kind,) its train of thought is merely a series of conceptions; or, in common language, of imaginations *. In the cafe, too, of poetical imagination, it is the affociation of ideas that fupplies the materials out of which its combinations are formed; and when fuch an imaginary combination is become familiar to the mind, it is the affociation of ideas that connects its different parts together, and unites them into one whole. The affociation of ideas, therefore, although perfectly diftin& from the power of imagination, is immediately and effentially fubfervient to all its exertions.

The laft obfervation feems to me to point out, alfo, the circumstance which has led the greater part of English writers, to ufe the words Imagination and Fancy as fynonymous. It is obvious that a creative imagination, when a perfon poffeffes it so habitually that it may be regarded as forming one of the charac teristics of his genius, implies a power of fummoning up, at pleasure, a particular clafs of ideas; and of ideas related to each other in a particular manner; which power can be the refult only, of certain habits of affociation, which the individual has acquired. It is to this power of the mind, which is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common principles of our nature, that our best writers (fo far as I am able to judge) refer, in general, when they make use of the word fancy: I fay, in general; for in difquifitions of this fort, in which the best writers are

* Accordingly, Hobbes calls the train of thought in the mind "Confequentia five feries imaginationum." "Per feriem imagi "nationum intelligo fucceffionem unius cogitationis ad aliam.”— LEVIATHAN, cap. iii.

feldom

feldom precise and fteady in the employment of words, it is only to their prevailing practice that we can appeal as an authority. What the particular relations are, by which thofe ideas are connected that are subfervient to poetical imagination, I fhall not inquire at present. I think they are chiefly those of resemblance and analogy. But whatever they may be, the power of fummoning up at pleasure the ideas fo related, as it is the ground-work of poetical genius, is of fufficient importance in the human conftitution to deferve an appropriated name; and, for this purpofe, the word fancy would appear to be the moft convenient that our language affords.

Dr. REID has fomewhere obferved, that "the part "of our constitution on which the affociation of ideas

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depends, was called, by the older English writers, "the fantafy or fancy;" an ufe of the word, we may remark, which coincides, in many inftances, with that which I propose to make of it. It differs from it only in this, that these writers applied it to the affociation of ideas in general, whereas I reftrict its application to that habit of affociation, which is fubfervient to poetical imagination.

According to the explanation which has now been given of the word Fancy, the office of this power is to collect materials for the Imagination; and therefore the latter power prefuppofes the former, while the former does not neceffarily fuppofe the latter. A man whofe habits of affociation prefent to him, for illuftrating or embellishing a subject, a number of refembling or of analogous ideas, we call a man of fancy; but for an effort of imagination, various

other

other powers are neceffary, particularly the powers of taste and of judgment; without which, we can hope to produce nothing that will be a fource of pleafure, to others. It is the power of fancy which fupplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allufions; but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex fcenes he defcribes, and the fictitious characters he delineates. To fancy, we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant; to imagination, thofe of beautiful or fublime.

SECTION II.

Of the Principles of Affociation among our Ideas.

HE facts which I stated in the former Section, to

Tilluftrate the tendency of a perception, or of an idea, to fuggeft ideas related to it, are fo obvious as to be matter of common remark. But the relations which connect all our thoughts together, and the laws which regulate their fucceffion, were but little attended to before the publication of Mr. Hume's writings.

It is well known to those who are in the least converfant with the present state of metaphysical science, that this eminent writer has attempted to reduce all the principles of affociation among our ideas to three: Refemblance, Contiguity in time and place, and Cause and Effect. The attempt was great, and worthy of his genius; but it has been fhewn by feveral writers

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writers fince his time *, that his enumeration is not only incomplete, but that it is even indiftinct, fo far as it goes.

It is not neceffary for my present purpose, that I fhould enter into a critical examination of this part of Mr. Hume's system; or that I fhould attempt to fpecify those principles of affociation which he has omitted. Indeed, it does not seem to me, that the problem admits of a fatisfactory folution; for there is no poffible relation among the objects of our know. ledge, which may not serve to connect them together in the mind; and, therefore, although one enumeration may be more comprehensive than another, a perfectly complete enumeration is scarcely to be expected.

Nor is it merely in confequence of the relations among things, that our notions of them are affociated:

*See, in particular, Lord Kaimes's Elements of Criticism, and Dr. Gerard's Effay on Genius. See alfo Dr. Campbell's Philofophy of Rhetoric, vol. i. p. 197.

It is obferved by Dr. Beattie, that fomething like an attempt to enumerate the laws of affociation is to be found in Ariftotle ; who, in fpeaking of Recollection, infinuates, with his usual bre vity, that "the relations, by which we are led from one thought to another, in tracing out, or hunting after," (as he calls it,) any particular thought which does not immediately occur, are chiefly three; Refemblance, Contrariety, and Contiguity."

See Differtations, Moral and Critical, p. 9. Alfo p. 145. The paffage to which Dr. Beattie refers, is as follows: Όταν ἓν αναμιμνησκώμεθα, κινεμένα των προτέρων τινα κινήσεων, ἕως αν κινηθώμεν, μεθ' ήν εκείνη ειωθε. Διο και το εφεξης θηρευομεν νοήσαντες απο το yUy, η αλλα τινος, και αφ' όμοις, η εναντία, η τε συνεγγυς.

Aix

ARISTOT. de Memor, et Reminisc. vol. i. p. 681. Edit. DU VAL.

they

they are frequently coupled together by means of relations among the words which denote them; fuch as a fimilarity of found, or other circumftances ftill more trifling. The alliteration which is fo common in poetry, and in proverbial sayings, feems to arise, partly at least, from affociations of ideas founded on the accidental circumstance, of the two words which express them beginning with the fame letter.

"But thousands die, without or this or that, ← Die; and endow a College, or a Cat."

POPE'S Ep. to Lord BATHURST.

"Ward tried, on Puppies, and the Poor, his drop."

Id. Imitat. of HORACE.

"Puffs, powders, patches; Bibles, billets-doux."

RAPE of the Lock.

This indeed pleases only on flight occafions, when it may be supposed that the mind is in fome degree playful, and under the influence of thofe principles of affociation which commonly take place when we are careless and difengaged. Every perfon must be offended with the fecond line of the following couplet, which forms part of a very fublime description of the Divine power:

"Breathes in our foul, informs our mortal part, "As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart."

ESSAY ON MAN, Ep. i.

To these obfervations, it may be added, that things which have no known relation to each other are often affociated, in confequence of their producing fimilar effects on the mind. Some of the finest poetical allufions

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