Council of War, which sat no less than sixteen hours; and that after all this, during the next five days, no preparations were even made for landing, none of the cannon or stores were got into the cutters, neither were the very mantelettes fixed to the boats that they were to land in, 'till so late on the 29th that they had hardly time to do it; on that night also, the General quitted the Ramillies, and went aboard the America, designing to land themselves from her, and it was from some resolution they took there, that they ordered the troops back to their transports. As to what passed in the Councils of War it is difficult as yet to know, as Cornwallis is not yet come to town, and Conway came but the day before yesterday. I find however that they consisted of the admirals and the senior captain, and the general officers, and the senior colonel, which was Howard. I believe it is also certain that Conway protests that he was for landing both at the first, and also on the 29th; and if his friends are to be credited, he thought the scheme very practicable; and by a letter I have received from a person who has seen several of the regiments since their landing, I find it to be the general opinion of the officers that the scheme would have succeeded at first, but think it would not have done on the 29th. The number of French troops that were on the coast is a point that is very little agreed on: I have seen no one that pretends to say that they saw any camps, but an officer has assured me that he saw some regiments exercising on the shore, as well horse as foot; and yet accounts from France say that all the force they had was six regiments of Gardes des Côtes, and two of regular troops, of all which, two regiments were at Rochelle, two at Fouras, and four at Rochfort:

it is also affirmed that the King of France said at his levée: "By this time the English are in possession of Rochfort, and it will cost me thirty millions of livres to repair the injury they will do me;" the sum seems rather extravagant. I do not hear a word of batteries on shore, but they saw them every day enlarging their works at Fort Fouras. The point the generals rest their defence on, is the difficulty of retreating to their ships, in case there had been a superior force; but to this it is answered, and universally allowed, that if they had taken Fouras, they might have retreated in defiance of any number of troops, and they might have made a trial of what they could do there, before any troops could come to attack them: this fort was weaker towards the land than the sea, so that it was the business of the land forces rather than the sea, and yet the pilot engaged to run a ship so near to the fort as to batter it with success if they would venture her being run ashore this fort once taken, it was thought that nothing would then oppose them up to Rochfort.

Having been so tedious upon this unhappy affair, I will mention what I have yet to say in as few words as possible. You heard perhaps on Saturday night, or else permit me to surprise you with telling you now, that the Duke' has resigned all his employments: the cause is, the displeasure of the King upon account of his conduct in Germany, but what has particularly passed between the King and him since his return I know not.

We hope that the King of Prussia will show the French that they are to be beaten; but if he does not, we cannot think that they will besiege so very strong a

1 The Duke of Cumberland.

place as Magdeburgh so late in the year with 16,000 men in it. I have, &c. C. JENKINSON.

MR. ELLIOT TO MR. GRENVILLE.

October 18, 1757.

I SEND you, my dear Sir, the reasons of the Navy Board, which I had copied a great while ago, and, as you rightly conjectured, forgot to transmit to you. I wrote to you last post a long letter upon the expedition, which I had the prudence to throw into the fire. I cannot yet venture to trust my pen with that subject: I can only say that after having carefully perused the Councils of War, letters, &c., and also held many conversations upon the subject with those who were present and privy to all that passed, I still remain unable to comprehend the reason why nothing was attempted. I can make no doubt but the commanding officers have two great a regard for their character not to attempt the clearing up this hitherto unexplained proceeding. The resignation of a great personage is at present the general topic.

CAPTAIN RODNEY TO MR. GRENVILLE

Portsmouth, October 19, 1757. DEAR SIR,-Yesterday I was favoured with yours of the 13th, from Wotton, and imagined you was in the country, by my not having the honour to hear from you sooner, as I waited with some impatience at this important crisis, having a great deal to communicate to you,

had time permitted me to have seen you (but for an hour) in town, which I was fully determined to do, had you been in London; now 'tis too late, as Sir Edward Hawke is come to Portsmouth, and we sail to-morrow or next day at farthest.

The author of the detracting pamphlet called the "Genuine Account," has mixed truth with falsehood; but as to the dissension at the Councils of War (if any), he cannot be a judge, unless 'twas from the extraor dinary length of them, which made people conclude that variety of opinions prevailed therein. This, I can assure my friend, that though he will find my name to the first Council of War, 'twas on this single point only, viz., that Rochfort could not be taken by escalade, if pallisadoed, or a wet ditch. This opinion of mine was grounded upon the opinion of all the generals and engineer, that no place so provided could be taken by escalade. As I was totally unacquainted with the nature of land attacks, I hope you will think I was obliged to depend upon the judgment of those who were supposed to be masters of their profession; but I must beg you will take notice that I was far from the opinion that Rochfort could not be taken or destroyed by other methods, or that the troops should not land; for, from the first to the last, I continued firm in that resolution, nor could I ever see any cause to alter it.

What will be your surprise when I tell you that the Isle of Aix surrendered the 23rd, at two o'clock in the afternoon, and the Council of War (which ought to have been held that moment, if necessary) was not summoned 'till the 25th. To me it appeared astonishing, as by my letter to you of the 23rd you will know what I thought ought to have been done instantly; and so cer

tain did it appear to me at that juncture, that I had prepared all the boats and troops on board the Dublin, to be ready at daylight to obey the signal, which I expected would then be made for landing the troops'. What infatuation prevented our taking that happy opportunity when the enemy were totally unprepared to dispute the landing, I am as yet at a loss to know.

The malicious reports, propagated with a design to mislead the minds of people, are without the least foundation of truth, the Viper sloop of war being the only vessel that brought despatches during our stay in the road of Basque, which despatches were published in the Gazette of the 13th instant. Vide Mr. Pitt's letter to Sir Edward Hawke.

I could say much more to you on the propositions I made to the Commanders-in-Chief, in regard to distressing the enemy by taking the Isle of Oleron, if they would not land on the main; but as my opinion was not then regarded, and as I should be unwilling to fall in your esteem by talking of myself, I shall conclude this long epistle with assuring you that I am most sincerely, Dear Sir, &c., &c. G. B. RODNEY.

P.S. I have the pleasure to tell you my health is restored; hope you and all your family are perfectly well. On my return from this cruize I hope to see you, when you shall know the whole of this unhappy affair.

1 See Captain Rodney's letter of Sept. 23, ante, p. 207.

2 The alleged secret pacific instructions before mentioned. Horace Walpole and Lord Chesterfield refer also to these reports, which were evidently very current at the time.