MIRABEAU'S SPEECH OF MAY 20, 1790.

By DR. FRED MORROW FLING, Ithaca, N. Y.

In the month of May, 1790, the National Assembly of France was earnestly engaged in the work of framing a constitution for the nation. A year had passed since the day when these same legislators, then known as StatesGeneral, had hurried to Versailles to aid the government in its effort to escape from the desperate financial straits into which it had fallen. They assembled as representatives of the three estates of France, but they brought with them into the halls of legislation unsettled questions of class privilege, that led to a rupture between the nobility and the commons, even before the general deliberations had begun.

Abandoned to themselves by an incompetent and vacillating minister, the estates consumed more than a month in the fruitless attempt to settle these questions in a manner satisfactory to all the orders. Finally, the commons, arrived at self-consciousness and spurred to action by the revolutionary populace of Paris, after a vain appeal to the nobility and clergy in behalf of unity, assumed the title of National Assembly. This was the beginning of the revolution, and during the next ten months it swept rapidly on both within and without the assembly. The old feudal structure was scattered to the winds; with inconsiderate haste, the monarch was stripped of his executive power, and after one short year of constitutional debate, hardly the shadow of his former glory remained. The unspoken and, for the most part, unconscious purpose of crowding him entirely out of the new government, became each day more evident. The man who saw all this most clearly, whose words-as we read

them to-day-have the ring of prophecy in them, who believed that he alone could save France from impending ruin, this man was Mirabeau.

Forced by circumstances to place himself at the head of the popular party, dependent upon his popularity for his strength, Mirabeau was never a Republican in the modern sense of the word. He was at the beginning of his public career, and he always remained, an advocate of the monarchical form of government; not of the form then existing in France, where the king's word was law, but a monarchy based upon justice and civil liberty, and he looked forward to the establishment of such a régime as to "the day when talent also shall be a power." Very early Mirabeau became convinced-to use his own words-that "the French were sick, very sick, and that it was necessary to treat them with precaution." His mental vision, rendered clairvoyant by his vast knowledge of men and affairs, enabled him to see in the prodigious effervescence of the public mind possibilities that startled him. To counteract this tendency toward radicalism, he early identified himself with the moderate party and exerted himself to save the monarchy from total destruction.

Desirous of co-operating with the ministers to the accomplishment of this end, he secured an interview through the mediation of Malouet; but his reception was so discouraging to his hopes and so crushing to his pride, that he departed in anger, never to return.

Foiled in his attempt to associate himself with the ministry, Mirabeau turned his attention to the king. To gain an audience was a matter of extreme difficulty. Although De la Marck, his warm friend and the confidant of the queen, was unwearying in his efforts in Mirabeau's behalf, it was not until the spring of 1790, that the agreement was completed by which he was received into the service of Louis XVI., as his confidential adviser and as the defender of his interests in the National Assembly.

Scarcely had the contract been sealed, before Mirabeau found an opportunity to serve his royal client. The right of declaring war and making peace, the only prerogative of any

importance still remaining to the king, became the subject of debate in the assembly. Like so many of the constitutional questions discussed in that body, this one also was brought to its notice in a most fortuitous manner. England

and Spain had come into contact on the coast of California; a Spanish squadron had seized a number of English vessels, and England had equipped a large fleet for the purpose of retaliating. These preparations were not unknown in Paris, but it was believed that no serious collision was to be feared. On the 14th of May, however, a letter from Montmorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, revealed to the assembly the gravity of the situation. France had equipped fourteen ships of the line, and although affirming that every effort would be made to adjust the differences amicably, the minister asked for a vote of supplies.

The assembly at once decided that on the following day all other business should be suspended and the king's message be taken into consideration. That night, the subject was discussed at the Jacobin Club, and it was there affirmed that "the right to declare war and to make peace and the right to form foreign alliances, pertain to the nation." This gave the keynote to the debate of the following day.

The discussion of the 15th of May turned at first upon the advisability of taking steps that might involve France in an expensive foreign war. This part of the debate culminated in the utterance of the Abbé Maury, "I see in all this only a question of money." But Alexandre de Lameth saw in it much more than this, and the discussion assumed a critical character when he declared, "No one certainly will find fault with the measures taken by the king. But this incidental question raises one of principle. It is necessary to know if the assembly is competent, and if the sovereign nation ought to delegate to the king the right of making war and peace." The radicals, supported by popular sentiment, had thrown down the gauntlet. Many members of the assembly spoke for and many others against this view of the subject, but their words made no definite impression. Finally Mirabeau ascended the tribune. He declared this

manner of eluding the question raised by the letter of the minister, "unreasonable, inconsistent, imprudent, and without object. I say that it is unreasonable and inconsistent, since the message of the king has no connection with a declaration of war; because the message of the king may exist when we have decided that the right to make war and peace pertains to the nation. The right of arming, of placing itself suddenly in readiness, will always be the right of the supreme executive of the national will." Here was Mirabeau's program, and it was thus that he answered Lameth's challenge. "You cannot then," he continued, "avoid an examination of the king's message. The question resolves itself into knowing, not if the king had a right to arm-which is not at all doubtful,-but if the funds demanded by the king are necessary, a thing that is not a bit more doubtful." He concluded with the demand that the assembly occupy itself with the message. When this proposal failed to find support, he moved that the assembly approve the measures taken by the king, and ordain by the same decree that on the morrow the constitutional principle involved should be submitted to discussion. This motion

was finally adopted.

The debate began accordingly upon the next day and lasted until the 22d of May. The question under discussion read: "Ought the nation to delegate to the king the exercise of the right of declaring war and making peace?” Mirabeau delivered his first speech on the 20th. The subject of debate up to that time had been, “ Does the right of making war and peace pertain to the king, or to the nation. as represented by the legislative body?" In this form Mirabeau declared the question insoluble and proposed to resolve it into the following terms: "Is it not necessary to attribute the right of making peace and war concurrently to the two powers that our constitution has consecrated?" The substance of his project was as follows:

The French nation should renounce all offensive wars; defensive wars must always begin with an attack from the side of the enemy. Meanwhile the king must have the