believe me not; but if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works. Go and shew John the things ye do hear and see; the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk,' &c. It is plain from hence, that Christ appealed to our senses and reason, in order to the full conviction of such as should believe on him; and desired this conviction in his disciples, to the end that, having found the religion he preached to be true and good, they might hold it fast,' as the Apostle advises.

There is no one now, I believe, who will dispute the justness of this rule, whether he submits to the authority of those who delivered it, or not. Every one must allow the rule to be good in itself. Yet what all are ready to grant in speculation, very few are willing to reduce to practice; I mean in matters of religion. In other things, indeed, as if they were of more value, we use all the sense and reason we have. If we are sick, we are not so attached to the name of a drug, or a physician, as not to postpone either to a better, for the sake of health. If we are to purchase an estate, we examine, without any manner of prejudice, the goodness and extent of the lands, and what they may be set for; nor will we close the bargain, till we have the opinion of the best lawyer concerning the title. We make it no objection. to his judgment, that his name is spelled after this or that manner. If we buy any piece of goods, its properties are thoroughly examined. If we sell one, the money is not received, till it is carefully viewed and inspected. We shew surprising sharpness, and go to an hair's breadth, in our disputes about property; and if they run to a lawsuit, the very father of lies and deceits must be employed against us, or no advantage can be taken of us. But examine us in religious matters, and behold, we are almost idiots. Here we know little or nothing; can give no reason for what we maintain, or, for the most part, a very weak one; are destitute of common sense and understanding. Here names, not things, are received, are loved, are contended for. Here names, not things, are rejected, hated, and even persecuted in those who adhere to them, not because we are sensible of any material difference between their persuasion and our own, but because they spell theirs with other letters, than we employ in the name of ours. Truth and error are here

alike to us in themselves, and differ only as they get the start of each other through our education or passions. If education predominates, the most knowing son takes up contentedly with, often adheres tenaciously to, a religion handed down to him by the most stupid father; and never goes farther than the herald's office for his creed. If his passions or affections have the ascendant, his religion, instead of being a tie, according both to the nature of the thing, and the etymology of the word, must be converted into a licence, that it may countenance what it should correct, and bring his conscience to second his will, as that does his appetites and desires. He must adhere to the religion of his father, though it was evidently the cause of blindness, cruelty, and wickedness, in him ; or he must have a religion of his own, because he is determined to take greater liberties than his father's principles could warrant. In these ways of choosing, or rather stumbling on, a religion, judgment and reason are not suffered to interfere, but are reserved for matters of greater consequence, such as the choice of a horse, a cook, or a strumpet.

And yet, if it is of any moment to a man, whether he shall be good and happy, or wicked and miserable, it must equally concern him, not only to be religious, but to make a wise choice of a religion; for it is not a whit more sure, that there is a God who made us, than it is, that he made us to serve him in spirit and in truth,' and in so doing to be completely happy. He who believes there is no God, whatever he does with the natural world, must look on the intellectual as a moral chaos, wherein if there is a right and a wrong in actions, there is no reason for doing the right, and avoiding the wrong; no law, no duty, because no account of what is done. But he who believes there is a God, must believe that whatsoever is good is true, inasmuch as a Creator of infinite goodness and truth can no more be supposed to have set them in opposition to each other in the nature of things, than to feel them opposite in himself. Now, that religion is good, we know by experience, because man can be neither good nor happy without it. We know also, that no man can subsist long out of society; nor society, without religion; so that a religion which hath any truth in it at all, must be better than no religion. As therefore religion is not only a

good, but a necessary good, we must conclude, it is a great and necessary truth. Indeed man is under as great a necessity of having religion, as he is of having food; and of having a true religion, as of having wholsome food.

Some men give themselves a marvellous liberty of speaking on this subject. They are so good indeed as to own religion may be useful, but deny its necessity; and as to the choice of a religion, they say, it is of no great consequence, because God may be served, and man saved, in any religion. As truth and goodness can never be separated, so this detestable way of talking hath as small a proportion of the one, as of the other, in it. Could God have been indifferent whether there should be any connexion between himself and his intelligent creatures? Or could he have judged a connexion less than necessary, at least to us, who, if separated from him, must be miserable? And how otherwise can we be connected with him, than by piety, devotion, and duty? Of his infinite goodness he gave us being; but being, without this union, must have been a curse, instead of a blessing. Religion therefore is necessary. And though the true religion is not absolutely necessary to our subsistence in this world, experience teaching us, that society may subsist with an erroneous religion; yet if there is a heaven, and if the purification of our nature, and the love of God, are necessary to fit us for that heaven, then the true religion, which alone can produce these excellent effects in us, must be necessary to our great, our lasting happiness. Besides, if our religion should consist in superstitious and wicked opinions, and in the worship of false gods, can we suppose that God should look with as favourable an eye on us as he would do, in case our principles were conformable to truth, and all our homage paid to himself alone? Could happiness be obtained without virtue, or virtue acquired under the influence of worship paid to a wrong object, and essentially erroneous in its practical principles; and could all this be as easily and safely done under these circumstances, as with the assistance of true religion; then indeed I should think the choice of a religion a matter of little moment to us. But suppositions like these are too chimerical

to deserve a farther notice.

Man is so made, that he cannot help being anxious to

obtain what is good; but he often mistakes the kinds, the degrees, nay, the very reality of good, pursuing one kind of good by means proper to the attainment of another; pursuing the less in preference to the greater; and, what is worse, pursuing real evil under the appearance of good. To remedy these mischiefs, from whence all sin and misery proceed,. the best way is to make a thorough inquiry after the chief good, which is God; and after the right means of arriving at that good, which is true religion. That man is truly wise, who, in order to this most useful and most important of all inquiries, banishes his prejudices, silences his passions, and, following his reason steadily, prays to God, that his reason may not mistake, nor miss of, its aim; and who, when he thinks he hath attained his end, which, in the use of such a method, he can hardly fail of, neither so far wrongs his own judgment, or God's assistance, as to withhold his heart, and his affections, from the fruits of an inquiry so anxiously pursued.

However, that an honest inquirer of this sort may have a sure path to go in, we will lay down a few rules, which, if followed, must direct him to the great truth he seeks for; and in so doing, shall not so much endeavour to shew him, what is the true religion, as how to find it out himself.

Let the first rule be, that as by our senses we apprehend things sensible, and by our reason come to the knowledge of things demonstrable; and have no other way, either of receiving information, or trying the truth of that information; so we must never receive a religion that contradicts sense and reason.

It is no objection to this rule, that our senses may be deceived, or that we may reason wrong, provided we fairly. and freely make the utmost use of both; for nothing more can be required of us, in order to the attainment of knowledge in any kind or degree, than a full exercise of the powers and faculties bestowed on us. But we may presume these cannot fail us in the attainment of knowledge so absolutely necessary to us, as that of religion; because, if it is so necessary, the lights, whereby the true religion may be distinguished from such as are false, must be sufficiently clear and strong to be apprehended by the faculties given us for that very purpose. If, however, there is, in respect

to any man, a failure either of the lights afforded, or the faculties bestowed, we know proportionable allowances will be made; for his happiness cannot possibly depend on the use of means not put within his power.

But to prevent a wrong use of this rule, it must be observed, that a point may be true and rational, which reason cannot account for; and that we may have full evidence of its truth, at the same time that we cannot shew demonstrably how it is consistent, either in itself, or with other known truths. For instance; we may have sufficient reason to think, God is both infinitely just, and infinitely merciful, although we can by no means demonstrate, how he can shew himself infinite in both, with regard to transgressors. Again, it may be matter of certainty to us, that God is infinitely good and communicative; and yet, that one half of eternity passed before any creature was brought into being; I say one half, because every moment of duration divides eternity into two equal parts. These two propositions are evidently true, and therefore reconcilable in themselves; although it exceeds the strength of our minds, and probably of all created minds, to shew their consistency. This caution, when duly considered, will be found necessary to prevent our running into downright Atheism; for there is no religion, indeed no kind of knowledge which can so approve itself to reason, as to be perfectly accounted for by us, in all its parts, results, and consequences. Every thing knowable. is self-evident, demonstrable, or probable, for a few steps; beyond which if it is pursued, it becomes unaccountable, and reduces all our boasted knowledge to doubt and paradox. Hence it may be expected, that religion, whether styled natural, or revealed, may have its mysteries, as well as physics, or any other branch of knowledge; nay, rather, because its object is infinitely more incomprehensible, and its operations more remote from human apprehension.

These things premised, it is the business of an ingenuous inquirer to try the truth of each religion by the rule laid down; and if he finds it sets forth any thing palpably absurd or inconsistent, that is, any thing, to which his senses, or his reason, can safely give the lie, he is to reject it as unworthy of his assent. Now this will not be so difficult a matter, as may at first be apprehended; because there neither