odious to their natures. This being the property of all unconstrained self-motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all passions, is principally the good; and secondarily, or by consequent, the evil of things: as one beareth with itrationem convenientiæ,' a quieting and satisfactory, -the other,rationem disconvenientiæ,' a disturbing and destroying, nature.

This being premised touching the nature and general essence of passions, the division of them must be thereon grounded: because (as philosophy teacheth us) faculties and operations receive their essential distinctions from their objects and those several respects, wherewith they, in order to the faculty, are qualified. Now since all appetite (being a blind power) is dependent upon the direction of some knowledge, from the diversity of knowledge in or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime distinction of passions.

Knowledge, in respect of created agents, may be considered either as disjoined and extrinsecal to the things moved, or as intrinsecal and united thereunto; both which serve as a law and rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not swerve into disordered and confused, or into idle and vain motions; but might ever work towards that due end, which God hath appointed them to move unto.

Passions which proceed from knowledge severed and extrinsecal, are those motions of merely natural agents, which are guided to their general or particular ends, by the wisdom and power of him that made them. And this it is which causeth that peremptory and uniform order, observed by these kind of agents in their natural course, never either swerving or desisting therefrom, so far as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they work permitteth them; because they are all governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant law, proceeding from a will, with which there is no variableness nor shadow of changing. And therefore we find those aberrations and irregularities of nature, wherein it swerveth from this law only, or at least, principally, in these inferior things; wherein, partly, from the deficiency and languishing of secondary agents, and, partly, from the excesses, defects, mutability, and the like exigencies

of matter, we find sundry times error and enormity in their several works and ends. Which, whether it be to set forth the beauty of regular operations, which, by deformity and confusion, will appear more beautiful;-or whether the original thereof be divine malediction, which, for the sin of man, he pleaseth to lay upon his fellow-creatures, which were all created for his comfort and service, (which Saint Paul calleth the vanity of the creature') it proceedeth certainly from the will and power of that law-giver, (who is only able) for reasons best known to his own wisdom, to dispense sometimes with that otherwise unalterable law, which he gave all his creatures to observe. So that all the miracles which ever God hath been pleased to work, for the conversion of men unto the faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that general law.

But, as I said, those irregularities and deviations, before spoken of, are seen principally in inferior things. The faith, being the principal creature that did bear the curse of man's fall, which made (if we will believe that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the heathen philosopher, upon observation of that wonderful eclipse of the sun at the passion of our Saviour, to cry ont, "Aut Deus naturæ patitur, aut mundi machina dissolvetur;" either the God of nature suffereth, or the frame of nature dissolveth; either something hindereth that universal power, which sustaineth and animateth all the creatures; or he doth at least willingly detain that virtue and the vigour of that law, without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole frame-which particular I have the rather observed, to note, that the more raised and heavenly a nature is, the more stable and constant likewise it is, to every divine law imposed on it.

Now this natural passion which I speak of, is called by sundry names amongst philosophers, "the law, the equity, the weight, the instinct, the bond, the love, the covenant and league of natural things," in order to the conservation of themselves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the universe, service of man, and glory of the Creator: which are the alone ends of all natural agents.

By all which we are given to understand, that when, at

any time, the ordinary course of nature is intermitted, when any creature forsakes its native motion, and falleth into confusion and disorder; there is then admitted a breach of a law; or as Aristotle calls it, auapria, an error, which, Saint John telleth us, is avopía, 'an iniquity' of nature; also a certain levity, unusefulness, and emptiness of true worth, which I call, in Saint Paul's phrase, the vanity of the creature: Thirdly, looseness, decay, and dissolution; and thereupon discord and unserviceableness towards the other parts, with which it should jointly conspire for the glory of the whole.

These are the inconveniences that follow nature's; how much greater are those which follow reason's, disobedience! For all this, touching the passions of nature, I have observed. only to give light unto those of reason; there being the same proportion of government in them all; saving that, what in things destitute of all knowledge, is guided by the law-giver himself, is, in the rest, performed by a knowledge conjoined, and intrinsecal to the worker. And this is either. mental, or sensitive, or rational; from all which, arise sundry degrees of motions or passions. Mental passions are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreme part of the understanding, which Aristotle calleth Nous,-the Latins, mens,' or apex animæ ;' which are most simple actions of the mind, wherein is the least intermixion or commerce with inferior and earthly faculties. Which motions are grounded first on an extraordinary knowledge, either of vision and revelation, or of an exquisite natural apprehension; both which are beyond the compass of usual industry, here to attain unto. The former of these, I call with the schoolmen, 'extasy' and 'rapture;' such as St. Paul's was, (for so himself calleth it) "novi hominem raptum :" and such as were the passions of the mind, in the prophets and holy men of God; when they were inspired with such heavenly revelations, as did slide into the soul with that lustre and abundance of light, that they could not but be ravished with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that "joy unspeakable, and peace past understanding," which the apostle makes to be the fruit of the Spirit of God,' in those hearts, wherein he lodgeth,— whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the soul, the mind, is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of

that future glory, which in heaven doth fill the spirits of men with ineffable light. And for the latter branch, Aristotle hath placed his greatest felicity in the contemplation of the highest and divinest truths; which he makes to be the object of that supreme part of the soul. And it was the speech of the philosopher Heraclitus to the same purpose, "Anima sicca est sapientissima;" (which toucheth something upon that of Aristotle, that "melancholy complexions are usually the wisest," for that temper is the driest of all the rest) that a mind, not steeped in the humours of carnal and gross affections, not drenched in the waves of a disquiet fancy; but, more raised and soaring to its original by divine contemplations, is always endued with the greater wisdom.

Another knowledge from whence the passions of this faculty are raised in man, is that light of natural principles,' which the schools callsynteresis;' unto which the custody of all practical truths being committed, they therehence work in the conscience motions of joy, love, peace, fear, horror, despair, and the like spiritual passions; according as the soul, out of those general principles, shall gather unto its own particular, any either delightful, or disquieting conclusions.

Sensitive passions are those motions of prosecutions or flight, which are grounded on the fancy, memory, and apprehensions of the common sense, which we see in brute beasts; as in the fear of hares or sheep, the fierceness of wolves, the anger or flattery of dogs, and the like. So Homer describeth the joy of Ulysses' dog, which, after his so long absence, remembered him at his return:

Οὐρῇ μὲν ῥ ̓ ἵν ̓ ἔσγνε, καὶ οὔατα κάββαλεν ἄμφω.

For wanton joy to see his master near,

He wav'd his flattering tail, and toss'd his ear.b

Now these motions in brute creatures, if we will believe Seneca, are not affections, but certain characters and impressions ad similitudinem passionum,' like unto passions in men; which he calleth impetus,' the risings, forces, and

a Arist. de Hist. Animal. 1. 1. c. 1. 1. 9. per totum. De Ira, lib. 1. c. 3.

bOdyss. P'. 302.

impulsions of nature, upon the view of such objects, as are apt to strike any impressions upon it.

I come therefore to those middle passions, which I called 'rational, not formally, as if they were in themselves acts of reason, or barely immaterial motions of the soul; but by way of participation and dependance, by reason of their im mediate subordination in man unto the government of the will and understanding, and not barely of the fancy, as in other creatures. And for calling passion thus governed, reasonable,' I have the warrant of Aristotle; who, though the sensitive appetite in man be of itself unreasonable, (and therefore by him contra-divided to the rational powers of the soul) yet, by reason of that obedience which it oweth to the dictates of the understanding, whereunto nature hath or dained it to be subject and conformable, (though corruption have much slackened and unknit that bond) he justly affirmeth it to be, in some sort, a reasonable faculty; not intrinsecally in itself, but by way of participation and influence from reason.

Now passion, thus considered, is divided according to the several references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the good,-and secondarily, the evil, of things; and either considered after a sundry manner; for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficulty and danger accompanying them. And both these are again to be determined, with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject: for all objects offend or delight the faculty, by virtue of their union thereunto: and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so do they occasion passions of a different nature in the mind. The object, then, may be considered simply in its own nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including only the natural conveniency or disconveniency which it beareth to the faculty. And so the passions are, in respect of good, love; in respect of evil, hatred which are the two radical, fundamental, and most transcendent passions of all the rest and therefore well called 'pondera' and impetus animi,' the weight and force, and (as I may so speak) the first springings and outgoings of the soul.-Secondly, the object may be considered as