with unconcern at the very critical situation in which that event would place him. Under these impressions, he thought much ought to be risqued to obtain so desirable an object as the destruction of the army now in Boston; and with this view, he frequently reconnoitred the situation of the enemy, and was assiduous in collecting every information respecting their strength. The result of his observations and enquiries seems to have been, a strong inclination to the opinion, that to carry the works of the enemy by storm, though very hazardous, was not absolutely impracticable. He therefore determined to call the attention of his general officers to this subject, and having previously communicated to them in a letter, the points he wished them to consider, they were assembled in council for the purpose of deciding on the meditated attack. They were unanimously of opinion that, " for the present at least, the attempt should not be made." This resolution having been formed, the original plan of keeping up the blockade, and strengthening the camp, was persevered in. In the mean time the distress of the British army, for fresh meat and vegetables, became very considerable. They could not receive these articles in the ordinary mode, from the country; and they could not spare such a number of troops for distant excursions, as might safely penetrate far enough to obtain adequate supplies. Some small parties sailed from Boston, probably with this object; but they met, wherever they appeared, with such opposition from the militia and minute men, as to be obliged to return to their ships, frequently without having obtained such ample supplies as their situation required To guard against these L12 CHAP. IV. 1774 CHAP. IV. 1774. these plundering parties, required a degree of exertion and activity, on the part of the inhabitants of the sea coast, which they soon found extremely harrassing; and the governors of the different colonies were urgent that detachments from the main army should be ordered to protect them from these predatory incursions. Although it was impossible to spare the troops demanded; yet the refusal to comply with these requests, occasioned no inconsiderable degree of irritation. So difficult is it for those who view only a part of a system, to judge rightly of the whole; and so certain is it that the great plans formed for the general safety must be deranged, if partial interferences be permitted. These demands of particular protection were so importunate, and the unavoidable refusal to comply with them was so ill received, that it was deemed necessary by Congress, to pass a resolution, de. claring that the army before Boston was designed only to oppose the enemy at that place, and ought not to be weakened by detachments for the security of other parts of the country. At Newport, in Rhode Island, the committee sought to secure the town by entering into a compromise with Captain Wallace, who commanded the ships of war on that station, in which it was stipulated that he should be furnished with provisions, on condition of his sparing the town, and committing no depredations on the country. This compromise while it secured those who had entered into it, interfered with the general plan of distressing the enemy, by withholding from them all supplies of provisions, and set an example which it was feared would be followed to a most pernicious extent. Although, afterwards, the assembly of Rhode Island, in imitation of the other colonies, passed an act for inflicting capital punishment punishment on those who should be convicted of holding any traiterous correspondence with the ministry of Great Britain, or any of their agents; or of supplying the English army or navy, with provisions or other necessaries; yet they excepted from the operation of this act, those who should furnish supplies of provisions to Captain Wallace, under his agreement with the town council of Newport. General Washington at length deemed it necessary to interfere, and to represent in a letter addressed to the governor of that province, the mischief to be apprehended from so dangerous a practice. While the blockade of Boston was thus perseveringly maintained, and every effort used to distress the enemy in that place, the transactions on other parts of the continent were calculated to attract the utmost attention. In July, Georgia had entered into the opposition made to the claims of the British Parliament to tax America, and had chosen delegates to represent that province in Congress; after which, the style of the Thirteen United Colonies was assumed, and by that title the English provinces, confederated, and in arms, were thence forward designated. After a very short recess of one month, Congress again assembled at Philadelphia. They immediately took under their consideration the state of the colonies, and the letters of the Commander in chief. The scarcity of arms and ammunition continued to be an alarming difficulty, which cramped all their military movements, and which their utmost efforts had been unable to remove. They not only applied large sums towards ob taining CHAP. IV. 1774 1774. CHAP IV. taining these articles on continental account, but recommended it to the state conventions, to use all the means in their power to effect the same object. These exertions were not entirely unsuccessful. They had the address to purchase all the powder on the coast of Africa, even within the British forts, without attracting notice; and they seized the magazine in the island of Bermudas, the inhabitants of which were well disposed to favour the attempt, and were restrained only by their inability to act efficiently, and by the insecurity of their situation from making one common cause with the continental colonies. They also made great exertions towards the internal manufacture of gunpowder, and the obtaining within themselves, saltpetre and sulphur, the principal materials in the composition of that all-important article. All these measures however, could not afford adequate supplies, and the danger resulting from the want of an article so vitally essential in war, still continued to be very great. The importance of a maritime force to the military operations of a country possessing an immense extent of sea coast, must always be felt very sensibly; and the particular attention of the united colonies was, in a very early period of the contest, directed more immediately to this interesting object, by an event not very unusual in the period of hostilities, but which, at the time, excited no small degree of resentment. Orders had been issued in his Majesty's name to the commanders of his ships of war, to proceed, as in the case of actual rebellion, against their sea port towns and places, which were ac cessible cessible to the king's ships, and in which any troops should be CHAP IV. raised or military works erected. The town of Falmouth, a flourishing village on the sea side of Massachussetts, having given some particular offence, its destruction was determined on, and, under colour of these orders, a small naval force commanded by Captain Mowat, was detached for that purpose. On his arrival, about three o'clock in the evening of the 17th, he gave notice that he was directed to burn every sea port town between Boston and Halifax; and that, as a favour to Falmouth, he had obtained permission to suspend the execution of his orders till the next morning, provided they would send him eight of their small arms. This proposition was acceded to, and the next day the committee of the place waited on him to endeavour to save their town. He offered to wait for further orders from his admiral, provided they would deliver up all their arms of every sort, with all their ammunition, and four of their citizens, as hostages. 1774 burned. This extraordinary demand not being complied with, a furi- Falmouth ous cannonade and bombardment was commenced, by which the town was reduced to ashes. An attempt was then made to penetrate into the country, but the militia and minute men, rather irritated than intimated by this wanton act of unavailing devastation, drove the party which had landed back to their ships, with loss. This measure was very strongly reprobated throughout America, and was a mean of stimulating the attention of the united colonies to their marine, and hastening their preparations for retaliating |