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it is abfolutely impoffible, but that a Play, that has all these Qualifications, must please, divert, fatisfy, and content beyond that which wants them; as for the most part those do ૮ that are now acted. And the Poets that write them are not in the Fault; for fome of them are very fenfible of the Errors they commit, and know what they ought to do. But Plays being become venal, they fay, and are in the right on't, that the Actors would give nothing for them, if they were not of 'that Stamp. And therefore the Poet endeavours to fuit himself to what the Actor, who is to pay for it, requires, &c.

This is fo near an Image of our Dramatick State, in this Nation, that I hope the Obfervation of fo receiv'd a Wit as Michael Cervantes, will have fome weight with our Men of Figure, who are, or would be thought Men of Senfe and Politenefs. Yet, if they should think Authority infufficient, because against their wretched Gouft; I fhall fhew, that Reason is as much against them: and then fhew the Source of our ill Tafte, and the Corruption of our Stage, by giving a View of the Original and Rife of the Drama, in Greece, in Rome, and in this Nation.

To come therefore to Reason, against those blind Enemies to Regularity, and without which there can be no Harmony, we must prove that Poetry is an Art.

As the Injustice of Men was the Cause of Laws, fo the Decay of Arts, and the Faults committed in them (as Dacier obferves) oblig'd Men first to make Rules, and afterwards to revive them. The Laws of Legiflators place all their Reafon in their Will, or the prefent Occurrences; but the Rules of Poetry advance nothing but what is accompany'd with Reason, and drawn from the common Sentiments of Mankind: fo that Men themfelves become the Rule and Measure of what these prescribe.

All Arts are certain Rules or Means of arriving at, or doing fomething that is good and beneficial to Mankind; now Poetry aiming at the Inftruction of Men by Pleasure, it propofes a certain End for the Good of Men: it must therefore have certain Rules or Means of obtaining that End; and is therefore an Art.

Poetry

Poetry is not only an Art, but its Rules are known, and it is impoffible to fucceed without them. The certain Consequence of this is, that the Rules, and what pleases, are never contrary to each other, and that you can never obtain the latter, without the former. Secondly, That Poefy being an Art, can never be prejudicial to Mankind: for when any Verses are so, they deviate from the Rules, and are no longer Poetry, which was invented, and improv❜d for their advantage only. Poefy owes its Rife to Religion: Hymns in the praise of, and Thanksgiving to Heaven for Bleffings receiv'd, was the original Poetry; for Men, naturally inclin'd to Imitation, employ'd their native Tendence to Mufick and Song, to the Praises of their Gods: And had Man continu'd in his primitive Simplicity, Hymns and Divine Songs, as among the Hebrews, had been all our Poetry. But in the Heathen Syftem, Men foon deviated from this Purity; admitting firft the Praife of Men, and then Satire, or Raillery on one another at their drunken Meetings, at Harvest-home, or the like. Thus Poetry being corrupted foon, scarce retain'd any Footsteps of Religion, whence it firft fprung.

The fucceeding Poets, being the Divines and Philofophers of thofe times, obferving the invincible Bent of the People to these Feafts and Shows, and that it would be a fruitless Labour and Endeavour to reftore their primitive Simplicity; took an admirable and wife care to turn this Inclination of theirs to Pleasure, to their advantage; by making that Pleasure convey Inftruction to them, in fo agreeable a manner.

To pass over the various Changes of Poetry, we must remember that we owe to Homer the Epick Poem; and in that, the Origin of Tragedy, more excellent for the Regulation of the Paffions, than the Epopee, which only reach'd to Cuftoms. The Invention of Comedy fome attribute to the Corruption and degenerate Luxury of the People, fome to the Margites of Homer; but both thefe Opinions are easily reconcil'd: for the Opprobria Ruftica, as Horace calls them, the lewd Railleries of the Country-People at their drunken rural Festivals, gave the Ground-work, which the Margites of Homer reduc'd into a more decent Form and Order,

and

and gave the Idea, whence after-Poets deriv'd the antient Comedy.

But hence it is plain, as I have faid, that Poefy is an Art, becaufe we fee from its Rife it has propos'd a certain End, and muft neceffarily have certain Means to be conducted to that End. For where there is a Right and a Wrong, there must be foine Art or Rules to avoid the one, and arrive at the other. But then perhaps it may fill be queftion'd, whether thefe Rules are fix'd and known, and whether they are those prescrib'd by Ariftotle? That they are known, will be plain from what follows; and that they are thofe of Ariftotle, at leaft in the Drama (which I fhall chiefly infift on in this Effay) will be as plain, if we confìder, ft, Who gives the Rules: 2dly, When he gave them: and 3dly, The Manner in which he gave them. Ariftotle's Character for Knowledge in all the politer Arts, will be of fome Force; for his Genius and Capacity are fufficiently known to the Learned. 2dly, The Age he liv'd in, was in almost the first Regulation, if not Rife of Tragedy; learning the Art with Sophocles, and Euripides, who brought it to Perfection, and feeing the effect it had on the moft polite and knowing People of the World. 3dly, The Manner in which they are deliver'd, is fo evident and conformable to Nature, as that I cannot but be fenfible of their truth. To confirm this, I confider the effects they have had in all Nations where they were known; for all the Beauties of Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, and the other Greek Poets of any note, are perfectly conformable to them: and these being five hundred years after reviv'd, in the time of Auguftus, at Rome, we find the Beauties of Virgil, and the Latins owing to them. Nay, two thousand Years after they were written, we obferve that by them the best Tragedies of France and Spain, nay, I may fay of England too, are thofe in which they are perfectly follow'd: in which all that pleafes, is according to the Rules; and all that difgufts, or is infipid, wild, or extravagant, contrary to them: for good Senfe and right Reafon are of all Countries. Human Laws indeed which regard the State, alter according to the Circumftances and Interests of the Men for which they were made: but these are

always

always the fame, and ever fupport their Vigour, because they are the Law of Nature, which always acts uniformly, revives them continually, and gives them a perpetual Exiftence.

From hence it follows, that these Rules are known, and that they are those deliver'd by Ariftotle, and that they are never oppofite to what pleases; fince they were made to fhew us the Path we ought to tread, that we may arrive at what pleafes. Were the Rules and what pleases oppofite, we could never please but by chance; which is abfurd. As there are certain Rules, therefore, that teach us to please, fo we ought to make it our business to ftudy and learn them, both for the reading and judging part: for these Rules are drawn from the Pleafant and the Profitable, and lead us to their Source. The Pleafant and the Profitable are what naturally pleafe; and that, in all Arts, is what we always confult. In this most perfect and fure Model of Imitation, we find perfect UNITY, and ORDER; for it is it felf the Effect of Order, and the Rule to conduct us to it :while there is only one way to find Order, but many to fall into Confufion.

There would be nothing bad (fays Dacier very juftly) in the • World, if all that pleas'd were good; for there's nothing fo abfurd, but will have fome Admirers. You may fay indeed, ' that it is not true that what is Good pleases, because we daily fee Difputes about the Good and the Pleafant; that the fame thing pleases some, and displeases others; nay, it pleases and difpleafes the very fame Man at different times. From whence then proceeds this difference? It comes either from an abfolute Ignorance of the Rule, or that the Paffions alter it. Rightly to clear this Truth, I believe, I may lay down this Maxim, That all fenfible Objects are of two forts; some may judg'd of by the Senfe independently of Reafon (I call Sense that Impreffion which the animal Spirits make on the Soul) and others can't • be judg'd of, but by Reafon exercis'd in Science. Things fimply agreeable or difagreeable, are of the first Sort; all the World may judge alike of these. For example, the moft Ignorant in Mufick perceives very well when a Player on the Lute frikes VOL. VII.

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C

be

one

one String for another; because he judges by his Senfe, and his Senfe is the Rule. On fuch occafions we may, therefore, very well fay, That all that pleases, is good; becaufe that which is good does please, or that which is ill never fails to difpleafe for neither Paffion, nor Ignorance dull the Senfes, • but sharpen them. It is not thus in things that fpring from Reafon Paffion and Ignorance work very ftrongly in them, • and choke the Judgment; and for this caufe we ordinarily judge fo ill, and differently in those things of which Reafon is the Rule, and the Caufe. Why what is bad often pleases, and that which is good does not always do fo, is not the Fault of the Object, but of the Judge: But what is good will infallibly please those who can judge, and that's fufficient. By this we may fee, that a Play, that fhall bring those things which are to be judg'd by Reafon within the Rules, and alfo that which is to be judg'd by Senfe, fhall never fail to please both the Learned, and the Ignorant. Now this Conformity of Suffra ges is the most fure, or, according to Ariftotle, the only mark of the Good and Pleafant. But thefe Suffrages are not to be ob tain'd but by the obferving of the Rules, and confequently thefe Rules are the only caufe of the Good and the Pleafant; whether they are follow'd methodicaly and with design, ⠀or only by hazard or chance. For 'tis certain, there are many Perfons who are intirely ignorant of these Rules, and yet do not miss of Success in many things. But this is far from deftroying the Rules, fince it only ferves to fhew their Beauty, and proves how far they are conformable to Nature, fince thofe often follow them, who know nothing of them.

The latter end of this is perfectly prov'd by our Shakespear, who in all that pleases is exactly conformable to the Rules, tho 'tis evident by his Defects, that he knew nothing of them. I hope this is enough to fatisfy any reasonable Man, not only that aš Poefy is an Art, it propofes certain Means to arrive at a certain End; but that thefe Rules are abfolutely neceffary for the judging, and writing juftly. If any one defire to fee this Argument handled more at large, it will be worth his while to read Mon