well have his name given him from flies ",' because he taketh most pleasure in the ulcers and wounds of men, as flies ever

resort unto sores.

Another corrupt effect of hatred is a sinister and crooked suspicion, whereby with an envious and critical eye we search into the actions and purposes of another; and according as is the sharpness of our own wits, or the course of our own behaviour and practices, we attribute unto them such ends, as were haply never framed but in the forge of our own brains;-evil men being herein like vultures, which can receive none but a foul scent. It is numbered amongst one of the noble attributes of love, that it thinketh none evil;' and certainly there is not a fouler quality against brotherly love, than that which (for the satisfying of itself with but the imaginary evil of him whom it disliketh) will venture to find out in every action some close impiety, and pierce into the reserved and hidden passages of the heart: like him in the philosopher, who thought, wherever he went, that he saw his own picture walk before him. And therefore we see, how Agrippina, when she would not discover any show of fear or hatred towards her son Nero,-who at first plotted her death on the sea, and that failing, sent the second time Anicetus the centurion to make sure work,-did, in both these practices, decline all show of suspicion, and not acknowledge either the engine or the murder to be directed by him; "solum insidiarum remedium aspiciens, si non intelligerentur," supposing the only remedies of these plots to be, if she seemed not to understand them: for ill meanings do not love to be found out. As the same historian telleth of Tiberius," Acrius accepit recludi quæ premeret:" he hated that man, who would venture to dive into his thoughts. And certainly there is not any crooked suspicion, which is not rooted in hatred. For as to think the worst of our own actions, is a sign of hatred to our sins, (for, I think, no man loves his sins who dares search them), so, contrariwise, to have a humour of casting the worst glosses upon the actions of another man, where there is no palpable dissimu

d Beelzebub. Matth. xii. 14. Báaλ uvîav vertunt LXX, 2 Kings i. 3.—'Añóμvios apud Pausan. lib. 5. et Clem. Alex. in Protrept Myiodem vocat Plin. 1. 29. cap. 6. • Tacit. Annal. lib, 14,

lation, argues as great a want of love. We search for evil in ourselves to expel it, but we search for evil in another to find it. There is scarce a more hateful quality in the eyes of God or man, than that of the Herodians, to lie in wait to catch an innocent man, and then to accuse him.

Another effect which proceedeth from corrupt hatred, is proud and insolent carriage; whereby we contemn the quality, or undervalue and vilify the merit, of a person. For though the apostle hath, in this respect of pride and swelling, opposed knowledge unto love," Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth." Yet the opposition holdeth not there only; for there is 'tumor cordis,' as well as tumor cerebri ;' as well a stubborn as a learned pride; a pride against the person, as against the weakness of our brother; a pride whereby we will not stoop to a yielding and reconciliation with him, as whereby we will not stoop to the capacity and edification of him: that is the swelling of malice, and this of knowledge. And hence it is, that hatred (as Aristotle hath excellently observed), when it is simple and alone (though that seldom fall out), is without the admixtion of any grief. And the reason, I take it, is, because grief is either for the evil of another, and so it is ever the effect of love; or for the evil which lieth upon ourselves, and so is the cause of humility neither of which is agreeable with hatred, whose property ever it is to conceive in itself some worth and excellency, by which it is drawn to a contempt and insolence towards another man. And therefore as it was pride in men and angels, which wrought the first hatred between God and them, so the most proper and inseparable effect of this hatred ever since is pride.

The last corruption of this passion is impatience, contention, and fury, as the Wise man telleth us," Hatred stirreth up strife." And therefore that worthy effect of love, which is contrary to this of hatred, is called paxpofuuía, and longanimitas,' long-suffering; to signify some length, distance, and remotion between a man's mind and his passion. But hatred, being of a fierce nature, is so far from admitting any peace, or yielding to conditions of parley, that (as hath been ob

f Rhet. 1. 2. c. 4.

Prov. x. 12.

VOL. VI.

I

served out of Aristotle) it rests not satisfied with the misery, but desires (if it be possible) the utter overthrow of an

enemy.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the affection of Desire: What it is. The several kinds of it, natural, rational, spiritual. Intemperate, unnatural, morbid desires. The object of them good, pleasant, as possible, as absent either in whole, or in degrees of perfection or continuance. The most general internal cause, vacuity, indigence. Other causes, admiration, greatness of mind, curiosity.

THE next passions in order of nature to these two, are Desire and Abomination; which, because they differ not much otherwise from love and hatred, than the act from the habit, or than a man sitting from himself walking,-desire being but the motion and exercise, as delight is the quiet and repose, of our love,-I shall therefore the more briefly pass it over. Desire is the wing of the soul, whereby it moveth, and is carried to the thing which it loveth, as the eagle to the carcase,' in the scripture-proverb, to feed itself upon it, and to be satisfied with it. For as the appetite of the eagle is attended with sharpness of sight to discover its prey, with swiftness of wing to hasten unto it, and with strength to seize upon it;-so, according to the proportion of the soul's love unto its object, doth it command and call together both the wisdom and powers of the whole man to direct unto, and to promote, the procuring of it. And the very best characters, and truest lineaments which can be drawn of the minds of men, are to be taken from their desires, rather than from their practices: as physicians often judge of the diseases of sick men by their appetites. Ill men dare not do so much evil as they desire, for fear of shame or punishment; good men cannot do so much good as they desire, for want of power and provisions of virtue. Besides, practices may be overruled by ends; but desires are always genuine and natural for no man can be constrained to will that which he

a Job xxxix. 30. Matth. xxiv. 28. Hab. xviii.

b Plut. Nat. Quæst. c. 26.

doth not love. And therefore, in the scripture, good men have had most confidence in approving themselves unto God by their affections, and the inward longings of their souls after him, as being the purest and most unfeigned issues of love, and such as have least proximity and danger of infection from foreign and secular ends. St. Paul himself was much better at willing, than at performing; and St. Peter, who failed in his promise of doing, dares appeal to Christ's own omniscience for the truth of his loving. Whatever other defects may attend our actions, this is an inseparable character of a pious soul, that it desires to fear God's name;' and according to the prevalency of that affection hath its conversation in heaven too.f In which regard Christ is called the desire of all nations,' both because where he is, he draweth all the hearts and desires of his people unto him, and also doth, by his grace, most fully answer and satisfy all the desires that are presented before him: as it is said of one of the Roman emperors, Neminem unquam dimisit tristem,' he never sends any discontented out of his presence.

The desires of the soul are of three sorts, according to the three degrees of perfection, which belong unto man, natural, rational, spiritual.

Natural desires respect rà avayxaia, things of simple necessity to the being, preservation, and integrity of nature, as the desires, which things have to their proper nourishment and place, ad conservationem individui,' for preserving themselves; and to propagation and increase, ad conservationem speciei,' for preserving of their kind.

Rational desires are such as respect αἱρετὰ καθ ̓ αὐτὰ, such things as are eligible in themselves, and the proper objects of right reason; such as felicity, the common end of all rational appetitions; virtue, the way, and eternal good things; as health, strength, credit, dignity, prosperity, the ornaments of human life.

Spiritual desires respect τὰ ἐπουράνια, τὰ πνευματικὰ, τὰ ἄνω Tà TOU OO, heavenly and spiritual things, the things of God, things which are above. The knowledge whereof we have

not by philosophical, but by apostolical discovery, by the Spirit of God, who only searcheth the deep things of God." k

The corrupt desires, contrary unto these, are either vicious or morbid. Vicious are again of two sorts: first, intemperate and incontinent desires, which err not in the substance, or nature of the thing desired; but only v T was, as the philosopher speaks, in the measure and manner of desiring them. It is lawful to drink wine, and a man may err (as Timothy did) in an over-rigorous severity to nature, when health or needful refreshment requireth it: for our flesh is to be subdued to reason, not to infirmities, that it may be a servant to the soul, but not a burden. But if we let wine be Xsubépios, as the heathen call it, to take a freedom against us, like Cham, to mock us, and discover our nakedness, and make us servants unto it; if we do not only eat honey, but surfeit on it; if we must have meat, like Israel in the wilderness, not only for our need, but for our lust; if we eat and drink so long, that we are good for nothing but to lie down and sleep, or to rise up and play, to live to-day, and die to-morrow; if we make our belly the grave of our soul, and the dungeon of our reason, and let our intestina, as well morally as naturally, far exceed the length of the whole man besides this is, in the apostle's phrase, to be "lovers of pleasure, rather than lovers of God;" and it is an intemperate excess against natural desires, which will ever end in pain. It was a witty speech of Anacharsis the philosopher, that the vine beareth three sorts of grapes; the first, of delight; the second, of excess; the third, of sorrow. If we let our delight steal us into excess, and become a mocker, our excess will quickly betray us unto sorrow, (as Dalilah did Samson to the Philistines) and let us know, that after wine hath mocked, it can rage too. Like the head of the polypus, which is sweet to the palate; but, after, causeth troublesome sleeps and frightful dreams. ¶

k Heb. ix. 23. 1 Cor. iii. 13. Col. iii. 1. 1 Prov. xxxi. 6. 1 Tim. v. 13. Psalm civ. 15. m Vid. Socr. 1. 4. c. 18.-Euseb. 1. 4. c. 38. 1. 5. c. 17. Iren. 1. 1. c. 34.-Tert. advers. Psychich. 15.-Epiph. To. 2. 1. 1. Vid. Gul. Stuck. Antiq. Conviv. 1. 3. c. 7, 8.-Clem. Al. Pæd. 1. 2. c. 12. Hier. 2. adv. Jovin. "Megarenses obsonant, quasi crastina die morituri. Tert. Apol. c. 39.

• Diog.

Laert. 1. 1.

P Prov. xx. 1.

9 Plut. de Auditione.