to truth.

the powerful emotions which may be occafionally excited in the minds of the most callous, when the attention has once been fixed, and the imagination awakened, by eloquent and circumftantial and pathetic description. A very amiable and profound moralist in the account which he has given of the origin of our sense of justice, has, I think, drawn a less pleasing picture of the natural conftitution of the human mind, than is agreeable "To disturb," (fays he,)" the happiness "of our neighbour, merely because it stands in the way "of our own; to take from him what is of real ufe "to him, merely because it may be of equal or of "more use to us; or, to indulge, in this manner, at "the expence of other people, the natural preference "which every man has for his own happiness above "that of other people, is what no impartial spectator σε can go along with. Every man is, no doubt, first "and principally recommended to his own care; and "as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other "perfon, it is fit and right that it should be fo. Every

man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in "whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what "concerns any other man: and to hear, perhaps, of "the death of another perfon with whom we have no "particular connexion, will give us lefs concern, will "fpoil our ftomach, or break our reft, much less than

a very infignificant difafter which has befallen our"felves. But though the ruin of our neighbour may "affect us much lets than a very fmall misfortune of

• our own, we must not ruin him to prevent that "fmall misfortune, nor even to prevent our own ❝ruin.

ruin. We must here, as in all other cafes, view ourfelves not fo much according to that light in "which we may naturally appear to ourselves, as according to that in which we naturally 66 appear to others. Though every man may, "according to the proverb, be the whole world to

himself, to the rest of mankind he is a most infig"nificant part of it. Though his own happiness may "be of more importance to him than that of all the "world befides, to every other perfon it is of no more "confequence than that of any other man. Though 66 it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in "his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all man"kind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, "and avow that he acts according to this principle. "He feels that, in this preference they can never go "along with him, and that how natural foever it may "be to him, it must always appear exceffive and extravagant to them. When he views himself in the "light in which he is conscious that others will view "him, he fees that to them he is but one of the mul ❝titude, in no refpect better than any other in it. If " he would act fo as that the impartial fpectator may "enter into the principles of his conduct, which is "what of all things he has the greatest desire to do, he "muft, upon this, as upon all other occafions, humble "the arrogance of his felf-love, and bring it down "to fomething which other men can go along with."

66

I am ready to acknowledge, that there is much truth in this paffage; and that a prudential regard to the opinion of others, might teach a man of good sense, without the aid of more amiable motives, to conceal

his unreasonable partialities in favour of himself, and to act agreeably to what he conceives to be the fenti ments of impartial fpectators. But I cannot help thinking, that the fact is much too strongly stated with respect to the natural partiality of felf-love, fuppofing the fituation of our neighbours to be as completely presented to our view, as our own must of neceffity be. When the Orator wishes to combat the felfifh paffions of his audience, and to roufe them to a sense of what they owe to mankind; what mode of perfuafion does nature dictate to him? Is it to remind them of the importance of the good opinion of the world, and of the neceffity, in order to obtain it, of accommodating their conduct to the fentiments of others, rather than to their own feelings? Such confiderations undoubtedly might, with fome men, produce a certain effect; and might lead them to affume the appearance of virtue; but they would never excite a fentiment of indignation at the thought of injuftice, or a fudden and involuntary burst of difinterested affection. If the Orator can only fucceed in fixing their attention to facts, and in bringing these facts home to their imagination by the power of his eloquence, he has completely attained his object. No fooner are the facts apprehended, than the benevolent principles of our nature display themselves in all their beauty. The most cautious and timid lofe, for a moment, all thought of themselves, and defpifing every confideration of prudence or of fafety, become wholly engroffed with the fortunes of others.

Many other facts, which are commonly alledged as proofs of the original selfishness of mankind, may be explained,

8

explained, in part, in a fimilar way; and may be traced to habits of inattention, or to a want of imagination, arifing, probably, from fome fault in early education.

What has now been remarked with respect to the focial principles, may be applied to all our other paffions, excepting those which take their rise from the body. They are commonly ftrong in proportion to the warmth and vigour of the imagination.

It is, however, extremely curious, that when an imagination, which is naturally phlegmatic, or which, like thofe of the vulgar, has little activity from a want of culture, is fairly roufed by the descriptions of the Orator or of the Poet, it is more apt to produce the violence of enthufiafm, than in minds of a fuperior order. By giving this faculty occasional exercise, we acquire a great degree of command over it. As we can withdraw the attention at pleasure from objects of fenfe, and tranfport ourselves into a world of our own, fo when we wish to moderate our enthusiasm, we can difmifs the objects of imagination, and return to our ordinary perceptions and occupations. But in a mind to which these intellectual visions are not familiar, and which borrows them completely from the genius of another, imagination, when once excited, be comes perfectly ungovernable, and produces fomething like a temporary infanity. Hence the wonderful effects of popular eloquence on the lower orders; effects which are much more remarkable, than what it ever produces on men of education.

SECTION V.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Inconveniences refulting from an ill-regulated Imagination.

IT

T was undoubtedly the intention of Nature, that the objects of perception fhould produce much stronger impreffions on the mind than its own operations. And, accordingly, they always do fo, when proper care has been taken in early life, to exercife the different principles of our conftitution. But it is poffible, by long habits of folitary reflexion, to reverse this order of things, and to weaken the attention to fenfible objects to fo great a degree, as to leave the conduct almost wholly under the influence of imagination. Removed to a diftance from fociety, and from the pursuits of life, when we have been long accustomed to converfe with our own thoughts, and have found our activity gratified by intellectual exertions, which afford fcope to all our powers and affections, without expofing us to the inconveniences refulting from the buftle of the world, we are apt to contract an unnatural predilection for medi. tation, and to lofe all intereft in external occurrences. In such a situation too, the mind gradually loses that command which education, when properly conducted, gives it over the train of its ideas; till at length the most extravagant dreams of imagination acquire as powerful an influence in exciting all its paffions, as if they were realities. A wild and mountainous country, which presents but a limited variety of objects, and

thefe