fider that all the languages which have hitherto exifted in the world, have derived their origin from popular use; and that their application to philofophical purposes, was altogether out of the view of those men who firft employed, them. Whether it might not be poffible to invent a language, which would at once facilitate philofophical communication, and form a more convenient inftrument of reafoning and of invention, than thofe we poffefs at prefent, is a queftion of very difficult difcuffion; and upon which I fhall not prefume to offer an opinion. The failure of Wilkins's very ingenious attempt towards a real character, and a philofophical language, is not perhaps decifive against fuch a project; for, not to mention some radical defects in his plan, the views of that very eminent philofopher do not feem to have extended much farther than to promote and extend the literary intercourfe among different nations. Leibnitz, fo far as I know, is the only author who has hitherto conceived the poffibility of aiding the powers of invention and of reafoning, by the use of a more convenient inftrument of thought; but he has no where explained his ideas on this very interefting fubject. It is only from a converfation of his with Mr. Boyle and Mr. Oldenburgh, when he was in England in 1673, and from fome imperfect hints in different parts of his works *, that we find it had engaged his attention. In the course of this converfation he obferved, that Wilkins had mistaken the true end of a real character, which was not merely to enable different nations to correfpond eafily together, but

* See Note [L].

to

to affift the reafon, the invention, and the memory. In his writings, too, he fomewhere fpeaks of an alphabet of human thoughts, which he had been employed in forming, and which, probably, (as Fontenelle has remarked,) had some relation to his univerfal language *.

The new nomenclature which has been introduced into chymistry, feems to me to furnish a striking illuftration of the effect of appropriated and well-defined expreffions, in aiding the intellectual powers; and the period is probably not far diftant, when fimilar innovations will be attempted in fome of the other fciences.

«M Leibnitz avoit conçu le projet d'une langue philofophi"que et univerfelle. Wilkins Evêque de Chefter, et Dalgarno y "avoient travaillé ; mais dès le tems qu'il etoit en Angleterre, il "avoit dit à Meffieurs Boyle et d' Oldenbourg qu'il ne croyoit

pas que ces grands hommes euffent encore frappé au but. Ils "pouvoient bien faire que des nations qui ne s'entendoient pas "euffent aisément commerce, mais ils n'avoient pas attrappé les "véritables caractères réels, qui étoient l'inftrument le plus fin "dont l'efprit humain fe pût fervir, et qui devoient extrêmement "faciliter et le raisonnement, et la memoire, et l'invention des "chofes. Ils devoient reffembler, autant qu'il étoit poffible, aux "caractères d'algebre, qui en effet font très fimples, et très expreffifs, qui n'ont jamais ni fuperfluité, ni équivoque, et dont "toutes les varietés font raifonnées. Il a parlé en quelque endroit, "d'un alphabet des penfées humaines, qu'il meditoit. Selon.

66

toutes les apparences, cet alphabet avoit rapport à fa langue "univerfelle." Eloge de M. LEIBNITZ par M. de FONTENELLE.

SECT.

SECTION V.

Of the Purposes to which the Powers of Abstraction and Generalifation are fubfervient.

IT

T has been already fhewn, that, without the use of figns, all our knowledge must neceffarily have been limited to individuals, and that we should have been perfectly incapable both of claffification and general reasoning. Some authors have maintained, that without the power of generalifation, (which I have endeavoured to fhew, means nothing more than the capacity of employing general terms,) it would have been impoffible for us to have carried on any fpecies of reafoning whatever. But I cannot help thinking that this opinion is erroneous; or, at leaft, that it is very imperfectly stated. The truth is, it appears to me to be juft in one sense of the word reafoning, but falfe in another; and I even fufpect it is falfe in that sense of the word in which it is most commonly employed. Before, therefore, it is laid down as a general propofition, the meaning we are to annex to this very vague and ambiguous term, fhould be ascertained with precifion.

It has been remarked by feveral writers, that the expectation which we feel of the continuance of the laws of nature, is not founded upon reasoning; and different theories have of late been proposed to account for its origin. Mr. Hume refolves it into the affociation of ideas. Dr. Reid, on the other hand,

maintains,

maintains, that it is an original principle of our conftitution, which does not admit of any explanation; and which, therefore, is to be ranked among those general and ultimate facts, beyond which, philosophy is unable to proceed *. Without this principle of expectation, it would be impoffible for us to accommodate our conduct to the established course of nature; and, accordingly, we find that it is a principle coeval with our very existence; and, in some measure, common to man with the lower animals.

In inquiries of this nature, fo far removed from the common course of literary pursuits, it always gives me pleasure to remark a coincidence of opinion among different philofophers; particularly among men of original genius, and who have been educated in different philofophical fyftems. The following paffage, in which M. de Condorcet gives an account of fome of the matephyfical opinions of the late Mr. Turgot, approaches very nearly to Dr. Reid's doctrines.

"La mémoire de nos fenfations, et la faculté que nous avons "de réfléchir fur ces fenfations paffées et de les combiner, font "le feul principe de nos connoiffances. La fuppofition qu'il "exifte des loix conftantes auxquelles tous les phénomenes obfervés "font affujettis de maniere à reparoitre dans tous les temps, dans "toutes les circonftances, tels qu'ils font déterminés par ces loix, "eft le feul fondement de la certitude de ces connoiffances.

"Nous avons la confcience d'avoir obfervé cette conftance, et un "fentiment involontaire nous force de croire qu'elle continuera de "fubfifter. La probabilité qui en refulte, quelque grande qu'elle "foit, n'eft pas une certitude. Aucune relation néceffaire ne lie pour nous le passé à l'avenir, ni la conftance de ce que j'ai vu à "celle de ce que j'aurois continué d'observer si j'etois resté dans des "circonftances femblables; mais l'impreffion qui me porte à re❝garder comme existant, comme réel ce qui m'a présenté ce carac"terede conftance eft irréfiftible."-Vie de TURGOT, partie ii. p. 56. "Quand un François et un Anglois penfent de même, (says "Voltaire,) il faut bien qu'ils aient raifon."

It is an obvious confequence of this doctrine, that, although philofophers be accustomed to ftate what are commonly called the laws of nature, in the form of general propofitions, it is by no means neceffary for the practical purposes of life, that we should exprefs them in this manner; or even that we fhould express them in words at all. The philofopher, for example, may ftate it as a law of nature, that "fire fcorches;" or that "heavy bodies, when unfupported, fall downwards :" but, long before the use of artificial figns, and even before the dawn of reason, a child learns to act upon both of these fuppofitions. In doing fo, it is influenced merely by the inftinctive principle which has now been mentioned, directed in its operation (as is the cafe with many other inftincts) by the experience of the individual. If man, therefore, had been deftined for no other purposes, than to acquire fuch an acquaintance with the course of nature, as is neceffary for the prefervation of his animal existence; he might have fulfilled all the ends of his being without the use of language.

As we are enabled, by our inftinctive anticipation of physical events, to accommodate our conduct to what we foresee is to happen, fo we are enabled, in many cafes, to increase our power, by employing phyfical caufes as inftruments for the accomplishment of our purposes; nay, we can employ a feries of fuch causes, so as to accomplish very remote effects. We can employ the agency of air, to increase the heat of a furnace; the furnace, to render iron malleable; and the iron to all the various purposes of the mecha