PART I.

But let us examine a little more closely the First limita- extent of the limits within which submission to

tion by the divine law.

our government or to any government is obligatory. The existence of such limits will scarcely be denied in so many words in our times. And first, then, it is obvious that no civil enactment can ever make void the laws of God-can ever make that sin which He makes duty, or that duty which He makes sin. "No human sovereign," Richard Baxter says, "hath authority to forbid what God commands, nor to command what God forbids; but their laws that are notoriously contrary to the laws of God, are nullities, and cannot oblige to obedience or punishment. A constable may a thousand times more excusably pretend authority against the king, or independent of him, than a king can claim authority against God, or independent on him. There is no power but from God; God giveth none against himself. All laws or commands of men are null and void of true obliging authority, which are against his laws. They are not words of authority but of rebellion or usurpation, that command us to disobey the God of heaven. To resist such a command is not to resist an act of power, but of usurpation. For there can be no power without, much less against the fountain of all power, the universal Sovereign. It may be, this is the meaning of the schoolmen and politicians, that say, It is no law that is unjust, and of Augustine who makes justice essential to the commonwealth.""* To illustrate this by example:-If the government were requiring its subjects (as some

Baxter's Holy Commonwealth, pp. 379, 380.

of its subordinate agents, not long ago, did in PART 1. a foreign country, and unhappily had their conduct sanctioned by the commander-in-chief and a majority in the House of Commons*), to take a part in idolatrous worship, they not only are not bound to obey, but they are bound to disobey such a command. Should the government engage in the prosecution of enterprizes opposed to the law of God, and require me directly to support them, I am bound to refuse. Should they engage directly in a trade, which they too long sanctioned, and send our ships of war as slavers, to the coast of Africa, would it be consistent with my duty to serve as a sailor aboard one of these ships, or, which as we will by and by see comes to the same thing, pay a tax, levied avowedly for the purpose of supporting this service? If government, in making and executing laws in reference to the church of which Jesus Christ is sole Lord and King, usurp his place, can any Christian taking this view of the government's conduct, actively support such an usurpation? And what other view can an enlightened Christian take of it? Is not Jesus Christ the sole King and Head of his Church? Who has right to legislate in her, or about her, but himself? To whom has he delegated the power given to him by the Father? Can a Christian safely, in any way, show his approbation of a principle, which is indeed the soul of "the Man of Sin"-of a system the very foundation of which, is permitting human authority to take the place of the autho

* Vide Note XVII.

+ Vide Note XVIII.

PART 1. rity of Christ-by adding to, and taking from his institutions?

Second limitation-by the law of the land.

The second class of limitations to the obligation of civil obedience, refers to cases in which the magistrates, of whatever grade, act illegally. Where the illegality is clear and obvious, it is plain that the subject is not bound to obey. In some cases, though not bound to obey, he may find, on the principle that it is our duty in matters not of absolute obligation, to do what is upon the whole for the best, that he may obey-that he ought to obey-though scarcely in any case, without distinctly showing that he is aware of the illegality, and protesting against it. The man who tamely and silently submits to injustice from an inferior magistrate, betrays the general cause of good order. He is a bad citizen, and not even a good subject. He obeys or submits to an inferior power, acting in an unauthorized manner, in preference to "the higher powers" of the law. If even the first magistrate of this kingdom-God bless and protect the Royal Maiden, and shed on her abundantly the healthful influence of his Spirit and the saving blessings of his grace, as “the dew of her youth"if even she were doing what some of her predecessors have done to their cost, but which neither her character nor her principles give us any reason to fear she will ever attempt-should Queen Victoria attempt to do that by proclamation, or direct warrants, which the constitution says ought to be done only by the legislature, her subjects would not in such a case be bound to obey her, and her best friends, with all their af

fection for her person, and reverence for her of- PARTI. fice, would be the first to declare that they would not.

tion by the

design of civil

rule.

The third class of limitations of the obligation Third limitaof civil obedience, embraces all cases in which the nature and magistrate leaves his proper province, and interferes in matters with which, as a magistrate, he has nothing to do.* The object and design of

* The original Scottish reformers state the truth on this subject very accurately, in "the Confession of Faith," drawn up and laid before Parliament in 1560. "Sik as resist the supreme power, doing that thing quhilk apperteinis to his charge, do resist Goddis ordinance,"-though they show how sadly they misapprehended what appertained to the magistrate's charge-by the following statement in the same document,—“ mairover to kings, princes, rulers, and magistrates, wee affirm that chieflie and most principallie the conservation and purgation of the religion apperteine; so that not onlie are they appointed for civil policie, but also for maintenance of the trew religion, and for suppressing idolatrie and superstitioun whatsoever."-The Confession of the Faith and Doctrine, belevit and professit be the Protestants of Scotland, chap. xxiv. Dunlop's Collection of Confessions, vol. ii. pp. 92, 93. There is a curious mistake in the Latin version of the Scots Confession of Faith, which appears in the "Corpus et Syntagma Confessionum," in 4to, printed at Geneva, 1654, the words, "doing that thing quhilk apperteinis to his charge," being referred not to the magistrate, but to those who resist him, and rendered" usurpantes quod ad illius munus pertinet," instead of "suum exercentem munus." The version in Dunlop's Collection of Confessions, though not literal, gives the meaning, "Quicunque magistratui in mora est qui minus suum exerceat munus."

In perfect conformity with the doctrine of the Confession, that in resisting the magistrate we resist God's ordinance only when "he is doing that thing whilk perteinis to his charge," we find Erskine of Dun, in a letter to the Earl of Marr, asserting, that "when the magistrate passes the bounds of his office, and enters within the sanctuary of the Lord, meddling with such things as appertain to the ministers of religion, the servants of God should withstand and resist, and would be unworthy of

PART 1. civil magistracy must be understood, to perceive the force and bearing of this remark. Dr Watts states, that "the design of civil government is to their character if they sacrificed this duty to the wish of conciliating the favour of princes by flattery or acquiescence.”—Bannatyne's Journal, pp. 278–293. Such passages as we have just cited from the Scots' Confession and from the good superintendent of Angus' letter, are striking illustrations of a fact which must have struck every enlightened student of history, especially ecclesiastical history-that men sometimes strongly and conscientiously hold a general principle, which, if understood in the full extent of its legitimate application, would lead them to abandon other principles, really, though not to them apparently inconsistent with it, and give a decidedly different direction to their practical plans and operations. It would be an interesting and not unfruitful theme of speculation-what would have been the probable consequences, if the reformers had entertained in their full extent, those just views of the spirituality of Christ's kingdom, and the complete distinctness of civil and religious authority, of which glimpses are occasionally exhibited in their works?

It would be difficult to discover in the writings of deep thinking and high-principled men, so many self-contradictory passages as are to be found in the symbolical books of the Reformed Churches, under the head, "De Magistratu;" and in none of them do these self-contradictions stand out in more grotesquely prominent relief than in the standards of our national church. We have looked through the most of those most interesting documents, the confessions of the Reformed Churches, and the view of magistracy in its design and functions most consistent with Scripture reason and itself, that we have met with, occurs in the Bohemian confession, to which our attention was particularly called by observing it referred to by Rutherford in his LEX REX, in support of some of the liberal principles asserted in that singular work,-" Docetur apud nos, juxta scripturas, quod sublimior potestas seu Magistratus secularis, Dei ordinatio sit, ut in iis quæ politica et temporaria sunt, populus regatur-Sunt autem magistratuum partes ac munus, omnibus ex æquo jus dicere, in communem omnium usum, sine personarum acceptione, pacem et tranquillitatem publicam tueri et procurare. De malis et facinorosis hanc interturbantibus, pænas sumere, aliosque omnes ab eorum vi et injuria vindicare.-Quod autem attinet ad eas res quæ animarum fideique et salutis sunt, docent, Tantum Dei