and coroners of the land; and their jurif diction is general all over England.

The Juftices of the King's Bench have a fovereign jurifdiction over all matters of a criminal and a public nature, judicially brought before them; to give remedy either by the Common Law, or by Statute: and their power is original and ordinary; when the king hath appointed them, they have their jurifdiction from the Law.

L.

Whatever crime is against the public good, though it doth not injure any particular perfon, comes within the cognizance of the juftices of this court; and no fubject can fuffer any kind of unlawful violence or injury against his perfon, liberty, or poffeflions, but he may here have a proper remedy, not only by way of fatisfaction in damages, but by the exemplary punishment of the offender: for this court is confidered as the cuftos morum of all the fubjects of the realm.

It

It is in the difcretion of this court to inflict fine and imprisonment, or infamous punishment on offenders: and they may commit to any prison they think fit; and the Law doth not fuffer any other court to remove or bail any perfons imprisoned by them. Nevertheless this court may grant a babeas corpus to relieve perfons wrongfully imprisoned, and may bail any person whatever.

This court formerly exercised autho rity only in criminal matters, and pleas of the crown; but now it is divided into a crown fide and a plea fide; the one deter mining criminal, and the other civil causes.

BOOK

Laws, it will be proper, in the first place, to fay fomething of the Nature, Source, and Degrees of Crimes.

Of the Nature of Crimes.

HE word Crime, in our language, is Toften used with vague and indifcri

minate application. It is frequently taken as fynonimous with Sin, Offence, Tranf greffion, &c.

Hobbes, however, diftinguishes between a Crime and a Sin. All Crimes, fays he,

are

are indeed Sins, but not all Sins Crimes. A Sin may be in the thought or fecret purpofe of a man, of which neither a Judge, nor a witness, nor any man can take notice; but a Crime is fuch a Sin, as consists in an action against the Law, of which action he can be accufed, and tried by a Judge, and convicted or cleared by witnesses. Farther, that which is no Sin in itself, but indifferent, may be made a Sin by a pofitive Law. Nay, fometimes an action good in itself may, by the Statute Law, be made a Sin: as if a Statute fhould be made to forbid the giving of alms to a strong sturdy beggar, the giving fuch alms after the Law would be a Sin, but was not fo before; for then it was charity, the object whereof is not the strength or other quality of the man, but his poverty.

But here, as well as in many other places, Hobbes feems to confound his own diftinctions. The Law can never make that a Sin, which was good in itself before the making of the Law; though it may make that a Crime which was not criminal before.

In truth, no act whatsoever, which is not immoral in itself, can be made finful by any Law. On the contrary, if the Law, as Laws fometimes have done, fhould enjoin what is wicked and against the primitive obligations of reafon and nature, it would be a Sin to obferve it; though, according to the above definition, it would be a Crime to break it.In fhort, whenever Civil Laws contradict the Laws of Nature, though the non-obfervance of the former may be a Crime, it cannot be a Sin. Befides, men, through ignorance, or error of judg ment, may violate the Law, and yet not be guilty of Sin.

1

It is fo far therefore from being true, that all Crimes are Sins, but not all Sins Crimes, that the contrary feems to be the juster conclufion, viz: that all Sins are Crimes, but not all Crimes Sins.

What feems to have led to this inaccuracy is, the having confidered Crimes only as contraventions to Human Laws; whereas, in a more liberal and juft conftruction,

every