education over the mind, they have concluded, that man is wholly a factitious being; not recollecting, that this very fufceptibility of education prefuppofes certain original principles, which are common to the whole fpecies; and that, as error can only take a permanent hold of a candid mind by being grafted on truths, which it is unwilling or unable to eradicate; even the influence, which falfe and abfurd opinions occafionally acquire over the belief, inftead of being an argument for univerfal fcepticism, is the most decifive argument against it; inafmuch as it fhews, that there are fome truths fo incorporated and identified with our nature, that they can reconcile us even to the abfurdities and contradictions with which we fuppose them to be infeparably connected. The fceptical philofophers, for example, of the prefent age, have frequently attempted to hold up to ridicule, thofe contemptible and puerile fuperftitions, which have dif graced the creeds of fome of the most enlightened nations; and which have not only commanded the affent, but the reverence, of men of the most accomplished understandings. But thefe hiftories of human imbec'lity are, in truth, the strongest teftimonies which can be produced, to prove, how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental principles of morality over the belief; when they are able to fanctify, in the apprehenfions of mankind, every extravagant opinion, and every unmeaning ceremony, which early education has taught us to affociate with them. That implicit credulity is a mark of a feeble mind, will not be difputed; but it may not perhaps be as generally acknowledged, that the cafe is the fame with unlimited unlimited scepticism: on the contrary, we are fometimes apt to afcribe this difpofition to a more than ordinary vigour of intellect. Such a prejudice was by no means unnatural at that period in the hiftory of modern Europe, when reason first began to throw off the yoke of authority; and when it unquestionably required a fuperiority of understanding, as well as of intrepidity, for an individual to refift the contagion of prevailing superstition. But in the present age, in which the tendency of fashionable opinions is directly opposite to thofe of the vulgar; the philofophical creed, or the philosophical scepticism of by far the greater number of those who value themselves on an emancipation from popular errors, arifes from the very fame weakness with the credulity of the multitude: nor is it going too far to fay, with Rouffeau, that "He, who, in the end of the eighteenth century, "has brought himself to abandon all his early prin. "ciples without difcrimination, would probably have "been a bigot in the days of the League." In the midst of these contrary impulfes, of fashionable and of vulgar prejudices, he alone evinces the fuperiority and the strength of his mind, who is able to difentangle truth from error; and to oppose the clear conclufions of his own unbiaffed faculties, to the united clamours of fuperftition, and of falfe philofophy.Such are the men, whom nature marks out to be the lights of the world; to fix the wavering opinions of the multitude, and to impress their own characters on that of their age. For fecuring the mind completely from the weakneffes I have now been defcribing, and enabling it to maintain a steady courfe of inquiry, between implicit credulity, and unlimited fcepticism, the most important of all qualities is a fincere and devoted attachment to truth; which feldom fails to be accompanied with a manly confidence in the clear conclufions of human reafon. It is fuch a confidence, united, (as it generally is) with perfonal intrepidity, which forms what the French writers call force of character; one of the rareft endowments, it must be confeffed, of our fpecies; but which, of all endowments, is the most effential for rendering a philofopher happy in himself, and a bleffing to mankind. There is, I think, good reason for hoping, that the fceptical tendency of the prefent age, will be only a temporary evil, While it continues, however, it is an evil of the most alarming nature; and, as it extends, in general, not only to religion and morality, but, in fome measure, also to politics, and the conduct of life, it is equally fatal to the comfort of the individual, and to the improvement of fociety. Even in its most inoffenfive form, when it happens to be united with a peaceable difpofition and a benevolent heart, it cannot fail to have the effect of damping every active and patriotic exertion. Convinced that truth is placed beyond the reach of human faculties; and doubtful how far the prejudices we despise may not be effential to the well-being of fociety, we refolve to abandon completely all fpeculative inquiries; and fuffering ourselves to be carried quietly along with the ftream of popular opinions, and of fashionable manners, determine to amufe ourselves, the best way we can, with business or pleasure, during our fhort paffage through through this fcene of illufions. But he who thinks more favourably of the human powers, and who be lieves that reason was given to man to direct him to his duty and his happiness, will despise the fuggestions of this timid philofophy; and while he is confcious that he is guided in his inquiries only by the love of truth, will rest afsured that their refult will be equally favourable to his own comfort, and to the best interefts of mankind. What, indeed, will be the particular effects in the first instance, of that general diffufion of knowledge, which the art of printing must fooner or later produce; and of that spirit of reformation with which it cannot fail to be accompanied, it is beyond the reach of human fagacity to conjecture; but unless we chufe to abandon ourselves entirely to a defponding scepticism, we muft hope and believe, that the progrefs of human reafon can never be a fource of permanent disorder to the world; and that they alone have cause to apprehend the confequences, who are led, by the imperfection of our present institutions, to feel themselves interested in perpetuating the preju dices, and follies, of their species. From the observations which have been made, it fufficiently appears, that in order to fecure the mind, on the one hand, from the influence of prejudice; and on the other, from a tendency to unlimited fcepticism; it is necessary that it should be able to distinguish the original and univerfal principles and laws of human nature, from the adventitious effects of local fituation. But if, in the cafe of an individual, who has received an imperfect or erroneous education, such a knowledge puts it in his power to correct, to a cerD 3 tain tain degree, his own bad habits, and to furmount his own fpeculative errors; it enables him to be useful, in a much higher degree, to thofe whofe education he has an opportunity of fuperintending from early infancy. Such, and fo permanent, is the effect of first impreffions, on the character, that although a philofopher may fucceed, by perfeverance, in freeing his reafon from the prejudices with which he was entangled, they will still retain fome hold of his imagination, and his affections: and, therefore, however enlightened his understanding may be in his hours of fpeculation, his philofophical opinions will frequently lose their influence over his mind, in thofe very fituations in which their practical affiftance is most required :—when his temper is foured by misfortune; or when he engages in the pursuits of life, and expofes himself to the contagion of popular errors. His opinions are supported merely by fpeculative arguments; and, inftead of being connected with any of the active principles of his nature, are counteracted and thwarted by fome of the moft powerful of them. How different would the cafe be, if education were conducted from the beginning with attention and judgment? Were the fame pains taken, to impress truth on the mind in early infancy, that is often taken to inculcate error, the great principles of our conduct would not only be jufter than they are; but, in confequence of the aid which they would receive from the imagination and the heart, trained to confpire with them in the fame direction, they would render us happier in ourfelves, and would influence our practice more powerfully and more habitually. There is furely nothing in error, which is more |