former truth by applying mathematics to accurate astronomic observations, he afterwards found the minor question to be contained in the larger, through its answering to the same general laws of physics. Yet as a small stone cannot be a sufficient foundation for a large building, so we cannot prove the existence of a general usage, because we have witnessed a petty operation of a similar character. We could not rightly argue that the globe is full of fire, from having seen a volcano belching its liquid flames: for, upon the same principle, we might declare it to be filled with water or with ashes. A few monsters are occasionally brought forth, and, according to history, we know that it has been so in former ages; but this is no reason for believing in a regular succession of prodigies, which would alter the character of the human family, or tend to depopulate the world. So false a mode of argument would put us on the same level with ancient theorists, who, from the procreation of a few gigantic forms, imagined a previous race of giants to have existed, from which their own pigmy bodies were a sad degeneration. Such a tradition was long cherished and credited, though now it is proved to have been a mere fable.

So, when geologists tell us that Nature is now in a quiescent state, compared with what she once was, when all the wonderful changes of our strata were accomplished, we ask for historical proofs of their assertion; and when Mr. Lyell, repudiating their hypothesis, maintains that the gradual processes of Nature through an immense period of time will produce complete revolutions in the external world, we deny that he has any premisses to support such extravagant conclusions. Other men of science teach the stability of our system from the perceived uniformity of known laws; so that they are of an opposite opinion from Mr. Lyell on this part of the argument. In building a scheme to suit his favourite notions of heat and volcanic agency, he has forgotten to consider the other parts of nature:-his is a fairy castle, beautiful and gorgeously adorned, but built in the air, so that no man can hope to reach it without borrowing the wings of imagination; which reason and logic refuse to do, and therefore they must be content with viewing it afar off. On another occasion, Mr. Lyell observes: "If, during the short period since South America has been colonized by Europeans, we have proof of alterations of level at the three principal ports on the western shores, Callao, Valparaiso, and Conception, we cannot for a moment suspect that these cities, so distant from each other, have been selected as the pecu

liar points where the desolating power of the earthquake has expended its chief fury:—a geologist must attribute no small discrimination and malignity to the subterranean force, if he should suppose it to spare habitually a line of coast many thousand miles in length, with the exception of those few spots where populous towns have been erected." Here we quite agree with Mr. Lyell, that any one who imagines the earthquake to be an independent power, may readily wonder at such discernment in its operations; but whoever believes in a Supreme Lord, overruling his own universe and directing his own servants, will not be at all surprised at the occasional manifestation of his anger in punishing a wicked people. Our geologist may be assured, upon the solemn authority of scripture, that Deity does so, without the least "malignity," according to the purest principles of a righteous judicature. The Bible gives us numerous examples of such penal visitations, especially that of Sodom and Gomorrah, where Nature had no power of interference, being caused by the angelic messengers of an insulted God. If Mr. Lyell's position be maintained, the Bible must be regarded as teaching a vile imposture; because it describes these calamitous events as the penal visitations of our Moral Governor.

PERHAPS there has not been a more objectionable writer on philosophic subjects, in our own country and times, than Mr. Charles Babbage. His "fragment," which he has chosen to term "the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise," is replete with erroneous views of the Divine Government. Having embraced the wildest theories of modern Geology, and reconciled them (in his own mind) with astronomical speculations of a similar cast, he would fain bring both reason and religion down to the level of his puerile fancies. He appears to have taken umbrage at an assertion of Mr. Whewell, that minds which have been wholly devoted to mathematical deductions are often rendered less fit and ready to apprehend and accept truths of a different class, because they have not been accustomed to exercise the powers of their understanding upon other subjects than those connected with their favourite science. Mr. Whewell very charitably accounts for this failing, (which has been the wonder and complaint of general society for many years,) from "the exclusive pursuit of particular trains and modes of reasoning, till the mind becomes less capable

of forming the conceptions and making the exertions which are requisite for the apprehension of truths not included in its usual subjects of thought." But Mr. Babbage wishes to show that the current opinion is incorrect; and, like the maniac who strove to prove that he was not mad, by arguments of so fantastic a nature as to convince every one of his actual derangement, he only furnishes an additional proof that the world is not far wrong in its belief. Mr. Whewell could not have a better example of his doctrine than that furnished by "the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise," the very title and introduction to which prepare the mind for something peculiarly strange.

It would appear that Mr. Babbage has invented a calculating machine, on the plan of which he imagines the world to have been created; and because its evolutions are performed with great exactness, according to the will of the person who arranges its stops, before putting it into motion, he supposes that Deity first set in order the laws of Nature, with certain pre-arranged causes of changes, in which provision was made for every contingency that has happened since the beginning. Our author seems to have obtained a new moral light, when thus viewing the world as a simple piece of mechanism; and he is enraptured with the fancied wisdom of the Great Contriver, who devised a calculating machine on so large a scale.

Forgetting that Deity is an Eternal Now, Mr. Babbage regards him as foreknowing and pre-arranging the universe like a finite creature, whose operations are confined to a particular period, and whose work, when once finished, would not require any further superintendence, or admit of any new modifications. On this ground, he tries to take away the value of miracles, by regarding them as necessary evolutions in the world's machinery: consequently, the workers of miracles were very adroit mathematicians, being able to calculate the precise period when such pre-arranged irregularities would take place. "The object of the present chapter," says he in chapter viii., "is to show that it is more consistent with the attributes of Deity to look upon miracles, not as deviations from the laws assigned by the Almighty for the government of matter and of mind; but as the exact fulfilment of much more extensive laws than we suppose to exist." In this view of the subject, man's belief in miracles is only a proof of the weakness or limited nature of his understanding!

The scepticism of the following passages is counterbalanced by their extravagance: "The waves of the air thus raised" (by the

human voice) "perambulate the earth and ocean's surface, and in less than twenty hours every atom of its atmosphere takes up the altered movement due to that infinitesimal portion of the primitive motion which has been conveyed to it through countless channels, and which must continue to influence its path throughout its future existence.-If man enjoyed a larger command over mathematical analysis, his knowledge of these motions would be more extensive; but a being possessed of unbounded knowledge of that science could trace every the minutest consequence of that primary impulse; would distinctly foresee and might absolutely predict, for any, even the remotest, period of time, the circumstances and future history of every particle of that atmosphere.—The air itself is one vast library, on whose ́pages are for ever written all that man has ever said or woman whispered. There in these mutable but unerring characters, mixed with the earliest as well as the latest sighs of mortality, stand for ever recorded, vows unredeemed, promises unfulfilled, perpetuating in the united movement of each particle the testimony of man's changeful will. But if the air we breathe is the never-failing historian of the sentiments we have uttered, earth, air, and ocean are the eternal witnesses of the acts we have done." If such be the case, we do hope that our posterity will never become expert mathematicians, or else they will be acquainted with our most secret thoughts, words, and actions! But if Mr. Babbage had ever been exposed to a tempest on land, or a storm at sea, he would have entertained great fears for the safety of his aëriel library, lest its contents should have been so thoroughly mixed together as to be no more intelligible.

Mr. Babbage seems perfectly ignorant of logic, and of any kind of evidence save that of figures. Yet, though cosmogonists cannot adduce a particle of mathematical evidence on behalf of their speculations, he takes it for granted that they are fully substantiated; forgetting that there is any difference between a belief in the existence of certain facts, and the reason of their production,-between a perception of the effect, and an admission of an adequate cause. He says, "To those who are unacquainted with this science, (Geology,) or indeed to any person not deeply versed in the history of this and kindred subjects, it is impossible to convey a just impression of the nature of that evidence by which a multitude of its conclusions are supported ;-evidence in many cases so irresistible, that the records of the past ages to which it refers are traced in language more imperishable than

that of the historian of any human transaction: the relics of those beings entombed in the strata, which myriads of centuries have heaped upon their graves, giving a present evidence of their past existence with which no human testimony can compete." This is hyperbole indeed! But since the hieroglyphics of ancient history are so indelibly fixed in the rocks, it does seem a pity that they should be so ambiguous that they cannot be deciphered with any degree of confidence as to the result; since those who are most "deeply versed" in the science differ from one another upon almost every part of the subject.

It would be highly amusing to see our philosopher in a barrister's place, attending to the examination of witnesses. The truth of their testimony would require to be calculated by Laplace's doctrine of probabilities: so that an involved case of circumstantial evidence would occupy the best mathematicians for a long period of time; indeed, both the accused and the accusers would doubtlessly die of old age before all the needful calculations could have been completed. There would be no necessity for a judge, jury, or barrister; algebra would solve the whole question on demonstrative grounds. In conformity with this novel practice of deciding upon human testimony, Mr. Babbage agrees with Hume's main argument against miracles; (and therefore against scripture;) only differing from him on one point, which is afterwards explained away in a note. We shall give a specimen of this curious piece of argument, that it may, by its folly, serve as an antidote to the sceptical opinions thrown out by modern men of science.

"The condition, therefore, in regard to the testimony, is, that the improbability of its falsehood must be greater than the occurrence of the fact. Hume asserts that this condition cannot be fulfilled by the evidence of any number of witnesses, because our experience of the truth of human testimony is not uniform and without any exceptions; whereas, our evidence of the course of nature, or our experience against miracles, is uniform and uninterrupted." But Hume appears to have been but slightly acquainted with the doctrine of "probabilities." After stating that one of the most important principles on which the question rests, is the "concurrence of the testimony of independent witnesses," Mr. Babbage proceeds: "Let us examine what is the probability of a statement about to be made by two such ́ persons," (who will speak the truth, and who are not themselves deceived in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred,) "absolutely