knew nothing; and of the character of the Tempter, they would not naturally form even a suspicion. Accustomed to hear only truth, they would not easily expect a lie; and, habituated only to faithfulness and friendship, fraud and malevolence were, in their approach to them, assured of a necessary, and sufficient, disguise. That artless, child-like simplicity, which so delights the mind, and embellishes the pictures of the historian and the poet; which adorned the life, and endeared and enforced the lessons of the Redeemer himself; and which now constitutes no small part of evangelical excellence; was then a principal trait of their character. In the peculiar kind of wisdom, which we call prudence, they certainly had made little progress; and caution must have been known to them, only in lessons of instruction.

Thus they were, in several important respects, beings fitted for imposition, and not unnaturally the victims of insidiousness and cunning. The same means, at the present time, ensnare persons of the same character; and it is not in the nature of things, that superior sagacity, however employed, should not possess the power of influencing, more or less, the same simplicity. Firm obedience, such as they were bound to render to their God, a prompt undeliberating refusal, and an original, steadfast determination not to listen, would have secured them from yielding; but, when they began to hear, and to investigate, they began to be exposed; and their danger increased with every step of their progress in inquiry.

In the mean time, it seems, that neither of them thought of supplicating the aid of their Creator. A single prayer would have put the Tempter to flight, and dissolved the charm of the Temptation. A single recollection, also, of his commands, his kindnesses, and his instructions, might easily have produced the same effect. But neither prayer nor recollection was summoned to their assistance. Like their descendants, when forgetful of God, and, in a sense, forgotten by him, they were weak, frail, and exposed to every danger.

IV. The consequences of the temptation were, as you well know, eminently unhappy.

Eve, pleased with the appearance of the prohibited fruit, and warmed with the thought of becoming wise, of leaving her present humble station, and assuming that of an Angel, rashly ventured on the forbidden ground; disobeyed the command of her Creator; defiled herself with sin; and yielded her title to immortal life. In the same manner Adam, also, partook of the transgression, and of all its miserable effects; lost his innocence; and resigned his dominion, glory, and happiness. The remoter consequences of this event, I shall have occasion to consider in a future discourse. The remainder of this, I shall occupy with some considerations on two great questions, often and earnestly asked, concerning this subject, and with a few practical remarks.

VOL. I.

52

The first of the questions, to which I have referred, is this; Since our first Parents were entirely holy, how could they become sinful?

This question, in its simple and proper form, is no other than, How can a holy being become sinful? or,

How can a holy being transgress the law of God?

This question, to which, perhaps, no satisfactory philosophical answer can be given, has been unnecessarily embarrassed by the modes, in which answers to it have been attempted. The language, often adopted, has been in a great measure abstract; and, being supposed to have meaning, when it had none, and to convey ideas, which it did not contain, has served only to bewilder, where it was intended to instruct.

The common method of conducting the investigation of this subject has been to seek for some cause in the nature of man, styled a principle of action, to which this effect might be fairly attributed. As the principles of moral action in Adam, must have been holy, and could in no degree have been sinful; it is inquired, How could a holy principle be the cause of a sinful action?

It will be obvious to a careful examiner, that in this inquiry, the word principle, is intended to denote a fixed, unchangeable cause; productive only of effects, of the same moral nature; and is supposed to exist, and to operate, during the interval of transgression. On this foundation, the inquiry is made; and, if the foundation be solid and just, the inquiry cannot be answered: because, in the actual case, viz. the case of our first Parents, there was no other principle of action, beside a holy principle.

But in this scheme of thought, there is a plain and important fallacy; not improbably originated, and certainly established, by the use of the word Principle. I do not deny; on the contrary, I readily admit; that there is a cause of moral action in Intelligent beings, frequently indicated by the words Principle, Affections, Habits, Nature, Tendency, Propensity, and several others. In this case, however, as well as in many others, it is carefully to be observed, that these terms indicate a cause, which to us is wholly unknown; except that its existence is proved by its effects. There is, as every man, who does not embrace the doctrine of casual, or contingent, existence, must admit, a reason, why one being is holy and another sinful; or why the same being is holy at one time and sinful at another; as truly, as that there is a reason, why he exists. There is also a reason, why a being is, at some times, more strongly inclined to a regular practice of sin or holiness, than at others. Our judgment concerning moral beings, is customarily formed in accordance with these truths. We speak of human nature as sinful; intending not the actual commission of Sin, but a general characteristic of man, under the influence of which, he has committed Sins heretofore, and is prepared, and is prone, to commit others. With the same meaning in our minds, we use the phrases, sinful propen

:

sity, corrupt heart, depraved mind; and the contrary ones, holy or virtuous disposition, moral rectitude, holiness of character, and many others of the like import. When we use these kinds of phraseology, we intend that a reason really exists, although undefinable, and unintelligible, by ourselves, why one mind will, either usually, or uniformly, be the subject of holy volitions, and another, of sinful ones. We do not intend to assert, that any one, or any number, of the volitions of the man, whom we characterize, has been, or will be, holy, or sinful; nor do we, indeed, design to refer immediately to actual volitions at all. Instead of this, we mean to indicate a state of mind, generally existing, out of which holy volitions may, in one case, be fairly expected to arise, and sinful ones, in another such a state, as that, if it were to be changed, and the existing state of a holy mind were to become the same with that of a sinful mind, its volitions would thenceforth be sinful; and vice versa. This state is the cause, which I have mentioned; a cause. the existence of which must be admitted, unless we acknowledge it to be a perfect casualty, that any volition is sinful, rather than holy. This cause is what is so often mentioned in the Scriptures, under the name of the heart; as when it is said, The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked. I have already remarked, that this cause is unknown, except by its effects. From these, however, we learn, that it is not so powerful, nor so unchangeable, as to incline the mind, in which it exists, so strongly to holiness, as to prevent it absolutely from sinning, nor so strongly to sin, as to prevent it absolutely from acting in a holy manner. Both Revelation and facts, the only sources, from which we derive any knowledge of the subject, place this truth beyond a reasonable debate. Beings, who have sinned, have afterwards become holy; and beings, who have been holy, have afterwards sinned; and nothing more seems necessary to explain this subject to us sufficiently, than barely to suppose, what we cannot avoid supposing, that a temptation, actually presented to the mind, is disproportioned in its power to the inclination of that mind towards resistance.

I have now, I flatter myself, prepared the way for introducing the only intelligible, and in any degree satisfactory, method of examining this subject; which is, to consider the man, and the facts;` and not the abstract principles.

In this view, the case stands thus: GoD created a moral being, capable, in the nature of things, of either sin or holiness. Originally, this being was holy; that is, disposed to obey the will of GOD; possessing a state of mind propense to virtuous, and opposed to sinful, conduct. Fitted by his moral nature to be operated on by motives, as all moral beings are, he was placed in a world, filled with motives; of which some induced to obedience, and others to disobedience. Wherever the means of happiness and misery exist, such motives exist of course; and of both kinds; for these means, themselves, are the motives; or perhaps more pro

perly the happiness and misery are the motives. Now it is plain. that in such a world, (and all possible worlds, except a world of perfect misery, must be such) motives of both kinds must, at times, be present to the view of such a being. It is equally evident, that some of the motives to sin, may, considered by themselves, become to such a being stronger inducements to action, than some of the motives to holiness. In other words, higher enjoyment may be found, or expected, in some courses of sin, than in some courses of holiness. That to a mind, capable of contemplating one or a few things, only, at once, and of feeling with different strength, at different times, the motives to sin may chiefly, or alone, be present, will not be doubted. For, it is apprehended, no finite watchfulness is sufficient to realize, with absolute certainty, the full presence of the motives to holiness at all times; nor to keep out of view all the motives to sin. Of course, every such mind may, for aught that appears, be induced by some supposable motive, or combination of motives, at some times, and in some circumstances, at least, to yield to temptation, and disobey.

There is no proof from the nature of things, that finite strength and stability are sufficient to resist all possible motives to sin. From facts, we are irresistibly led to admit the contrary doctrine. Angels, though entirely holy, yielded to such motives; as did our first Parents also, who possessed the same virtuous character. These facts furnish a strong presumption, at least, that it is not within the limits of created perfection to resist temptation in all possible cases; and that the final perseverance of saints and Angels, both in a state of trial, and in a state of reward, is derived ultimately from the Almighty Power of God.

In a former discourse, I observed, that there were three methods, in which sin, or moral evil, is supposed to have been introduced into the universe. The first is, that he permitted it to exist. One of the remaining two is, that God could not, without destroying the free agency of his creatures, prevent them from sinning: the other, that he creates their sinful volitions.

To the former of these methods of accounting for the introduction of sin, it is unanswerably objected, that God has actually preserved some of the angels from falling; and that he has promised to preserve, and will, therefore, certainly preserve, the spirits of just men made perfect; and that this has been, and will be, done without infringing at all on their moral agency. Of course, he could just as easily have preserved Adam from falling, without infringing ou his moral agency. To the second scheme, I object in the

1st. Place, That it is wholly without proof.

But a doctrine of this magnitude, ought not to be admitted without the most ample evidence.

2dly. It is unnecessary.

All the satisfaction, which this subject admits, is capable of bein derived as completely from attributing this event to the agency

of creatures, as to the agency of GoD. At the same time, it is as easy to conceive, to evince, and to admit, that man is an agent, as that God is an agent. No difficulty attends the former case, which does not in an equal degree attend the latter. If man is an agent, then there is no necessity of tracing his actions beyond himself. We find no necessity, when we think of GoD as an agent, of tracing his actions beyond himself. There is no more necessity of tracing human actions beyond man; nor is there, so far as I can perceive, any additional light thrown on the subject of human agency, by referring our actions to GOD. That GOD created us; that he can, and does, influence our actions in various ways, as he pleases; and that even we can in various ways influence the actions of each other; must be admitted on all hands. But I see no proof, that God is the author, or agent, of human actions; nor the least difficulty in believing that he has made us capable of being the agents, and authors, of them, ourselves.

3dly. It increases the difficulties, which it professes to remove.

It is at least as difficult to conceive how GOD can be the author of actions, existing in a human mind, as how that mind can be the author of them. Here, therefore, no advantage is gained. On the other hand, difficulties are multiplied without end. No conception is more perplexing, or distressing, than this; that God creates our sin by an act of his Omnipotence, and then punishes it.

4thly. The Scriptures no where assert this doctrine.

The passages, commonly alleged in support of this doctrine, appear, to me at least, to be forced from their natural, obvious interpretation, for this purpose. Nor ought it to be admitted, that a doctrine of this importance would be taught in ambiguous and obscure passages only. A strong support of this opinion, is found in the copiousness, variety, and explicitness of the passages, in which the Scriptures teach us the agency of GoD in our sanctification. This important distinction between the two cases, ought to have its full weight with our minds; and should, I think, be considered as decisive.

Should it be here objected, that the scheme, which I am contending for, is opposed to the doctrine of GOD's agency in our sanctification: I deny the objection to be true. The Scriptural doctrine of sanctification does not, I apprehend, teach us, that he is the author, or Creator, even of our holy volitions. On the contrary, Scriptural regeneration is the creation, not of our volitions, but of such a state, temper, or disposition, that the mind itself produces other volitions, than those which it would have produced in its former state. After regeneration, GoD affects the mind in sanctifying it, in the manner commonly denoted by the word influence; and not by a work of creation, continually carried on in the mind. Hence GOD is said to sanctify his children by his Word, as well as by his Spirit. But it is impossible, that his Word should any way be concerned with the creation of new volitions.