Of the Influence of Affociation in regulating the Succeffion of SECT. I.-General Obfervations on this Part of our Con- ftitution, and on the Language of Philofo- 4. Of Invention in the Arts and Sciences, V.-Application of the Principles ftated in the fore- IV. Continuation of the fame Subject.-Of the Aid which the Memory derives from Philosophical V.-Continuation of the fame Subject.-Effects pro- duced on the Memory by committing to Writ- VI. Continuation of the fame Subject.—Of Artificial VII. Continuation of the fame Subject.-Importance of making a proper Selection among the Ob- ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 1 HUMAN MIN D. INTRODUCTION. PART FIRST. Of the Nature and Object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. TH HE prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations, feems to arise chiefly from two causes: Firft, from an apprehenfion that the subjects about which they are employed, are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, fecondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life. The frivolous and abfurd difcuffions which abound in the writings of moft Metaphyfical authors, afford but too many arguments in juftification of these opinions; and if fuch difcuffions were to be admitted as a fair fpecimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with juftice be regarded, B regarded, as no inconfiderable evidence of the progrefs which true philofophy has made in the prefent age. Among the various fubjects of inquiry, however, which, in confequence of the vague ufe of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphyfiçs, there are fome, which are effentially diftinguished from the reft, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts: and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general difcredit, into which the other branches of metaphyfics have juftly fallen. To this circumftance is probably to be afcribed, the little progress which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND; a science, fo interesting in its nature, and fo important in its applications, that it could fcarcely have failed, in thefe inquifitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been claffed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable difquifitions of the fchool-men. In order to obviate thefe mifapprehenfions with respect to the fubject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the Nature of the truths which I propofe to inveftigate; and, fecondly, to point out fome of the more important Applications of which they are fufceptible. In ftating thefe preliminary obfervations, I may perhaps appear to fome to be minute and tedious; but this fault, I am confident, will be readily pardoned by thofe, who have ftudied with care the principles of that fcience of which I am to treat; and who are anxious to to remove the prejudices which have, in a great meafure, excluded it from the modern fyftems of education. In the progrefs of my work, I flatter myself that I fhall not often have occafion to folicit the indul gence of my readers, for an unneceffary diffufenefs. The notions we annex to the words, Matter, and Mind, as is well remarked by Dr. Reid *, are merely relative. If I am afked, what I mean by Matter? I can only explain myfelf by faying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or foft, rough or smooth, hot or cold;—that is, I can define it in no other way, than by enumerating its fenfible qua. lities. It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my fenses; but only extenfion, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the conftitution of my nature leads me to refer to fomething, which is extended, figured, and coloured. The cafe is precifely fimilar with respect to Mind. We are not immediately confcious of its existence, but we are confcious of fenfation, thought, and volition; operations, which imply the existence of fomething which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man too is impreffed with an irrefiftible conviction, that all thefe fenfations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the fame being; to that being, which he calls bimfelf; a being, which he is led, by the conftitution of his nature, to confider as fomething diftinct from his body, and as not liable tɔ be impaired by the lofs or mutilation of any of his organs. From thefe confiderations, it appears, that we have the fame evidence for the existence of mind, that we Effays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 8, 9. |