judgements; which yet they cannot but acknowledge that they most worthily do endure: for it is the nature of proud and stubborn creatures, (as was before observed) odisse quos læserint,' first to wrong God, and then to hate him. Another particular cause of this passion may be a disparity of affections and desires: for notwithstanding there be, many times, hatred, where there is similitude; (as those beasts and birds commonly hate one another, which feed upon the same common meat, as the philosopher observethTM) and sundry men hate their own vices in others, as if they had not the trade of sin enough to themselves, except they had gotten a monopoly, and might engross it; yet this ever proceeds from an apprehension of some ensuing inconveniences, which are likely to follow therefrom; as hath been formerly noted. So that, in that very similitude of natures, there is a disagreement of ends, each one respecting his own private benefit. Now the corruptions herein are to be attended according to the nature of that disparity, whereon the passion is grounded; which sometimes is moral; wherein it is laudable to hate the vicious courses, in which any mandiffers from us, or we ourselves from the right rule of life; so that the passion redound not from the quality to the person, nor break out into an endeavour of his disgrace and ruin; except it be in such a case, when our own dignity or safety, which we are bound more to regard, being assaulted, is in danger to be betrayed, unless prevented by such a speedy remedy. Sometimes, this disparity may be in actions civil, and with respect to society: and then as the opposition which hatred discovereth, may be principally seen in two things, opposition of a man's hopes, and of his parts and abilities, by crossing the one, and undervaluing the other; so corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable grounds, ambition and self-love, the one pursuing its hopes, the other reflecting upon its worth. And to this particular may be reduced that hatred, which ariseth out of a parity of desire; as amongst competitors for the same dignity, or corrivals for the same love, or professors of the same art, either by reason of covetousness, or envy, or ambition, a Hist. Animal. greedy desire of their own, or a discontented sight of another's good. "Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Cæsarve priorem, Thus two great rulers do each other hate, Cæsar no better brooks ", Pompey no mate. And these are very unfit affections for society, when private love of men to themselves shall devour the love which they owe unto their country. More noble was the behaviour of Themistocles and Aristides, who when they were ever employed in the public service of State, left all their private enmities in the borders of their own country, and did not resume them till they returned, and became private men again. The last cause which I shall observe of hatred, may be a settled and permanent intuition of the object, a penetrating, jealous, and interpreting fancy: because, by this means, a redoubled search and review doth generate a kind of habitual detestation; it being the nature of evil commonly to show worse at the second or third view. And that, first, because the former act doth work a prejudice, and thereby the after-apprehension comes not naked, but with a forestalled resolution of finding evil therein and next, because from a serious and fastened search into the object, the faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it, and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it, the former knowledge being a master and light unto the latter. But light and wandering fancies, (though they may be more sudden in the apprehension of evil, and by consequence liable to an oftener anger, yet by reason of the volubility of the mind joined with an infirmity and unexercise of memory, they) are for this cause the less subject to deep and rooted hatred. Unto this head may be referred that hatred which ariseth from excessive melancholy, which maketh men sullen, morose, solitary, averse from all society, and haters of the light; delighting only like the shriek-owl P, or the bittern, in desolate places, and monuments of the dead." This is that which is called Auxav@panía", when men fancy themselves trans Mallem hic primus esse quàm dam, dum Alpes transiret. Plut. ii. 14. Isai. xxxiv. 11, 14, 15. Romæ secundus :' Cæsar de oppidulo quo- r Herodo t. de formed into wolves and dogs, and accordingly hate all human society. Which seemeth to have been the distemper of Nebuchadnezzar', when he was thrust out from men, and did eat grass with the beasts. Timon the Athenian was, upon this ground, branded with the name of právρwños, the man-hater', because he kept company with no man, but only with Alcibiades; whereof he gave this only account, Because he thought that man was born to do a great deal of mischief. And we read, even in the histories of the church ", of men so marvellously averse from all converse or correspondence with men, that they have, for their whole lives long, some of sixty, others of ninety years, immured themselves in cells and silence, not affording to look on the faces of their nearest kindred, when they travelled far to visit them. So far can the opinion of the mind, actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body, transport men even out of human disposition, which, the philosopher telleth us, is naturally a lover of society; and therefore he saith, that such men usually given to contention, the sign and the fruit of hatred.' are CHAP. XIV. Of the quality and quantity of Hatred, and how, in either respects, it is to be regulated. I PROCEED NOW unto the consideration of this passion in the quantity and quality of its acts; which must be observed according to the evil of the object: for if that be unchangeable, there is required a continual permanency of the passion in regard of the disposition of the mind or if it be importunate and assaulting, there is required a more frequent repetition of the act. The same likewise is to be said of the quality of it: for if the evil be of an intense and more Neuris in Melpom.-Plin. 1. 8. c. 22. Virgil. Eclog.-Pompon. Mela, de situ orbis 1. 2.-Wierus de Præstig, dæmon. 1. 3. c. 21.-Aug. de Civ. Dei, 1. 18. c. 17.— Olaus Mag. de Reg. Septentr. 1. 18. c. 45, 46, 47.-Lucian in Asino. v. 21. • Dan. t Cic. de Amicit. et l. 4. Tusc. quæst.-Suidas in Timon.-Plut. in Alcibiade et Antonio.-Laert, in Timone.-Turneb. Advers. 1. 24. c. 33. "Socr. 1. 4. c. 18. Theod. 1. 4. c. 26. Sozom. 1. 5. c. 29. x Arist. Polit I. 1. c. 2. invincible nature, our hatred must arm us the more; if more low and remiss, the passion may be the more negligent. Here then is a fourfold direction of the quantities and qualities of our hatred, and it will hold proportion in the other passions. First, the unalterableness of the evil, warrants the continuance of our hatred. Secondly, the importunity and insinuation of it, warrants the reiteration of our hatred. Thirdly, and fourthly, the greatness, and the remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred. We may instance for the three former in sin, so much the worst of evils, by how much it is a remotion from the best of goods. First then, sin is, in its own formal and abstracted nature, unchangeable, though not in respect of the subject in whom it dwelleth for a creature now bad, may, by the mercy of God, be repaired and restored again: but this is not by a changing, but by a forsaking of evil; by a removing of it, not by a new moulding it into another frame. Sin then remaineth in its own nature unchangeable and always evil: and the reason is, because it is a transgression of a perpetual law, and a remotion from an unalterable will; sin then is to be hated with a continual and peremptory hatred. But in other things there is, according to the nature of their evils, required a conditional and more flexible dislike; they being evils that have, either some good annexed unto them, or such as are of a mutable nature. And therefore we see, that, in most things, the variety of circumstances doth alter the good or evil of them, and so makes the passions, thereabout conversant, alterable likewise. Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages, which they might receive by a seasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly, for inconveniences now removed, did dislike. And, in morality likewise, much damage might be inferred, both to private persons and to the public, by nourishing such private enmities, and being peremptory in continuing those former differences; which, though happily then entertained upon reasonable grounds, may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmful, by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a grown and strong, than of a vanishing and lighter passion. Secondly; Again, as no evil is altogether so unchange able as sin, so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a multiplicity and reiteration of our hatred in regard of its importunity and insinuation: that as there is an impudence in the assault, so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it. Some evils there may be, which require only a present, and not a customary exercise of this passion: present, I say, when the object is offensive, and not customary; because as the object, so the passion likewise may be unusual. Sin only is of all other evils the most urging and active, furnished with an infinite number of stratagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures, though best armed against such assaults: and therefore here only are necessary such reiterated acts, as may keep us ever on our guard, that we be not unprepared for a surprise. Thirdly, Then for the quantity of an evil, because that is not in any thing so intense as in sin, whether we consider it in its own nature, as a rebellion against the highest good; or in its effects, either in regard of the diffusion of it, it being an overspreading pollution; or of the vastness of it, both in guilt and punishment. In these respects our hatred of it cannot be too deep or rooted: whereas other evils are not so intense in their nature, nor so diffusive in their extension, nor so destructive in their consequents: and therefore do not require an unlimited passion,-but one, governed according to the exigence of circumstances. And here I shall take notice of one or two particulars, touching the manner of corruption in this particular. As first, when a man shall apply his hatred of prosecution, or ill-willing against that evil, which is the proper object only of aversation for some things there are only of conditional evil, which hurt not by their own absolute being, but by their particular use or presence; which being offensive only in their application, requires a particular forbearance, not any further violence to their natures. Secondly, A corruption in regard of intension, is either when the passion admits not of any admixtion of love, when yet the object admits of an admixtion of good; or when the hatred is absolute against only relative evils. There is • Μήδ' ή βία σε μηδαμῶς νικησάτω Τοσόνδε μισεῖν, ὥστε τὴν δίκην πατεῖνο Soph. Ajax, 1351. |