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1. Amativeness, moderate.

2. Philoprogenitiveness, very large.
3. Concentrativeness, large.
4. Adhesiveness, large.

5. Combativeness, large.

6. Destructiveness, very large.
7. Secretiveness, large.
8. Acquisitiveness, large.

9. Constructiveness, very large. 10. Self-esteem, large.

11. Approbativeness, very large. 12. Cautiousness, large.

13. Benevolence, very large.
14. Veneration, large.

15. Firmness or Perseverance, large.
16. Conscientiousness, very large.
17. Hope, large.

18. Marvellousness, very large.

19. Ideality, very large.

20. Gaiety or Wit, large.
21. Imitation, very large.
22. Individuality, very large.
23. Form, very large.

24. Size, rather large.

25. Weight or Power, rather large.
26. Colour, small.
27. Locality, large.
28. Numeration, large.

29. Order or Arrangement, large.
30. Eventuality, very large.
31. Time, large.

32. Melody or Tune, very large.
33. Language, large.

34. Comparison, very large.
35. Causality, very large.

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1. Amativeness, small.

2. Philoprogenitiveness, very large.

3. Inhabitiveness, large.

4. Adhesiveness, very large.
5. Combativeness, large.

6. Destructiveness, very large.
7. Secretiveness, large.
8. Acquisitiveness, large.

9. Constructiveness, very large.
10. Self-esteem, very large.
11. Approbativeness, very large.
12. Cautiousness, large

13. Benevolence, very large.

14. Veneration, very large.

15. Firmness or Perseverance, very large. 16. Conscientiousness, very large.

17. Hope, very large.

18. Marvellousness, large.

19. Ideality, very large.

20. Gaiety or Wit, very large.
21. Imitation, very large.

22. Individuality, very large.
23. Form, very large.

24. Size, rather large

25. Weight or Power, rather large. 26. Colour, full.

27. Locality, large.

28. Numeration, large.

29. Order or Arrangement, large.
30. Eventuality, very large
31. Time, very large.

32. Melody or Tune, very large.

33. Language, large.

34. Comparison, very large.

35. Causality, very large.

ISABELLA RUDKIN, the Infant Lyra, aged three years and 10 months.

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Secretiveness to Secretiveness....

...............

In. 10ths.

..4 2

..3 4

.4 7

5 3

..5 1

...5 3

..5 1

.4 4

.6 9

...5 4

...5 4

..4

.4 3

.5

Acquisitiveness to Acquisitiveness.

Constructiveness to Constructiveness..
Cautiousness to Cautiousness.....
Ideality to Ideality..........

1. Amativeness, moderate.

2. Philoprogenitiveness, very large.
3. Inhabitiveness, very large.
4. Adhesiveness, very large.
5. Combativeness, very large.
6. Destructiveness, large.
7. Secretiveness, large.
8. Acquisitiveness, large.

9. Constructiveness, very large. 10. Self-esteem, large.

11. Approbativeness, very large. 12. Cautiousness, large.

13. Benevolence, very large.

14. Veneration, rather large.

15. Firmness or Perseverance, very large.
16. Conscientiousness, very large.
17. Hope, large.

18. Marvellousness, large.

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A View of the Philosophical Principles of Phrenology. By J. Spurzheim, M. D. 3d Edition, greatly improved, 8vo. pp. 216; price 78. Charles Knight, London; Hill and Son, Edinburgh; Duffield, Bath; and Duffield and Weller, Cheltenham.

THE opinion which Mr Locke ventured to pronounce on the logic of his day, will be held by every Phrenologist as

-perfectly and therefore equally applicable to the scholastic metaphysics, of which, indeed, that logic is a scion or an offset; and the judgment of Bacon, adduced by Mr Locke, in support of his attempt to introduce a better system of dialectics, may, with as much propriety, be quoted in favour of

a new philosophy of mind.

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"The logic now in use," says Mr Locke," has so long possessed the chair as the only art taught in the schools for the direction of the mind in the study of "the arts and sciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affec"tation of novelty to suspect that rules that have served the learned "these two or three thousand years, and which, without any com"plaints of defects, the learned have rested in, are not sufficient to t guide the understanding; and I should not doubt but this attempt would be censured as vanity or presumption, did not the great Lord Verulam's authority justify it; who, not servilely think"ing learning could not be advanced beyond what it was, because "for many ages it had not been, did not rest in the lazy approbation "and applause of what was because it was, but enlarged his mind "to what might be." (Conduct of the Understanding; Introduc"tion, Section 1.) The judgment of Bacon may be summed up in one of his own authoritative and prophetic sentences, the import and cogency of which are as claimant in our time as in that of his illustrious disciple; "Necessario requiritur, ut melior et perfectior mentis et intellectus humani usus et adoperatio introducatur."

The reason for this preliminary remark is easily given. Phrenology, as it appears to those who have both satisfied themselves of its conformity to nature, and witnessed its utility, possesses, to say the least of it, all the theoretic excellencies of the ancient metaphysics, so far as correctly expository of the intellectual and moral constitution of mankind, and admits all the efficacy of the ancient logic, so far as really conducive to the guidance of the faculties in the acquisition or the maintenance of truth. The production before us, to the notice of which we now hasten, as a proof, will, we think, not only sustain but materially enhance the reputation of its accomplished and singularly able author. We are aware that the essence of it is contained in the two first editions of Dr S.'s Physiognomical System; but, we may remark, it is here given with so much more detail, so many additional and im

portant expositions, and in an arrangement so different, as fairly to demand new and even increased attention.

The general nature and design of the book may be expressed in the following sentence, which we take from the preface:

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"In my work, entitled Phrenology,' a great mass of incontestable "facts is collected. This volume contains philosophical reflections "and inferences only; it is divided into seven sections. In the "first I examine the modes of action of the fundamental powers "of the mind, and the necessity of rectifying by Phrenology all the "systems of philosophy which have been given to the world; in the second, give a new nomenclature of the fundamental powers "of the mind, state their aim, the disorders which may result from "them, and the consequences of their inactivity; in the third, "discuss their origin; in the fourth, the conditions of their mani"festations; in the fifth, the moral nature of man; in the sixth, "make some practical reflections; and in the seventh, explain seve"ral philosophical expressions, according to the fundamental powers "of the mind."

The judicious reader will easily perceive, from this statement, that the work is intended strictly to correspond with its title, "A View of the Philosophical Principles of Phrenology;" and it is now our duty to show in what manner, and to what extent, it accomplishes the design. We shall take the sections in order; but, for good reasons, our extracts from and our observations on them must be very limited.

In the first section, Dr S. gives, inter alia, a summary view of the fundamental powers of the mind. For determining these, as he justly remarks, the prevalent error of those philosophers who confine themselves to general ideas, must be avoided; and, consequently, it is maintained to be necessary in this case, as in the various departments of natural history, to determine the specific qualities of the mind. In short, in place of reducing all the operations of the mind, as some philosophers have attempted to do, to sensation, or, with others, to understanding and will; or employing, like a third and a very numerous class, such general terms as perception, conception, memory, judgment, imagination, and attention, to denote the fundamental powers of the mind, which they conceive to be thereby sufficiently enumerated and indicated; it is

"

incumbent on an inquirer to detect, if possible, and describe, the special faculties of the mind, of the operations or modes of action of which the terms now mentioned are expressive. The reason is quite obvious, as applicable to one class of metaphysicians at least; and it is quite valid, indeed, in every other instance of a similar kind. The consequence has been a degree of confusion, a perplexity, a difference of opinion and statements as to facts, and a separation into sects and parties, which have proved so great a bane as almost entirely to deter sober-thinking minds from the pursuit or cultivation of this branch of science. One distinction, hence arising, is of very ancient date, and still exists among the retainers of the scholastic doctrines, namely, that of Idealogians and Moralists; the former title being used to denote those who confined themselves principally, or altogether, to the study of the UNDERSTANDING, and the latter to those who directed their attention chiefly, or solely, to the WILL. It is one of the ob

jects of Dr S., in this section of his work, to point out the harmony which subsists between Phrenology and both of these branches of philosophy, so far as they can be ascertained to be conformable to truth, or, in other words, to be expository, or to afford a fair record, of the phenomena of the mental world, considered as capable of classification under such titles as intellect and moral feeling, understanding and will, intellectual and moral or active powers.

In treating, first, of the opinion of the idealogians, with a view to the illustration and establishment of his proposed harmony, Dr S. presents a concise history of intellectual science commencing with the period of the Greek philosophers, and coming down very nearly to our own day. We say very nearly, because, though he speaks of Kant and Fichte, we cannot help regretting it as a serious defect in his memoir, that he has made no mention of the system of the late Dr Brown, in which, more than in any previous works, he would have found materials for comparison with his own principles. To the views of Locke, as forming the basis of the greater

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