person, or disappointment of his purposes, or slandering his good name, or any other way of casting injury on him; for any of these particulars being impaired, (if by such on whom we may hope to receive revenge) do work not only anxiety and grief, (which is a motion of flight) but hope also and desire to ease itself, if not in the recovery of its own loss, yet in the comfort of another man's: for calamity (as the historian speaks) is ever either querulous or malignant; “Cum suo malo torquetur, quiescit alieno :" when it feels itself wrung and pinched, it quickly proceeds, either by justice or revenge, to please itself in retaliation.

For the former of these, as it is the common property of man, with all other creatures, to love himself; so it is his particular desire also, being Animal sociale et politicum,' to be loved by others; because hereby that love of himself, which proceedeth from judgement and reason, is confirmed: for every man doth more willingly believe that, whereunto he hath farther authority to persuade him. And therefore though love be not sinisterly suspicious, nor too envious in interpreting a man's own, or a friend's actions and behaviour; yet that love, which is not blind and furious, will be ever ready to submit itself unto that opinion of stayed and indifferent judgements, because it is conscious to itself, how easily it may miscarry, if it rely upon its own censure, wherein reason, affection, and prejudice are mixed together.

Now then, when a man already strongly possessed with a love of his own or his friend's person or parts, shall find either of them by other slighted and despised, from whose joint respect he hoped for a confirmation of his judgement; therehence ariseth not only a grief to see his expectation deceived, and his opinion undervalued; but withal a desire to make known unto the persons, who thus contemn him, by some manner of face, or tongue, or hand, or heart, or headrevenge, (for all these may be the instruments of our anger)

* Q. Curt.—Καὶ μὴ δοκῶμεν, δρώντες ἂν ἡδώμεθα, Οὐκ ἀντιτίσειν αὖθις ἂν λυπώ μεθα. Sophoc. Ajax. 1105. Εἰ δὲ κακὸν εἴποις, τόχα κ ̓ αὐτὸς μεῖζον ἀκούσαις. Hesiod. Epy. 1. ii. 339. Si mihi pergit quæ vult dicere, ea quæ non vult, audiet. Terent. Andr. y Ignescunt iræ : duris dolor ossibus ardet: Eneid. 9.=Affectus nunquam sine tormento sui violentus, quia dolorem, cum inferre vult, patitur, &c. Val. Max. 1. 9. c. 3.-Dolor addidit iram. Ovid. Met. 12. addita suscitat iras. Æneid. 10.

z Spes

that there is in him more courage, power, and worth, than deserves so to be neglected. Which passion, in a word, so long as it submits itself to the government of reason, is then always allowable and right, when it is grounded on the pride and insolency of others, who unjustly contemn us :-and then irregular and corrupt, when it proceeds from the root of pride and ambition in ourselves, which makes us greedy of more honour from others, than their judgements, or our own worth, suffers them to afford us.

To this branch of contempt may be referred forgetfulness of friends and acquaintance, whereby we upbraid them with obscurity and distance, as well from true worth, as from our affection. For Omnia quæ curant, meminerunt,' saith Tully; and Aristotle to the same purpose: Those things which we do respect, do not lie hid and out of our sight.

a

Next, hither may be referred all ungrateful persons, who slight those favours, which they have received from other men's bounties; and, out of a swelling and height of stomach, cannot endure to acknowledge any obligations; but desire to receive benefits, as corrupt men take bribes in the dark, and behind their backs, that so neither others, nor (if it were possible) their own eyes might be witnesses unto it. For, as Tacitus speaks, Gratia oneri habetur;' such is the pride of some men, that they disdain to be overcome in any thing, though it be in kindness. And therefore, Ubi multum beneficia ante venere, pro gratia odium redditur,' saith the same author; when they find themselves overladen with love, the best requital which their high minds can afford, is hatred ;-which cannot but work a double anger; an anger against ourselves and our own weakness in the choice of so unfit a subject for the placing of our benefits; and an anger at that contemptuous pride, which so basely entertained them.

Hither also we may refer those locked and close men, who even to their friends are so reserved, and keep every thing so secret, as if none were worthy, to whose judgement or trust they might commit themselves.

Hitherto likewise are referred acceptation of persons in equality of merit with unequal respect, negligence of out

Ejectum littore, egentem, Excepi, et :egni demens in parte locavi : Amissam classem, socios à morte reduxi. Heu furiis incensa feror, &c. Æneid. 4.

ward ceremony and behaviour, and generally whatever else may work an opinion that we are undervalued.

The second branch of this first fundamental cause was an hindering of the projects and purposes of another; which is not only a privative, (as the former) but a positive and real injury, which includes that other, and adds unto it, as being not only a slighting, but an assault upon us; not an opinion only, but an expression of our weakness; a course so much the more likely to incense nature, and make it swell, by how much violence and opposition is more sensible in motion than in rest. So that these two former injuries, I think I may well compare to a bank and to a bridge, or some other stops to a river in his course; whereof the former doth confine the river, and not oppose it, as not hindering it in its direct and natural motion, (which it rather helpeth, by more uniting the parts) but only in a motion lateral and indirect, which Nature intended not: and therefore herein we see not any manifest fretting and noise, but only a secret swelling and rising of the water, which breaks not to outrage and violence but the latter, resisting the natural course of the stream in its own channel, and standing directly across where the water should pass, makes it not only in time to overswell on all sides, but in the mean time works in it great tumult and noise.

"Spumeus, et fervens, et ab obice sævior ibit."

It foams, and boils, and, with a raging force,
Fights with all obstacles that stop its course.

So of these two degrees of contempt in anger, the former, as being only a confining and limiting contempt, which shuts up a man's worth within too narrow and strait a judgement, works indeed a secret swelling of the heart with indignation at the conceit of such disesteem; but this breaks not out into that clamour, (as St. Paul calls it) that noise of anger, as the other doth, which ariseth out of a direct opposition against our counsels or actions.

Unto which opposition may be reduced all manner of injurious proceedings, which tend to the prejudice and disap

Quem ego credo manibus, pedibusque obnixe omnia Facturum : magis id adeo, mihi ut incommodet, Quam &c. Terent. And. Act. 1 Scen. 1.

pointing of any man's end; whether it be by closeness and undermining, as cheats and cozenages in the preventing of lawful, or by other politic wisdom in hindering unlawful ends; or whether by open and professed opposition ', as in matters of emulation, competition, commodity, and the like; or, lastly, whether it be such as takes notice, and discovers ends which desire to be undiscerned. And therefore Tacitus, reckoning the ambiguous and close speeches of the emperor Tiberius, says, that it was unicus Patrum metus, si intelligere viderentur;' the Senate feared nothing more, than to discover that they understood him; which is the same with his judgement after, eo acrius accepit recludi quæ premeret; nothing did more exasperate him, than to see those things taken notice of, which he desired to suppress and dissemble. Both which were true in Scaurus, one of the senators; who, adventuring to collect Tiberius's willingness of accepting the empire, in that he did not forbid, by his tribunitial authority, the relation thereof by the consuls, did thereby procure his utter and implacable hatred.

But, of all contempts, the last of the three is greatest; that, I mean, which immediately violates our reputation and good name, because it is a derivative and spreading injury, not only dishonouring a man in private and reserved opinion, but in the eyes and ears of the world, not only making him odious in his life, but in his memory. As there is in a man a double desire, the one of perfecting, the other of perpetuating himself; which two answer to that double honour of our creation, which we lost in our first father; the honour of integrity in goodness, and the honour of immunity from corruption; so there may be from the violation of these, sundry degrees of anger, or any other burthensome passion wrought But when in injury we find them both assaulted, and not only our parts and persons, (which belong to our perfection) privily undervalued, but our name and memory (which belong to our preservation) tainted likewise; we cannot but be so much the more incensed, by how much perpetuity accumulates, either to weakness or perfection. But of this fundamental cause of anger, enough.

in us.

© Annal. 1.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of other causes of Anger: First, in regard of him that suffers wrong; excellency, weakness, strong desires, suspicion. Next, in regard of him who doth it; baseness, impudence, nearness, freedom of speech, contention, ability. The effect of Anger, the immutation of the body, impulsion of reason, expedition, precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this passion.

THOSE which follow, are more accidental; whereof some may be considered, ex parte patientis,' on the part of him that suffers; and some, ex parte inferentis injuriam,' on the part of him that doth the injury. Touching the patient or subject of an injury, there are three qualifications, which may make him more inclinable to anger, upon supposition of the fundamental cause, contempt: and the first of these is excellency, whether inward from nature, or accidental from fortune; for hereby men are made more jealous of their credit, and impatient of abuse, as well perceiving, that all injury implies some degree, both of impotency in the patient, and of excellency (at least conceited) in the agent. As Aristotle speaks, ὑπερέχειν οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες, that injurious men are commonly highly conceited of their own excellency, which cannot well stand with the height and distance of that mind which is possessed with his own good opinion: and this cause the poet intimates in those words,

"Manet alta mente repôstum

Judicium Paridis, spretæque injuria formæ."

A deep and lasting discontent is bred,

To see their beauties undervalued

By a weak wanton judgement.

It wrought a deep indignation in the minds of Power and Wisdom, to see a weak and wanton judgement give beauty

* Αγανακτοῦσι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. Arist. Θυμὸς μέγας ἐστι Διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος. Iliad. a.

b Rhet. 1. 2. c. 2.

Eneid. 1.