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What if God created all human and all rational beings, eadem lege et modo; all equally incapable, the wicked as well as the virtuous, " of falling back into

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nothing?" Is there any thing unjust in this? any thing, but what is highly congruous, uniform, and proper? Must different men, the good and the bad, have souls of a different nature? the souls of the good, under God, naturally immortal; while those of the incurably wicked should have a natural tendency to "slide back again into nothing?" This is absurd, contradictory, and impossible: the souls of men must be all of the same nature and order. And Dr. Burnet himself has excellently proved, in his second chapter, that they are naturally immortal. This therefore is the constitution which God has actually established; and is therefore again, we may be sure, the best. Still, however, it is in the power of God to annihilate them; though they have no tendency in their own nature" to fall back into nothing.” But is God Almighty obliged to do this? Yes, says Dr. Burnet, the honour of Providence cannot be maintained without it. That is, the honour of Providence cannot be maintained, unless, by arbitrary interpositions of mere power, it acts contrary to the original constitution and nature of things; unless it reverses its own laws, and, in favour of its greatest enemies, reduces into nothing beings created naturally immortal, capable of eternal happiness, and who once stood a fair and equal chance for it, but voluntarily rendered themselves incurably wicked and miserable. To say, fas is said, that these beings

f Both by Dr. Burnet, p. 290. and Mr. Whiston, p. 19. Though this last gentleman once talked as if they would be "a most useful "spectacle" (their place of torment being the atmosphere of a co

can be " of no use," is saying a great deal more than any man knows. However, this is certain, they can be of little use after they are annihilated; and the example, perhaps, if known, might be of ill consequence to other creatures, (if any such there should be,) in some future states of probation; besides that it is contrary to the nature of things. I doubt not but we should find, if we could comprehend the whole scheme and conduct of Providence, that it always acts uniformly, agreeably to the nature of things, and its own original constitution and appointment in the creation. Beings created naturally immortal, that is, to exist for ever, with the ordinary influence and concurrence of God, will never be destroyed preternaturally by the power of God. They must abide by the consequences of the nature which God at first implanted in them. But being thus "exposed to the terrible risk of eternal damna"tion, they will have reason," it seems, " to upbraid "their Creator for giving them existence." Why so? He not only gave them existence, but all the necessary means of rendering that existence happy, through the whole extent of its endless duration. Was this an ill gift? It proved so, you will say, in the event: but was that the Creator's fault? Must he create them necessarily happy, without liberty or virtue; without any probation? We see he has not done this; the constitution which he has established

met, revolving in the sight of all the inhabitants of our air, and of the rest of the system,) to the rest of God's rational creatures; and would admonish them above all things to preserve their innocence and obedience; and to fear him who is thus able to destroy both soul and body in hell. Astronomical Principles of Religion, p. 156.

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in fact, is of a contrary kind; and there is no arguing against it, but upon the principles of atheism. We are all of us yet in this probationary state; and consequently "exposed to the terrible risk of eternal "damnation;" that is, we may incur this doom, if we will. But is there any room for complaint upon this head? Any reason to upbraid the Creator? Can we, consistently with any principles of religion, upbraid him for giving us existence upon these terms? Suppose now this state of probation over: we are disposed of in another, of exact distributive justice; where our natural condition will be as good, as our moral temper and habits deserve; or, all things considered, perhaps, will admit of: that is, they will be exactly adapted and suited to each other. Where then will be the reason to upbraid the Creator? If we are miserable, still all is right: and there will be no more reason to upbraid God in that state of retribution, than there was before, in the state of probation. It would be a miserable universe, if this righteous disposition of things did not finally prevail. I will close this article in the words of a fine reasoner, which will have more weight than any of my own.

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"To produce a being into a state of clear happiness, in any degree, can be no injury to it; or into a state of mixed happiness, provided the happiness "certainly overbalances the contrary, and the unhappy or suffering part be not greater than what "that being would choose in order to obtain the happiness, or rather than lose it. Nor, again, can

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any wrong be done by producing a being subject to "more misery than happiness, if that being hath it " in his own power to avoid the misery, or so much

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"of it, as may leave the remainder of misery not

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greater, than what he would rather sustain than "miss the proportion of happiness. The only case "then, by which wrong can be done in the produc"tion of any being, is, when it is necessarily and irremediably to be miserable, without any recompense, or balance of that misery: and this indeed "is a case so grievous, so utterly irreconcilable to "all reason, that the heart of a reasoning and considering man can scarce bear the thought of it. So "much every one must understand of the nature of "reason and justice, as to allow these things for "truths incontestable." Religion of Nature delineated, p. 200. fifth edit.

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I pass on to a second observation, intimated more than once already, viz. That the degrees of this future punishment will be infinitely various, and exactly in proportion to the guilt and demerit of those who suffer them 1. It is plainly declared in scrip

8 Hence may appear the difference between the doctrine of the eternity of future punishments, and the doctrine of absolute reprobation two very different things, though Mr. Whiston, p. 2. and Dr. Burnet, p. 308. are pleased to rank them together.

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"There is such a difference acknowledged in the state of the "blessed, where all are happy according to their several capacities; and so it is in hell, where all are miserable, if compared "with the condition of the blessed, but in different degrees and "as in this life some are so unfortunate that it were better for "them not to be at all, than to continue always in the state in "which they are; so in hell there may be some whose condition "is preferable to not being; though for Judas and such sinners "it had been better they had never been." Archbishop King, Sermon on the Fall of Man, at the end of the second volume of the Origin of Evil.

It is better, perhaps, not to determine any thing about the point here mentioned by the archbishop. All that are condemned

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ture, that it will be more tolerable for some than for others, in the day of judgment; and that some will receive a greater damnation. And indeed this doctrine of the degrees and different measures of punishment is implied in the very notion of a just and righteous judgment. I need not therefore undertake formally to prove this point. "It is certain," says Mr. Whiston, " and agreed to by all, that some "sinners deserve much greater punishment than "others; and that God will render to every one according to his works: that some will be beaten "with many, and others with few stripes, in the "future world." P. 108. This principle, thus "agreed "to by all," our adversaries endeavour to make their advantage of; (though they seem to forget it upon some other occasions; when, in their rhetorical declamations upon this subject, they seem to represent all the sufferers alike, in the same exquisite and extreme degree of torment.) "It most naturally implies," Mr. W. tells us, "that the punishment of "some of the wicked shall be much longer than of "others." But why longer? Cannot some be beaten

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to hell, suffer, of course, the loss of heaven, and all that is included in the pœna damni. If they deserve to suffer no more, they will suffer no more. And every degree of positive punishment superadded will be no more than what is just and necessary. So that no one's existence will be worse than nonexistence, wrongfully, or without reason.

i To what Mr. W. alleges out of Justin Martyr, I answer, that it is evident from his own testimonies out of that father, p. 76, 77. that he asserted the eternity of future punishment; which testimonies, however, he has castrated by his arbitrary interpretation. As to what Justin says in the place here referred to, it must be observed, that he is arguing against that independent immortality of the soul, asserted by the Platonists, which implies a be

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