The Methods of EthicsMacmillan and Company, limited; New York : The Macmillan Company, 1901 - 526 Seiten |
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Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
action actual admit æsthetic appears appetite application Aristotle ascer attainment aversion balance of happiness Benevolence Book causes cerned chap chapter clear cognition Common Sense commonly conceive conflict consciousness consequences consider definite desire determined Determinist discussion distinguish doubt duty effect Egoistic Hedonism element emotional Ethics existence experience feeling fundamental greatest happiness hedonistic human ideal implied important impulses individual internal sanctions Intuitional Intuitionism J. S. Mill judge Justice kind latter less Libertarian maintained mankind means means of happiness merely method mind moral judgments moral rules moralists motive nature notion object observed opinion ordinary particular perfect persons pleasant pleasures and pains positive law possible practical prescribed present prima facie principle prompt proposition psychological Hedonism question rational realisation reason recognised regard relation result right conduct seems self-love sentiments social Social Statics society suppose term thought tion ultimate end Utilitarian valid virtue virtuous volition
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 387 - The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.
Seite 118 - Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such ; yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it.
Seite xvii - I know nothing that could, in this view, be said better, than " do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you...
Seite 210 - Thus it has been completely shown by these examples how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the object of the action) on the same principle. If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us...
Seite 191 - In other words, those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or indirectly destructive of life...
Seite 411 - By utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct.
Seite 369 - Activity (unselective). 5. Love of Gain (reflective derivative from Appetite). 6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings). 7. Primary Passions ; — Antipathy, Fear, Resentment. 8. Causal Energy ; — Love of Power, or Ambition ; Love of Liberty. 9. Secondary Sentiments ; — Love of Culture. 10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration. 11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social ; — with (approximately) Generosity and Gratitude. 12. Primary Affection of Compassion....
Seite 383 - I regard the apprehension, with more or less distinctness of these abstract truths, as the permanent basis of the common conviction that the fundamental precepts of morality are essentially reasonable.
Seite 387 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good; that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
Seite 39 - By the principle of self-preference, understand that propensity in human nature, by which, on the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness...