and an account of the most important laws which regulate their operation; but an explanation of the various modifications and combinations of these principles, which produce that diverfity of talents, genius, and character, we obferve among men. To inftruct youth in the languages, and in the sciences, is comparatively of little importance, if we are inattentive to the habits they acquire; and are not careful in giving, to all their different faculties, and all their different principles of action, a proper degree of employment. Abstracting entirely from the culture of their moral powers, how extenfive and difficult is the business of conducting their intellectual improvement! To watch over the affociations which they form in their tender years; to give them early habits of mental activity; to rouze their curiofity, and to direct it to proper objects; to exercife their ingenuity and invention; to cultivate in their minds a turn for fpeculation, and at the fame time preferve their attention alive to the ob. jects around them; to awaken their fenfibilities to the beauties of nature, and to infpire them with a relish for intellectual enjoyment;-thefe form but a part of the bufinefs of education; and yet the execution even of this part requires an acquaintance with the general principles of our nature, which feldom falls to the share of thofe to whom the inftruction of youth is commonly intrufted.Nor will fuch a theoretical knowledge of the human mind, as I have now defcribed, be always fufficient in practice. An uncommon degree of fagacity is frequently requifite, in order to accommodate general rules to particular tempers, and characters.—In whatever way we chufe to account for it,

whether

whether by original organisation, or by the operation of moral caufes, in very early infancy; no fact can be more undeniable, than that there are important differences difcernible in the minds of children, previous to that period at which, in general, their intellectual education commences. There is, too, a certain hereditary character (whether refulting from phyfical conftitution, or caught from imitation and the influence of fituation), which appears remarkably in particular families. One race, for a fucceffion of generations, is distinguished by a genius for the abstract sciences, while it is deficient in vivacity, in imagination, and in tafte: another is no less distinguished for wit, and gaiety, and fancy; while it appears incapable of patient attention, or of profound research. The fyftem of education which is proper to be adopted in particular cafes, ought, undoubtedly, to have some reference to these circumftances; and to be calculated, as much as poffible, to develope and to cherish those intellectual and active principles, in which a natural deficiency is moft to be apprehended. Montefquieu, and other fpeculative politicians, have infifted much on the reference which education and laws fhould have to climate. I fhall not take upon me to fay, how far their conclufions on this fubject are juft; but I am fully perfuaded, that there is a foundation in philofophy, and good fenfe, for accommodating, at a very early period of life, the education of individuals to thofe particular turns of mind, to which, from hereditary propenfities, or from moral fituation, they may be prefumed to have a natural tendency.

There

There are few fubjects more hackneyed than that of education; and yet there is none, upon which the opinions of the world are ftill more divided. Nor is this furprifing; for most of those who have speculated concerning it, have confined their attention chiefly to incidental questions about the comparative advantages of public or private inftruction, or the utility of particular languages or fciences; without attempting a previous examination of thofe faculties and principles of the mind, which it is the great object of education to improve. Many excellent detached obfervations, indeed, both on the intellectual and moral powers, are to be collected from the writings of ancient and mo dern authors; but I do not know, that in any language an attempt has been made to analyse and illuftrate the principles of human nature, in order to lay a philofophical foundation for their proper culture.

I have even heard fome very ingenious and intelligent men difpute the propriety of fo fyftematical a plan of inftruction. The most successful and fplendid exertions, both in the fciences and arts, (it has been frequently remarked,) have been made by individuals, in whofe minds the feeds of genius were allowed to fhoot up, wild and free; while, from the most careful and skilful tuition, feldom any thing refults above mediocrity. I fhall not, at prefent, enter into any difcuffions with refpect to the certainty of the fact on which this opinion is founded. Suppofing the fact to be completely established, it must still be remembered, that originality of genius does not always imply vigour and comprehenfiveness, and liberality of mind; and that it is defirable only, in fo far as it is compatible

gene

with thefe more valuable qualities. I already hinted, that there are fome purfuits, in which, as they require the exertion only of a fmall number of our faculties, an individual, who has a natural turn for them, will be more likely to distinguish himself, by being fuffered to follow his original bias, than if his attention were distracted by a more liberal courfe of study. But wherever fuch men are to be found, they must be confidered, on the moft favourable fuppofition, as having facrificed, to a certain degree, the perfection and the happiness of their nature, to the amufement or inftruction of others. It is too, in times of ral darkness and barbarifin, that what is commonly called originality of genius moft frequently appears: and furely the great aim of an enlightened and benevolent philofophy, is not to rear a fmall number of individuals, who may be regarded as prodigies in an ignorant and admiring age, but to diffufe, as widely as poffible, that degree of cultivation which may enable the bulk of a people to poffefs all the intellectual and moral improvement of which their nature is fufceptible. Original genius" (fays Voltaire)" oc"curs but feldom in a nation where the literary "tafte is formed. The number of cultivated minds "which there abound, like the trees in a thick and

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flourishing foreft, prevent any fingle individual from "rearing his head far above the reft. Where trade "is in few hands, we meet with a fmall number of over-grown fortunes in the midst of a general po"verty: in proportion as it extends, opulence becomes general, and great fortunes rare. cifely, because there is at prefent much

It is, pre

light, and "much

"much cultivation, in France, that we are led to com"plain of the want of fuperior genius."

To what purpose, indeed, it may be faid, all this labour? Is not the importance of every thing to man, to be ultimately estimated by its tendency to promote his happiness? And is not our daily experience fufficient to convince us, that this is, in general, by no means proportioned to the culture which his nature has received?-Nay, is there not fome ground for fufpecting, that the lower orders of men enjoy, on the whole, a more enviable condition, than their more enlightened and refined fuperiors?

The truth, I apprehend, is, that happiness, in fo far as it arifes from the mind itself, will be always proportioned to the degree of perfection which its powers have attained; but that, in cultivating these powers, with a view to this most important of all objects, it is effentially neceffary that fuch a degree of attention be bestowed on all of them, as may preferve them in that ftate of relative strength, which appears to be agreeable to the intentions of nature, In confequence of an exclufive attention to the culture of the imagination, the taste, the reafoning faculty, or any of the active principles, it is poffible that the pleasures of human life may be diminished, or its pains increased: but the inconveniences which are experienced in fuch cases, are not to be afcribed to education, but to a partial and injudicious education. In fuch cafes, it is poffible, that the poet, the metaphyfician, or the man of taste and refinement, may appear to disadvantage, when compared with the vulgar; for fuch is the benevolent appointment of Providence with refpect to the lower orders, that, although