but what is particular is involved; while, on general topics, he is perfectly unable either to reafon, or to judge. It is this laft turn of mind, which I think we have, in most instances, in view, when we speak of good fenfe, or common fenfe, in oppofition to fcience and philofophy. Both philofophy and good fense imply the exercise of our reasoning powers; and they differ from each other only, according as these powers are applied to particulars or to generals. It is on good fense (in the acceptation in which I have now explained the term) that the fuccefs of men in the inferior walks of life chiefly depends; but, that it does not always indicate a capacity for abftra&t fcience, or for general fpeculation, or for able conduct in fituations which require comprehenfive views, is matter even of vulgar remark.

Although, however, each of these defects has a tendency to limit the utility of the individuals in whom it is to be found, to certain stations in fociety; no comparison can be made, in point of original value, between the intellectual capacities of the two claffes of men to which they characteristically belong. The one is the defect of a vigorous, an ambitious, and a comprehenfive genius, improperly directed; the other, of an understanding, minute and circumfcribed in its views, timid in its exertions, and formed for fervile imitation. Nor is the former defect, (however difficult it may be to remove it when confirmed by long habit,) by any means fo incurable as the latter; for it arifes, not from original conftitution, but from fome fault in early education; while every tendency to the oppofite extreme is more or lefs characteristical

of

of a mind, useful, indeed, in a high degree, when confined to its proper sphere, but deftined, by the hand that formed it, to borrow its lights from another.

As an additional proof of the natural fuperiority which men of general views poffefs over the common drudges in business, it may be farther observed, that the habits of inattention incident to the former, arife in part from the little interest which they take in particular objects and particular occurrences, and are not wholly to be afcribed to an incapacity of attention. When the mind has been long accuftomed to the confideration of claffes of objects and of comprehenfive theorems, it cannot, without fome degree of effort, descend to that humble walk of experience, or of action, in which the meanefst of mankind are on a level with the greateft. In important fituations, accordingly, men of the most general views, are found not to be inferior to the vulgar in their attention to details; because the objects and occurrences which fuch fituations prefent, rouse their paffions, and intereft their curiofity, from the magnitude of the confequences to which they lead.

When theoretical knowledge and practical skill are happily combined in the fame person, the intellectual power of man appears in its full perfection; and fits him equally to conduct, with a masterly hand, the details of ordinary bufinefs, and to contend fuccefsfully with the untried difficulties of new and hazardous fituations. In conducting the former, mere experience may frequently be a fufficient guide, but experience and speculation must be combined toge

ther

ther to prepare us for the latter. "Expert men," fays lord Bacon, "can execute and judge of par"ticulars one by one; but the general counfels, "and the plots, and the marfhalling of affairs, come best from those that are learned."

SECTION VIII.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Ufe and Abuse of general Principles in Politics *.

THE foregoing remarks, on the dangers to be apprehended from a rafh application of general principles, hold equally with refpect to most of the practical arts. Among thefe, however, there is one of far fuperior dignity to the reft; which, partly on

*The events which have happened fince the publication of the former edition of this Volume in 1792, might have enabled me to confirm many of the obfervations in this Section, by an appeal to facts ftill fresh in the recollection of my Readers; and, in one or two inftances, by flight verbal corrections, to guard againft the poffibility of uncandid mifinterpretation: but, for various reafons, which it is unneceffary to state at prefent, I feel it to be a duty which I owe to myfelf, to fend the whole difcuffion again to the prefs in its original form. That the doctrine it inculcates is favourable to the good order and tranquillity of fociety, cannot be difputed; and, as far as I myself am perfonally interested, I have no wish to vitiate the record which it exhibits of my opinions.

On fome points which are touched upon very flightly here, I have explained myfelf more fully, in the fourth Section of my Biographical Account of Mr. SMITH, read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1793, and published in the third Volume of their Tranfactions.

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account

account of its importance, and partly on account of some peculiarities in its nature, feems to be entitled, to a more particular confideration. The art I allude to, is that of Legiflation; an art which differs from all others in fome very effential respects, and to which, the reasonings in the last Section must be applied with many restrictions.

Before proceeding farther, it is neceffary for me to premise, that it is chiefly in compliance with common language and common prejudices, that I am fometimes led, in the following obfervations, to contrast theory with experience. In the proper sense of the word Theory, it is fo far from ftanding in oppofition to experience, that it implies a knowledge of principles, of which the most extenfive experience alone could put us in poffeffion. Prior to the time of Lord Bacon, indeed, an acquaintance with facts was not confidered as effential to the formation of theories; and from these ages, has defcended to us, an indifcriminate prejudice against general principles, even in thofe cafes in which they have been fairly obtained in the way of induction.

1

But not to dispute about words: there are plainly two fets of political reafoners; one of which confider the actual inftitutions of mankind as the only fafe foundation for our conclufions, and think every plan of legiflation chimerical, which is not copied from one which has already been realised; while the other apprehend that, in many cafes, we may reafon fafely a priori from the known principles of human nature,

combined

with the particular circumstances of the times. The former are commonly understood as contending for experience in oppofition to theory; the latter are accused of trufting to theory unfupported by experience: but it ought to be remembered, that the political theorift, if he proceeds cautiously and philofophically, founds his conclufions ultimately on experience, no lefs than the political empiric; as the aftronomer, who predicts an eclipse from his knowledge of the principles of the fcience, refts his expectation of the event, on facts which have been previoufly afcertained by obfervation, no lefs than if he inferred it, without any reafoning, from his knowledge of a cycle.

There is, indeed, a certain degree of practical skill which habits of business alone can give, and without which the most enlightened politician must always appear to disadvantage when he attempts to carry his plans into execution. And as this kill is often (in confequence of the ambiguity of language) denoted by the word Experience; while it is feldom poffeffed by those men, who have most carefully ftudied the theory of legiflation; it has been very generally concluded, that politics is merely a matter of routine, in which philofophy is rather an obftacle to fuccefs. The ftatefman who has been formed among official details, is compared to the practical engineer; the fpeculative legiflator, to the theoretical mechanician who has paffed his life among books and diagrams. In order to afcertain how far this opinion is juft, it may be of ufe to compare the art of legiflation with thofe practical applications of mecha