Reason and Reasonabless [sic]Riccardo Dottori LIT Verlag Münster, 2005 - 446 Seiten This volume contains the Proceedings of the fourth Meeting Italian/American Philosophy on the theme "Reason and Reasonableness" that took place in Rome from October 8-11, 2003. To be reasonable does not mean anymore to follow steady rules but it meant to tray to understand the different point of view and widening our cultural criteria in order to find a common evaluation. |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
adventure aesthetic argument Aristotle becoming believing q believing that dogs bioethics Catholicism ceteris paribus claim common concept context cultural dogs bark dogs have existed endoxa enthymemes epistemology ethical example experience fact feeling Gadamer global hermeneutic human idea identity interpretation John justification for believing justified in believing Kant kind language lieving literary literature lives logic logos meaning ment metaphysical Minkowski spacetime moral narrative naturalisation nature normative notion object one's organic unity particular Peirce philosophical pluralism political possible posteriori posteriori justified premises principle priori justified problem proposition public reason purely a priori quantum quantum computational qubit question rational Rawls relation relativity of simultaneity reproductive cloning ritual Roquentin Sartre scienza seems semantic sense senso sentential structure simultaneity social sort spacelike-related spacetime story theory thesis things thought tion traditional true truth ture understanding University Press Wittgenstein words worldline
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 21 - A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.
Seite 24 - Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premisses which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one.
Seite 21 - We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy.
Seite 24 - For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.