Queen and in difcourfing of the royal rights and authority, he very properly confiders the King. 1. With regard to his title. 2. His royal family. 3. His councils. 4. His Duties. 5. His prerogative. 6. His revenue.

We are forry that our limits will not allow us to follow the Writer through thefe divifions, which are treated in a moft fatisfactory and mafterly manner: more efpecially the chapter relating to the royal revenue. This nice and intricate fubject is rendered intelligible to an ordinary understanding. Nothing can be more accurate, more perfpicuous, and at the fame time more compendious: and the inference the Writer draws from a view of the antient and modern revenues of the crown, is too excellent to be omitted. He takes notice that the powers of the crown are now to all appearance greatly curtailed and diminished fince the reign of king James the firft: particularly, by the abolition of the itar chamber and high commiffion courts in the reign of Charles the firft, and by the difclaiming of martial law, and the power of levying taxes on the subject, by the same prince: by the difufe of foreft laws for a century paft: and by the many excellent provifions enacted under Charles the fecond; efpecially, the abolition of military tenures, purveyance, and pre-emption; the habeas corpus act; and the act to prevent the the difcontinuance of parliaments for above three years: and, fince the revolution, by the ftrong and emphatical words in which our liberties are afferted in the bill of rights, and act of settlement; by the act for triennial, fince turned into feptennial, elections; by the exclufion of certain officers from the house of commons; by rendering the feats of the judges permanent, and their falaries independent; and by reftraining the king's pardon from operating on paliamentary impeachments. Befides all this, if we confider how the crown is impoverished and stripped of all it's antient revenues, fo that it greatly depends on the liberality of parliament for it's neceffary fupport and maintenance, we may perhaps be led to think, that the ballance is inclined pretty ftrongly to the popular scale, and that the executive magistrate has neither independence nor power enough left, to form that check upon the lords and commons, which the founders of our conftitution intended.

But, on the other hand, it is to be confidered, that every prince, in the first parliament after his acceffion, has by long ufage a truly royal addition to his hereditary revenue fettled upon him for his life; and has never any occafion to apply to parliament for fupplies, but upon fome public neceffity of the whole realm. This reflores to him that conftitutional independence, which at his first acceffion feems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands

of

of government are at leaft fufficiently ftrengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The inftruments of power are not perhaps fo open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the lefs liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In fhort, our national debt and taxes (befides the inconveniences before-mentioned) have alfo in their natural confequences thrown fuch a weight of power into the executive fcale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors; who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative; and by an unaccountable want of forefight eftablifhed this fyftem in their ftead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rife to fuch a multitude of new officers, created by and removeable at the royal picafure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witnefs the commiffioners, and the multitude of dependents on the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the commiffioners of excife, and their numerous fubalterns, in every inland diftrict; the poftmafters, and their fervants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commiffioners of the ftamps, and their diftributors, which are full as fcattered and full as numerous; the officers of the falt duty, which, though a fpecics of excife and conducted in the fame manner, are yet made a diftinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the furveyors of houses and windows; the receivers of the land tax; the managers of lotteries; and the commiffioners of hackney coaches; all which are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, and removeable at pleasure without any reafon affigned: thefe, it requires but little penetration to fee, muft give that power, on which they depend for subfiftence, an influence moft amazingly extenfive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, fubfcriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-tranfactions, which will greatly encrease this influence; and that over thofe perfons whofe attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most defirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen, confequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to fupport them, eftablishing our prefent perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new fince the restoration in 1660; and by far the greatcft part fince the revolution in 1688. And the fame may be faid with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has cre ted. All which put together gives the executive power fo perfuafive an energy with respect to the perfons themfelves, and fo prevailing an intereft with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the lofs of external prerogative.

But, though this profufion of offices fhould have no effect on individuals, there is ftill another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a difciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by, the crown; raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot it is true only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year they muft, by the nature of our conftitution, if raised at all, be at the abfolute difpofal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how great a trust is thereby repofed in the prince by his people. A truft, that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublefome prerogatives,

Add to all this, that, befides the civil liit, the immenfe revenue of seven millions fterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the publick, or carried to the finking fund, is first depofited in the royal exchequer, and thence ifiued out to the refpective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, becaufe it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which alfo, when well confidered, will appear to be a truft of great delicacy and high importance.

Upon the whole therefore I think it is clear, that, whatever may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any tranfactions in the last century. Much is indeed given up; but much is alfo acquired. The. ftern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence; the flavish and exploded doctrine of non-resistance has given way to a military eftablishment by law; and to the difufe of parliaments has fucceeded a parliamentary truft of an immenfe perpetual revenue. When, indeed, by the free opera tion of the finking fund, our national debts fhall be leffened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the univerfal introduc-. tion of a well planned and national militia, will fuffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when (in confequence of all) our taxes fhall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will flowly and imperceptible di-, minifh, as it flowly and imperceptibly rofe. But, till that fhall, happen, it will be our efpecial duty, as good fubjects and good, Englishmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and fervile influence from those who are intrufted with it's authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent: and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a fovereign, who, in all thofe public, acts that have perfonally proceeded from himself, hath mani-, fefted the highest veneration for the free conftitution of Britain; hath already in more than one inftance remarkably ftrengthened; it's outworks; and will therefore never harbour a thought, or

adopt

adopt a perfuafion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public liberty.'

The enfuing chapter, refpects the rights and duties of fubordinate magiftrates, and having treated of perions as they ftand in the public relations of magiftrates, he proceeds to confider fuch perfons as fall under the denomination of the people, (in which body the fubordinate magiftrates are included) and explains their rights and duties in all their various relations.

Having already tranfgreffed our bounds, we muft, for these explanations, refer the Reader to the work itself; which, from the extracts herein given, he will no doubt be curious to peruse.

We cannot conclude without obferving that Mr. Blackstone is perhaps the firft who has treated of the body of law in a liberal, clegant, and conftitutional manner. A vein of good' fenfe and moderation runs through every page, and he fhews himfelf equally free from that fervile attachment to prerogative which is generally imputed to lawyers, efpecially fuch as are fervants of the crown, without giving loose to that undistinguifhing factious zeal for liberty, which too often wears the mafk of patriotifm. Upon the whole he has acquitted himself as a found lawyer, an able Writer, a good fubject, and a worthy citizen.

The Freedom of Speech and Writing upon Public Affairs, confidered. 4to. 4s. Baker.

IN

N the whole compafs of political subjects, there is no question of greater importance than that which our Author hath here undertaken to confider. Freedom of speech and writing on public affairs, is the true ftandard of the ftate of public liberty; and may not improperly be called the political barometer. Under the abfolute and defpotic forms of government, where the will of the prince is the fupreme law, and the people have no concern in the bufinefs of legiflation, it is extremely low, or rather hath no exiftence at all. In aristocratic and oligarchic governments it rifes but to a finall and inconfiderable degree, and for the very fame reafon, in proportion, that it is never to be found in monarchies. It is in popular governments alone, where the people have power in enacting laws, granting fupplies, debating on public meafures, and judging of the conduct e their governors, that this valuable and manly fpecies of freedom is ever to be met with in any confiderable extent. Where fubjects are immediately interested in the adminiftration of affairs;

re, fom the tructure of their government they are frequently

called

called together to confult for the common good, and feel their own importance in approving and fupporting, or in condemning and rejecting any particular, meafures, we may expect to find the free and independent fenator bravely oppofing the pernicious schemes of a wicked and corrupt minifter; or in a more public manner, from the prefs, calling upon his fellow-citizens to unite their influence in oppofing the deftructive, and countenancing the wife and falutary measures that are propofed. And wherever, in a free government, we observe an attempt to fupprefs or bear down this fpecies of freedom; where every man is not protected in the fullest manner in the exercise of it; but the people are intimidated by the infamy of corporal punishment, fines, imprisonment, banishment, &c. it is then the public jealoufy ought to be awakened; it is then the wicked. fons of ambition and tyranny are meditating the deftruction of every thing dear and valuable to us as men. That this liberty may be abused to the most ungenerous and unworthy purposes will not be denied, and fo have the beft bleffings and most valuable privileges which kind heaven hath bestowed on the chil dren of men; and were we to be at once deprived of every bleffing we abuse, it is easy to see what must have been our condition long ago: but the benevolent and righteous governor of the world judgeth not as men judge; he continueth our mifimproved privileges; and in imitation of his wifdom and goodnefs fhould our earthly governors continue to protect us in thofe liberties, which are too often abused indeed; but cannot be taken away without the introduction of greater evils; and of which moreover, though abufed, it is an unjuft and wicked extenfion of their power to attempt to deprive us.

The manner in which the work before us is conducted will appear from the following analyfis of it.

Our Author fets out with obferving the excellence of truth, and the difficulty of difcovering it; from whence he rightly infers the neceffity of a free use of the means of difcovering it, which are speech and writing. As power is progreffive, restraint on the latter would foon extend to the fuppreffion of the former: and he well observes, the more injurious the defigns and actions of men are, the greater will be their folicitude to prevent a free examination of them.

This general introduction is followed by an enumeration of the laws against libels under the Roman emperors; from whence he paffes to an account of the revival of the civil law in Europe, which he imputes not fo much to its utility and excellence, as to its being favourable to the power of princes and ecclefiaftics, of which he gives feveral inftances from the Digeft and Juftinian's Inftitutes he thinks therefore that we ought to revere the REV. May, 1766.

Dd

memory