SECT. II.

Of the attainableness or poffibility of happiness in this life.

CHAP. I.

The notion of happiness ftated; granted imperfect, compared to that of another life, yet in it felf confiderable and defirable.

H

Aving

removed such discouragements as were lefs confiderable, I come now to examine that which attacks my design with the rudeft violence, and undermines the very foundation of it; I mean, the impoffibility of obtaining happiness in this world. "Tis true, if our endeavours after happiness here could fucceed no further than to fecure it to us hereafter, none could deny them reasonable upon this fole account: yet, because this perfwafion would blunt the force of one of the moft powerful motives to religion, which is, That its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace, and confequently very much abate our vigilance and induftry in pursuit of it; I judge it indifpenfably neceffary to enter into a full difcuffion of this point. In managing which, I will, Firf, Affert the poffibility of obtaining happiness, by plain, and, as I think, unanfwerable arguments and then, 2dly, I will endeavour

to

to give full fatisfaction to all objections to the contrary. But, before I do either of these, as well for order and instruction fake, as to obviate mistakes, I think 'tis fit I fhould explain my notion of the happiness I propofe: I must therefore acquaint my reader, that I do not promise him a heaven upon earth; that

men;

and

The happiness of this life granted imper

fect.

I do not promife him the happinefs of angels, but of that I do not understand happinefs in this propofition of that which is every way perfect and abfolute, to which fancy it self can add nothing; but of that which is, like our nature, incompleat and imperfect, fpeaking comparatively, and yet truly great and excellent in it felf too. Seneca doth fomewhere defcribe this happy man much after this manner; 'He is one who defpifes all those things which are 'fubject to change; who accounts nothing good 'or bad, but virtue and vice; who is not puffed 'up by profperous events, nor caft down by ad'verse ones; one whofe great pleasure is to de'fpife pleasure; one above either defire or fear, 'content with the riches which are the true and proper poffeffion of virtue,and coveting nothing 'more fuch a one, he thinks, cannot chufe but 'be happy.' And I think fo too, and I fear, a great deal happier than any man on earth can ever be. This is a gay dream, but well fuiting that philosophy which requires the tranquillity, and fteadiness or conftancy, of God to be joined with the frailty of man; a compofition of things infinitely more incompatible than that of an immortal foul and mortal body can be fancy'd

:

fancy'd to be. For my part I am content to call a building beautiful, tho' there be fomething in it which doth not answer the test of the stricteft art, or at least of the most accurate fancy: I am content to call it a day, tho' Alitting clouds and fhowers do now and then a little obfcure the light; fo can I not chufe but call him righteous, who is fincere, tho' not perfect; whofe life is, generally speaking, bright and exemplary, tho' not utterly void of spots and blemishes; whofe motion is a progrefs towards virtue, tho' it be fometimes retarded, nay, fometimes interrupted: and fo I am content to think him a happy man, not who is utterly exempt from all disturbances in mind or body; not who lives in constant extafy; but him whose pleasures are more and greater than his troubles, whofe hopes are more and greater than his fears; one whofe enjoyments, tho' they do not transport, do satisfie him; one whose ferenity and calm of mind, tho' it may fuffer interruptions, fuffers but few and flight ones. I will entreat the reader to admit of this notion of happiness here, till we gradually_advance to a clear and full discovery of it. Now, as we are not to lay afide any advice of being virtuous, because we cannot arrive at the height and conftancy of holy angels; fo neither are we to caft off all thoughts of happiness, because we cannot equal theirs: for if we are happy in fuch a degree as the imperfection of our nature and this inferiour state will permit; if we can free our felves from thofe miferies which do involve the foolish and vicious part of mankind;

if we can poffefs our felves of those humble and modeft joys that human nature is here capable of, it will be worth all the time

and travail we can spend upon the defign: and, that we may

The poffibility, &c.

proved.

advance thus far, the following confiderations, will, I think, render it more than probable.

С НА Р. І.

The poffibility of attaining happiness, afferted.

1. Some happier than others, and this owing to their virtue. 2. Good and evil in the world. Obj. Evils more than goods, anfwer'd, by asserting the contrary. From the fuffrage of the good. The make of the world. The nature of man. Scripture. The confeffion of Atheists and Epicureans. Obj. 2. Evil more efficacious than good, anfwered. What impreffions evils ought to make on man, examin'd. Natural evils flight, unless fharpened by our felves. Moral evils avoidable. What impreffions evils actually have, examined. Man proved naturally furnished with inclinations and arts that magnify good, and leffen evil. Obj. 3. Good and evil not dependant of man, anfwered, by confidering the nature of wisdom and folly. A recapitulation of the arguments of this chapter.

FIrft, It cannot be denied but that fome men are more happy, or at least more miferable,

than

Becaufe fome are more happy than others.

than others who will deny Titus to have been infinitely more happy than Nero? Titus, whose government of the Roman people was not more mild and gentle than the impartial reflections of his confcience upon himfelf and actions, if we credit Suetonius ( in vita Titi) in his relation of his death? Nero, that guilty wretch, whofe confcience was no lefs a plague to him than he to Rome? Who prefers not the character of Mitio in the comedian, before that of Demea ? (Terent.) Mitio, whose smooth and kind, as well as prudent behaviour, render'd him eafy and amiable to his family and relations, and made the fortune of his whole life flow calmly and gently to the end? Demea, whofe four, fufpicious and fevere behaviour did exafperate and ruffle the minds of all that related to him, and did disturb and muddy that ftream of his affairs, which would otherwise have run smooth and clear? Who will compare the pleasant retirements, the modest contentments, the regular and virtuous enjoyments of Atticus, with the turbulent popularity of Gracchus, or the fatal luxuries of Cataline, or the proud cruelties of Sylla and Marius? What then? Shall we attribute no share of happiness or mifery to the virtues or vices of the one or the other? or no part of their virtues or vices to themselves, but to (I know not what) fatal and irresistible causes? If we affert the former, with frontlefs confidence we contradict unquestionable matters of fact; if the latter, we rob the virtuous of that merit which render'd 'em belov'd