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"C occurs, have told me that they live in a state of habitual uneasiness in looking forward to the hour of death; while others, with a large Hope and small Cautiousness, have said that such a ground "of alarm never once entered their imaginations. Our hopes "or fears on a point of such importance as our condition in a future "state, ought to be founded on grounds more stable than mere con"stitutional feeling; but I mention these cases to draw attention "to the fact, that this cause sometimes tinges the whole conclusions "of the judgment; and the existence of such a source of delusion being known, its effects may more easily be resisted.

"In religion, this faculty favours the exercise of faith; and by producing the natural tendency to look forward to futurity with expectation, disposes to belief in a life to come.

"The metaphysicians admit this faculty, so that Phrenology only "reveals its organ, and the effects of its endowment, in different "degrees. I have already stated an argument in favour of the Being ❝ of a God, founded on the existence of a faculty of Veneration con"ferring the tendency to worship, of which God is the proper and "ultimate object. May not the probability of a future state be "supported by a similar deduction from the possession of a faculty of Hope? It appears to me that this is the faculty from which "originates the notion of futurity, and which carries the mind for"ward in endless progression into periods of never-ending time. May it not be inferred, that this instinctive tendency to leave the present scene, and all its enjoyments, to spring forward into the regions of a far-distant futurity, and to expatiate, even in imagi"nation, in the fields of an eternity to come, denotes that man is "formed for a more glorious destiny than to perish for ever in the "grave? Addison beautifully enforces this argument in the Spec"tator and in the soliloquy of Cato; and Phrenology gives weight "to his reasoning, by shewing that this ardent Hope, this longing "after immortality,' is not a factitious sentiment, or a mere exu"berance of an idle and wandering imagination, but that it is the "result of a primitive faculty of the mind, which owes at once its "existence and its functions to the Creator."

ARTICLE XI.

To the Editor of the Phrenological Journal.

ON THE TALENT FOR RECOLLECTING NAMES.

SIR,-It has been often remarked, as a fact not easily accounted for, on the ordinary view of the functions of the organ of Language, that persons who, from a great endow

ment of the corresponding faculty, manifest an excellent verbal memory, and a great command of words, are nevertheless frequently deficient in the power of recollecting proper names and names of individual objects. Dr Spurzheim has noticed and endeavoured to explain this curious phenomenon by supposing, that the organ of Language must be "composed of different parts,"* each taking cognizance of particular applications of Language. Other Phrenologists, not satisfied with this supposition, (for it is nothing more), and from having generally noticed a full development of Individuality in those who excelled in recollecting names, have conceived, that, although Language is indisputably the first source of all names, yet, by constant association with the things signified, the names at last become so completely individual existences, as to pass altogether out of the domain of Language, and to constitute part of Individuality alone; while words for neral ideas, from constantly changing in their applications, continue always to depend on the organ and faculty which gave them birth, and that hence the one power may easily exist in different proportion to the other. Neither of these opinions, however, is free from very obvious objections, and neither of them seems to harmonize so completely with actual experience as that which I now beg to offer to the consideration of your readers.

ge

The explanation which I have to propose was first suggested to me by observing, that those individuals who were most conspicuous for the memory of proper names were also equally remarkable for a great endowment of both Individuality and Language, and that those who were defective in this power always presented a corresponding deficiency in one or other, or in both, of these organs. The concurrence of both must indeed be always necessary to constitute a good memory for names; for, in recollecting these, we have to remember, and to connect together, 1st, the name or sign, and, 2d, the thing

Spurzheim's Phrenology, p. 292.

signified; the first of which is done by Language, and the second by Individuality; and, inasmuch as the thing signified exceeds in importance the simple sign, so is the latter more necessary than the former. But Language is still so completely the source and support of names, that the latter, when duly analyzed, are found to be as much a part of speech, or common language, as any other words whatever. Without Language we can neither have a name, nor, if we had it, could we perceive any relation between it and the object signified, however often they may previously have been connected. A name is not like natural language. It is purely conventional, and therefore, without the corresponding faculty as interpreter, it would never suggest to the mind of another the thing signified.

In giving names to persons, objects, and things, Language stands in the same relation to Individuality that it does to Causality, when it clothes in words ideas of relation, or to Ideality in expressing feelings of beauty. Names are nothing more than signs furnished by Language to clothe the conceptions of a particular faculty-Individuality; and the only reason why Individuality is necessary to the recollection of names is, that it is the function of Individuality to know the things named. Hence, if you injure Language, as in Mr Hood's case, the name or sign may vanish, while Individuality retains the thing signified, which could not happen if the name became a separate existence, and was afterwards recognized wholly by Individuality. For the same reason, it sometimes happens, that the name is recalled distinctly, but, from diseased Individuality, the object is not. Mr. C. has great difficulty in recollecting names, but then he has equally great difficulty in recollecting the things named; and his large Language does not take the direction of naming, simply because Individuality is so poorly furnished that it has nothing to name; and in this way his Individuality and Language rarely act together, which they must habitually do before readiness can be attained. From not being accustomed

to joint action, the one often acts without the other, and hence things recur without names. Mr C.'s Comparison and Causality are active, however, and they, it seems, solicit and easily obtain from Language, names to express their conceptions; but as their conceptions are relations, and not, like those of Individuality, mere existences, so the signs or names which they seek and obtain are not what Individuality would call names, but they are words abstractly considered equally entitled to be so called. In this way, where Language is large, it is ever ready at the call of the predominant faculties; and, if Individuality be predominant, then ideas of individual existence are equally so; and as these are expressed by signs, which, from their application, are called names, so Language will lend its aid to Individuality, and recollect as many names as it chooses. But if Comparison and Causality are large, and Individuality small, why then, without changing its nature, Language will give signs to them to express their modifications of thought.

Nay, it will even do more than this; when very active, it will give signs or words without being asked for by any other faculty, and then we have words without ideas, or clothing without the body which nature intended it to cover, just like a goodly coat at a tailor's door, which would be very useful if a naked man could once get into it. It is therefore no proof against the perfect identity of Language in names and in common speech, to say that Causality does not understand or care for the signs used by Individuality; Causality and Individuality are very different in their conceptions and functions; and because each employs different words to convey its meaning, we have no more right to infer that Language is unnecessary in the one case and not in the other, than we would have to infer that a coat is not a coat, because although it fits the man for whom it was made, it does not fit equally well every one who chooses to put it on.

· All this being perfectly plain, it is easy to see how Individuality is necessary for a good memory for names, although

Language is in fact the base of all nomenclature. Language interprets for all the faculties, and takes its character from those which are most predominant, because these furnish the ideas which it is most often used to convey. Hence furious Combativeness and Destructiveness become eloquent in curses, by forcing Language to supply signs for their ideas. Active Comparison and Causality, in like manner, force it to give them signs for reasoning. Our friend Mr S. has a small upper Individuality, and forgets signs for existence or names, because existences seldom trouble him; but he has a large Ideality, Comparison, Causality, Wonder, and Adhesiveness, and these accordingly recollect names or words expressive of their conceptions so easily, that he has whole passages in his memory. In short, the idea must be in the mind first, and then the sign is sought. Hence it is much more likely that a man with large Individuality and moderate Language, whose mind is filled with individualities, should succeed in getting Language to add signs to the substance, than that a man with large Language, and moderate Individuality, should succeed in getting substance to the signs. Take away Individuality, Language still retains the sign as a word, but then it has nothing to tack it to, and it remains only a word.

Large Language recollects the equivalents of any word in other languages, because here all of them are conventional signs, which is not the case when things and signs are both considered. Language gives signs, and the other faculty the meaning. Either alone is useless; and hence Individuality and Language, both large, give the best recollection of names.

The principle here laid down seems to me to be of considerable importance, and to be susceptible of a great variety of applications to questions still in dispute in regard to the nature of Language. But it is unnecessary to enter into the consideration of these at present, as the subject may be resumed in a subsequent Number.

I am, &c.

ANDREW COMBE.