other: and, for the clofe of all, I have endeayour'd to make it manifeft, that good and evil are not fo much the refult of time or chance, &c. as the neceffary confequence of wisdom and folly. From all which the conclusion that natu rally arifes, is this; that if man be miserable, 'tis his own fault; or, which is all one, a man may be happy if he will, which was the thing to be prov❜d.

A recapitulatory conclufion.

Let us now make a clofe application of all that has been faid, to the wants and neceffities of mankind; what the evidence, what the conviction, what the real ufe and force of this difcourfe is. I am unhappy, I am miferable; whoe'er thou art that fayeft fo, thou must needs mean one of these two things. Thou do'ft ens joy no good, or, art oppreft with evil: if the latter, I demand, what evil? Speak out, speak plainly. There are three forts of evils; the e vils of the mind, the evils of the body, the evils of fortune. Which of thefe art thou oppreft by? The evils of the mind? These are either fintul paffions, or, what is the effect of them, guilty fears: nothing can compel thee to be wicked; Geafe to be wicked, and thou wilt ceafe to fear. The evils of the body? They are generally the effect of unruly pattions and a diforderly life; and where they are not, the pleafures of the mind will out-weigh the pains of the body. The evils of fortune? 'Tis in thy power whe ther these shall be really evils, or no: they befal thy poffeffions, not thee: the foolish and vicious mind only fuffers in thefe; the wife and virtuE

ous one is much above them: 'tis therefore thy own fault if thou be oppreft with evil. But wilt thou fay the former? I enjoy no good, no fatisfactory good. Why, is there no good to be enjoy'd? I have already prov'd the contrary; and, if I had not, how eafy were it here to do it? There's truth to entertain thy understanding, moral perfections to delight thy will, variety of objects to treat thy fenfes, the excellencies of the visible and invifible world to be enjoy'd by thee: why then doft thou defer to live? Why doft thou not begin to enjoy? Here 'tis evident that thou must be forc'd to fay one of these two things; either that thou art not capable of enjoying the bleffings, or that they are out of thy reach, out of thy power: to say, thou art not capable of 'em, is to renounce the faculties of thy foul, and the fenfes of thy body: to fay, they are out of thy reach, is in effect to fay, that virtue and vice, wisdom and folly are all one; or, which is every jot as abfurd, that thou art wicked and fottifh, and canft not help it. And this is that indeed which in effect all do fay, that accufe fortune, or fate, or nature, or any thing but themselves, as the causes of their mifery and yet, as abfurd as this is, it must be now examined; because the minds of men are perverted and difcourag'd by fuch notions. I will therefore now proceed to the next thing, that is, to anfwer the objections against the attainment of happiness.

CHAP.

CHA P. II.

God not the cause of man's misery.

Object. r. Imputing to God man's mifery, anfwered; and God's goodness and holiness af ferted. The transition to the objections. The importance of the right notions of God. Polytheism, fuperftition and atheism. The iffue of wrong ones. Sect. I. Of the goodness of God. 1. God proved infinitely good. The abfurdity of the contrary. God the original of all perfections. The teftimony of pagans and fcripture. Object. 1. From God's dealings with the pagans, anfwer'd. Object. 2. Other difpenfations, vindicated. 2. Of the influence of God's goodness on man. Whether God's goodness extended to man, concerns not the main objection. That it does, is proved, from whence inferr'd, 1. That God is not the cause of man's mifery. This proved by reason and authority, human and divine. 2. That he is forward to affift man in acquiring happiness. 3. Divine affif tance, what it imports: The manner of it confider'd and freed from contradictions. This affiftance farther proved in fact, by God's government of Chriftians, Jews, and Pagans. The idolatry of the philofobers, examin'd. Sect. II. Of God's holiness. From whence is inferr'd, what is necessary on our fide to intitle us to divine affiftance.

Would
Ould men talk coherently, the affertion of

my former chapter would meet but few oppofers; none can be rationally allowed to deny the poffibility of happiness, but fuch as affert fate: for he that leaves to man his liberty, leaves him in a capacity of happiness; it being hardly poffible to conceive, that man fhould be free in his choice of good or evil, and yet neceffarily or unavoidably miferable: befides, few of those who are fond of fate, are willing to extend its empire over the liberty of man's mind; it being as easy to confute their fancy, if they did by fome inftance of a free choice, as it was by moving or walking to confute his, who de

nied motion.

If it be in the next place confider'd, that none can rationally maintain fate, but fuch as deny a God, fince the belief of a God does naturally include his creation and government of the world; and this again naturally infers, either vice or virtue, rewards or punishments: but on the other hand, the denial of a God, and the admitting no principle of all things but matter does not only introduce a fatal connection and dependance of events on their causes, but alfo renders every motion of the mind of man as neceffary and determinate, as that of fire, wind, or water. All this put together amounts to thus much, that none fhall exclude happiness, but fuch as exclude God and liberty out of the world; and fince very few, I hope, are guilty of this, I ought to have very few antagonifts. But when I am to anfwer objections, I am not to confider fo much what men fhould

*

fhould fay, as what they do; nor mut I chalk out my own path, but follow, men in that they take, tho' it be far enough from being the nearest way. Since therefore inen are wont to impute there mifery one while to God, and another while to chance, now to fate, and anon incapacity, I muft examine what truth or ju tice there is in these complaints.

to

In this chapter therefore I fhall not only vindicate God from all afperfions and calumnies, but alfo fully affert the love of God to mankind; whereby I fhall not only baffle all the poor pretences of fuch as charge God directly or obliquely with their mifery; but also more ftrongly establish my own pofition, by demonftrating God's readiness to contribute all affif tance that is neceffary to our attainment of happiness. In profecuting this, I fhall,

First, Evince the importance of entertaining right notions of God.

to True notions of God, of great impor

tance.

Secondly, Because of all God's attributes, his goodness and holiness have the most direct influence on the prefent queftion, I fhall particulary confine my felf to these two. felf to thefe two. To begin with the First, If what Epictetus faid with refpect many gods had been fpoke with refpect to one, nothing had ever been faid with more a better pois'd judgment. The thing in religion is to have rational and true notions of God, being otherwife impoffible that religion fhould ferve the

E 3

exact truth, or first and chief

Τῆς περὶ Θεὸς ἐυσεβείας

TXUPTATEV

εκείνο έσιν, ορθώς απολή

Epicteti Enchir. c. 37.

great