and practices which are generally receiv'd and fashionable in the place we live. I have a juft veneration for whatever is the sense of mankind; but I think their fuffrage is not to be taken by number, but by weight: nor are we to follow the opinion or example of the moft, but of the beft: nor indeed is it poffible to understand what is the sense of mankind in this point; for we have cuftom against custom, nation against nation, and religion against religion.

It ought farther to be confider'd, that principles taken upon trust have seldom an equal influence upon us, with those which we take upon ftrict examination and mature deliberation; that men will easily be tempted to defert those for which they have no better authority than the vote of a multitude: nor can any thing tend more to the difparagement of any perfuafion than this, that 'tis not the refult of our judgment but our fortune; or to the difhonour of any religion than this, that 'tis magifterially obtruded by the authority of laws, and terror of force, and will not submit it felf to the trial of fober philofophy: and fo I take it to be a credit to the Chriftian religion that it did not force affent, but gain it by irrefiftible arguments; that is, fo far from fhunning the trial of impartial philofophy, that it did always invite men to a fober examination of its evidence; and commanded its difciples, Be ready to give an anfwer to every man that asketh you a reafon of the hope that is in you, I Pet. iii. 'Tis true indeed, as the cafe now ftands, religion may, nay, must be recommended by authority

of

of law and custom, and ingratiated by particular practice of it, but afterwards muft grow up and be confirmed by reason, like a tender plant that is fixed by the help of another's hands, but afterwards it ftands firmest upon its own roots: and this method our Saviour himself did fometimes make use of, when either the stupidity of nature, or prejudice of education render'd those to whom he addressed his doctrine incapable of entering into a thorough examination of it; Then if any man will do my will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God.

Lastly, To truft to others, who themselves with like rashness and credulity do truft to others in the matter of the higheft moment of life, feems to me inconfiftent with common prudence, with the very conftitution of rational nature; for what ufe can be as much fancied of reafon, if I flight its service in so important an affair as this?

It is true, temper, fortune and education have de facto fo great a fhare in the happiness or mifery of fome kind of men especially; that I muft not yet difmifs this objection, till I have taken a little notice of fuch for whofe defence and fervice it was at firft found out: these are,

First, The ftupid and brutish part of mankind: these feem to have met with happiness whilft they feek it not; their fancies flat, their profpect fhort, and their defires few and easy; and confequently if their pleafures be not rais'd, neither are their troubles deep; time and chance happen to 'em, and they bear the one, and wear

out

out the other without any very melancholy or tender refentments; ftupidity in them out-does all the habits of philofophy in others; and want of fense makes them laugh more loudly, live more fecurely, and die more unconcernedly than the acuteft and thoughtfulleft of men can.

*Non ideo tamen quifquam felicia dixerit, quibus non eft felicitatis intellectus. Sen. de Vit. beat.

Were the incapacity of these men great enough to juftifie their contempt of reafon and religion, I fhould almost be tempted to call them happy; but at the fame moment I should despise their happiness; * for I cannot call thofe happy, whate'er their enjoyments be, whofe fouls are too fluggish and drowfy to understand or reflect upon their happiness: or, if I muft call this happiness, 'tis the happiness of a beast, not of a man: with me to live, is fomewhat greater than to feed and reft; and to be happy, must be much more than to live. The extream to these are,

Secondly, The gay, the gaudy, the modish, the unthinking part of mankind: these in their own opinion, and truly in the opinion of the world (most men being either flatterers or enviers of their good luck) may pretend to happinefs; and if their pretence be well founded, their way to happiness is a more ready,plain, and compendious one, than any that ever was, or ever will be discover'd.

But alas, shortness of fight cannot pass with me for wit, nor an unthinking confidence for wifdom: I have seen moft of thofe dreams the world can prefent the gayeft fancy with; and

upon

upon the utmost of my trial, I have perhaps found fomething that would divert my fancy, nothing that could fatisfy a rational foul. I will not here examine what is the imployment, what the pleasure proper to a rational being; nor will I now go about to fhew, that that mind can enjoy no fober or lafting peace, much less pleafure, which is engag'd in fuch a method of life as it cannot give a good account of, or rationally justify to it felf; both which confiderations would be plain refutations of this gay objection: 'tis enough in this place to fay, that this fort of life is repugnant to thofe principles which religion reveals, which reafon feems ready to embrace, and which are back'd by all the authority which the unanimous approbation of the wifest and best part of mankind can give 'em. It behoves us therefore not to abandon our felves to this kind of life, till we have narrowly difcufs'd and try'd these principles; for if they should prove true, then will this fenfual, careless life betray'd us to a miferable eternity: and tho' they should be falfe, yet till we are upon rational grounds convinc'd that they are fo, we have little reason to commit our happiness to fo great a hazard, where the odds are very great against us, that we are in the wrong.

It remains, notwithstanding all thefe objections, that it behoves every man to pursue his happiness by a rational enquiry after it, neither under-valuing human nature or its happiness, nor giving up himself to the guidance of the brutish and blind part of him; but seriously and thoroughly to examine whatever end be

C

pro

pos'd

Object. 4

the e is in man; and

pos'd to him as his happiness, or whatever method be propos'd to him as the way to it: but when we have blown off these not formidable objections against this enquiry, but loose and wanton excuses of the neglect of it, there are others yet that seem by a fairer fhew of reason to deter us from it by the difficulty and unfuccessfulness of the attempt. Happiness (fay they) is like Proteus in the poet, it puts on fo many different forms and fhapes, that it feems impoffible to circumfcribe it within general rules, or to reprefent it under any one fixt, definite and single notion or idea; and it deferves well to be examin'd, what weight or truth there is in the vulgar notion of happiness, that for a man to be happy, is nothing else but to live according to his fancy and it seems no lefs abfurd to invite every man to the fame heaven, or gratify every humour by the fame kind of happiness, than to entertain all appetites with one and the fame difh.

The great variety confequently his happines explodes these attempts.

But as in that great variety of complexion, feature, fhape and motion; and in that great diverfity of capacities and endowments which we behold in men, there is yet one common nature wherein they all agree, whereby they are conftituted creatures of the fame fpecies; juft fuch accidental varieties may the happiness of man be capable of, and yet the life and being, the foul and fubftance of it, may be one and the fame, and confequently may be comprehended

under