pletely familiarifed to the mind, as the most obvious phenomena which the material world exhibits to their fenfes.

If these remarks be juft, they open an unbounded prospect of intellectual improvement to future ages; as they point out a provifion made by nature to facilitate and abridge, more and more, the procefs of fludy, in proportion as the truths to be acquired increase in number. Nor is this profpect derived from theory alone. It is encouraged by the past hiftory of all the fciences; in a more particular manner, by that of mathematics and phyfics, in which the ftate of discovery, and the prevailing methods of inftruction, may, at all times be cafily compared together. In this last observation I have been anticipated by a late eminent mathematician, whofe eloquent and philofophical statement of the argument cannot fail to carry conviction to thofe, who are qualified to judge of the facts on which his conclufion is founded:

"To fuch of my readers as may be flow in admit

ting the poffibility of this progreffive improvement "in the human race, allow me to state, as an example, "the hiftory of that fcience in which the advances "of discovery are the most certain, and in which

they may be measured with the greatest precision. "Those elementary truths of geometry and of aftro

nomy, which, in India and Egypt, formed an occult "science, upon which an ambitious priesthood "founded its influence, were become, in the times "of Archimedes and Hipparchus, the fubjects of "common education in the public fchool of Greece. "In the last century, a few years of ftudy were fuf

ficient

"ficient for comprehending all that Archimedes and "Hipparchus knew; and, at prefent, two years "employed under an able teacher, carry the ftudent "beyond thofe conclufions, which limited the in"quiries of Leibnitz and of Newton. Let any perfon reflect on these facts: let him follow the "immenfe chain which connects the inquiries of "Euler with those of a Priest of Memphis; let him observe, at each epoch, how genius outstrips the "prefent age, and how it is overtaken by medio

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crity in the next; he will perceive, that nature has furnished us with the means of abridging and "facilitating our intellectual labour, and that "there is no reafon for apprehending that fuch fim

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plifications can ever have an end. He will per"ceive, that at the moment when a multitude of "particular folutions, and cf infulated facts, begin "to diftract the attention, and to overcharge the memory, the former gradually lofe themselves in "one general method, and the latter unite in one "general law; and that these generalizations con"tinually fucceeding one to another, like the "fucceffive multiplications of a number by itself, "have no other limit, than that infinity which the human faculties are unable to comprehend *.

* See Note [M].

SECTION VII.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Differences in the Intelle&ual Characters of Individuals, arifing from their different Habits of Abstraction and Generalisation.

IN

N mentioning as one of the principal effects of civilifation, its tendency to familiarife the mind. to general terms and to general propofitions, I did not mean to fay, that this influence extends equally to all the claffes of men in fociety. On the contrary, it is evidently confined, in a great meafure, to thofe who receive a liberal education; while the minds of the lower orders, like thofe of favages, are fo habitually occupied about particular objects and particular events, that, although they are fometimes led, from imitation, to employ general expreflions, the ufe which they make of them is much more the refult of memory than judgment; and it is but feldom that they are able to comprehend fully, any procefs of reafoning in which they are involved.

It is hardly neceffary for me to remark, that this obfervation, with refpect to the incapacity of the vulgar for general fpeculations, (like all obfervations of a fimilar nature,) must be received with fome reftrictions. In fuch a state of fociety as that in which we live, there is hardly any individual to be found, to whom fome general terms, and fome general truths, are not perfectly familiar; and, therefore, the fore

going conclufions are to be confidered as defcriptive of those habits of thought alone, which are most prevalent in their mind. To abridge the labour of reasoning, and of memory, by directing the attention to general principles, instead of particular truths, is the profeffed aim of all philofophy; and according as individuals have more or lefs of the philofophic spirit, their habitual speculations (whatever the nature of their pursuits may be) will relate to the former, or to the latter, of these objects.

There are, therefore, among the men who are accustomed to the exercife of their intellectual powers, two claffes, whofe habits of thought are remarkably distinguished from each other; the one clafs comprehending what we commonly call men of business, or, more properly, men of detail; the other, men of abstraction; or, in other words, philofophers.

The advantages which, in certain refpects, the latter of these poffefs over the former, have been already pointed out; but it must not be fuppofed, that these advantages are always purchased without fome inconvenience. As the folidity of our general principles depends on the accuracy of the particular observations into which they are ultimately resolvable, fo their utility is to be estimated by the practical applications of which they admit: and it unfortunately happens, that the fame turn of mind which is favourable to philofophical pursuits, unless it be kept under proper regulation, is extremely apt to difqualify us for applying our knowledge to use, in the exercise of the arts, and in the conduct of affairs.

In order to perceive the truth of these remarks, it is almost fufficient to recollect, that as claffification, and, of confequence, general reasoning, presuppose the exercise of abftraction; a natural difpofition to indulge in them, cannot fail to lead the mind to overlook the fpecific differences of things, in attending to their common qualities. To fucceed, however, in practice, a familiar and circumstantial acquaintance with the particular objects which fall under our obfer. vation, is indispensably neceffary.

But, farther: As all general principles are founded on claffifications which imply the exercise of abftraction; it is neceffary to regard them, in their practical applications, merely as approximations to the truth; the defects of which, muft be fupplied by habits acquired by perfonal experience. In con fidering, for example, the theory of the mechanical powers; it is usual to fimplify the objects of our conception, by abftracting from friction, and from the weight of the different parts of which they are compofed. Levers are confidered as mathematical lines, perfectly inflexible; and ropes, as mathematical lines, perfectly flexible;-and by means of these, and fimilar abftractions, a subject, which is in itself extremely complicated, is brought within the reach of elementary geometry. In the theory of politics, we find it neceffary to abftract from many of the peculiarities which distinguish different forms of government from each other, and to reduce them to certain general claffes, according to their prevailing tendency. Although all the governments we have ever feen, have had more or lefs of mixture in their

compo