houses has been frequently and fully discussed. The question is of less importance, because the legislature, however constituted, is to be allowed to change its own constitution.

But we may be permitted to express great surprise that any country in the enjoyment of a form of government which has been found admirably adapted to the wants and temper of its people, should suggest a government to its dependencies,

containing hardly a feature of the constitution of the mother-country.

The formidable objection to the introduction of Government nominees into a popular assembly, is in the fact, that a party is thereby raised up in the colony with interests and sympathies not belonging to one or another political faction in the colony, but attached to the home government as opposed to the coTony altogether. Nothing can be more alarming to the future relations of the mother-country and the dependency, than the existence of a British and a colonial party opposed to one another in the colony itself. There ought to be no British party, as such, in a colony: politics must work themselves out in the colony as they do at home. The attempt to govern a distant community by a faction, can, in the long run, only peril the relations between the two countries. How it may be wise to frame a second chamber, is a matter of minor importance. The necessity of having one chamber, expressing the wholly unbiassed will of the people, is imperative. There can be no other guarantee for the affections of the people.

But a much more important consideration is, that the constitutional law of a colony ought to contain a nice discrimination between the imperial and the municipal functions. In the Government measure there is no trace of such a distinction. How could it be expected in a measure which itself sets the example of a gross intrusion on the province of the local legislatures? Yet history has warned in vain, if such a measure goes out to the colonies unaccompanied by those definitions and limitations of mutual authority, which can alone offer any guarantee for permanent, good, mutual understanding.

This measure must be regarded as final. The colonies are now loyal. They would enter gladly into mutual terms; and having voluntarily pledged themselves, would honourably abide by the arrangement. It may not be so a few years hence. They are growing in power and wealth with amazing rapidity. If they begin to exercise what may be termed the imperial functions, they will with difficulty be induced to resign them. But the greater dan

ger is, not that they will intrude upon the imperial province, but that we shall continue our mischievous and irritating intermeddling with their affairs.

The Government measure contains no guarantee that this great grievance to the colonies shall not be continued in all its present calamitous rigour.

The power of the Colonial Office -that fatal power, which cost us America, which has superseded the constitutional rights of British colonists all over the world,-that is to be maintained in its full integrity.

The governor of the colony, as before, is not to govern as the representative of the majesty of England, using a dignified discretion, and being responsible to his sovereign for a misuse of the high and sacred trust imposed in him, but he is still to be the miserable delegate to the colony from Downing Street; he is still to govern by the instructions' he shall receive; still to assent in the Queen's name to bills by the colonial legislature, which may, after all, be vetoed in England, setting aside his authority; still he is to reserve some bills for the Queen's, that is, the colonial minister's, assent; still he is to be the tool of English political faction.

The colonies will very soon find out that a bill which leaves the governor and the Colonial Office on their present footing in respect to the colony, is a sham from beginning to end. It does not give them that which their forefathers in America had-municipal freedom.

But the Government scheme also proposes to get up a federation of all the Australian colonies under one central government. The defect of the bill in other parts is more egregiously visible here; for no discrimination of any kind is attempted between the powers of the federal government and of the imperial authority; whilst as between the federal government and the governments of the separate colonies, it is expressly stated that they may both legislate on the same subjects; but that the legislation of the federal government is to supersede that of the individual legislatures, and that the Queen in council is to decide disputes. It would be hard to devise

a scheme more certain to produce perpetual conflict.

The federation, however, is to be a voluntary act; and as the colonies are to be represented according to population in the House of Delegates, which will secure to New South Wales a preponderating majority of the house, and as the powers of the individual legislatures are to be curtailed by their union with the federation, one does not perceive what they can gain, whilst they certainly lose a good deal. The federation clauses are, therefore, little more than an innocent amusement at constitution-making.

But whilst, on other grounds, the several states will have a direct interest in not accepting of the proposed federal government, a bribe has been offered which it is imagined will prove sufficiently tempting to overcome these objections. The regulation and disposal of the waste lands and the disposal of the funds arising from their sale or leasing, are to be placed within the power of the federal government as soon as it is formed.

But

Now we should be very curious to hear the reasons why the waste lands are to be given up to the federal government, and not to the government of each individual state. There can, one would imagine, be but one reason, viz. to secure a uniform price in all the Australian colonies. why should the price of the waste land in all the colonies be the same? There is no argument at all for charging any price for lands, except Wakefield's argument. But Mr. Wakefield admits that the 'sufficient,' price is a price which cannot be accurately foretold. It depends on the circumstances of the colony. It can be found out only by experience. Hence it may be different in all the colonies.

But by the proposal to place the waste lands under the control of the federal government, it is acknowledged that the present management will not do, that the present system requires some change. This, we say, is distinctly acknowledged by the proposal to alter the authority entrusted with the disposal of waste lands.

But after making this acknowledgment, what do the Government

do? They place the management of the lands in a body whose very existence is no more than a remote contingency, and will probably never become a reality at all. This mode of treating the waste lands' question is a mere pretence. The result will be, as the object seems to be, that they shall remain as at present under the control of the home Government.

Again, supposing that New South Wales and any other colony-say Victoria-entered into a federal alliance under this bill, New South Wales would have a very large majority in the House of Delegates. Now, what is to prevent the house, so constituted, from disposing of the waste lands in Victoria, and appropriating the proceeds to the benefit of Sydney? There is nothing in the world to prevent this taking place.

So that the waste-land question is arranged either so as to secure continual hostility and jealousy between the separate states, or as to remain in its present disgraceful condition.

Will the Government give any reason of any kind why its own waste lands should not be placed under the control of each individual state?

In the present sad indifference to colonial politics it were difficult to recognize the important era through which we are passing. And yet it can be no light matter to issue to future nations the magna charta of their liberties - the basis of their constitutional law. It is vain to suppose that their future career will not be influenced by the circumstances of their first projection into their orbits; or to forget that the responsibility of the original impetus is with ourselves.

But however the destinies of the colonies may be concerned, depend upon it our own are at least as deeply staked. The time is fast arriving when it will be out of our power to inflict any permanent evils on the colonies. The ills they would suffer by a separation from the mother country would be slight and transient; for America has taught them how soon the energies which can emancipate a province will create an empire. We cannot injure our colonies, because they contain within themselves the elements of their own great prosperity; elements which are beyond our control. The noble

blood of a dominant race, to which God has given dominion over land and sea, the blood which fills our own veins, flows with replenished vigour in theirs; whilst an iron destiny compels us, even out of the materials of our distress and decrepitude, to administer to their rising prosperity. The vast population around us, swarming, and thickening, and clambering upon one another, in the rush after wealth, or the struggle for existence, until a multitude is trodden underfoot - the crowds who are doomed to vice and misery, or are driven out into that most desolate of solitudes, the thronging streets of our cities; this, our weakness, is their strength this cause of our despair is their brightest promise.

And as the visions of the future crowd upon the brain-as we watch the colossal forms of young and lusty nations which are rising like genii out of the Southern Ocean—as we attempt to grasp the dim outline which portends the immensity of their future power - how strange appears the ignorance or infatuation which is indifferent to the magnitude of the act which is to fix our relations to them for ever.

Our really honest Colonial Reformers are few; but they are ardent and energetic. Let them look to it-they have a heavy session before them. Some colonial government bill must be passed this session, or the colonies are lost. The Government proposal is confused, blundering, unintelligible, deficient in many details, wrong in many principles. The bill which goes out to the colonies ought to be--and will be if the Colonial Reformers stick to their work- simple, distinct, and, above all, complete. It must not legislate for the colonies. It must establish local legislatures, and enumerate definitively the constitutional limits within which they may act; and it must finally and for ever annihilate the power of the Colonial Office.

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The Ministry are feeble and vacillating the Parliament ignorant and indifferent. If the Colonial Reformers are firm and wise as they are patriotic they may yet save the empire.