THE AFGHAN WAR.

December 10, 1878.

[On December 5, 1878, Parliament was called together to receive a message from the Queen requesting that provision might be made for an expeditionary force despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan. He had received a Russian envoy, and had declined to admit an English one. Explanations were demanded and refused, and war was the result. Lord Grey moved an Amendment to the Address, which was negatived without a division. But on the following Monday, the 9th, on Lord Cranbrook moving that Parliament do consent to the application of the Indian Revenue to this purpose, an Amendment embodying a vote of censure was moved by Lord Halifax, and produced a debate of two nights. The Amendment was defeated by 201 votes to 65; and on the second night Lord Beaconsfield wound up the debate with a speech which extorted the admiration of some of his most hostile critics.]

MY

Y LORDS,—I hope you will think me justified if I ask to detain you for a few moments. My noble and learned friend on the woolsack sketched to us, as it were in allegory, a picture that may give to your lordships an idea of this northwestern boundary that has been the subject of discussion these two nights. My lords, I think it is advisable that at this moment some general conception of this scheme should be in your possession. I would picture it, not in allegory, but such as it really exists. That boundary, that north-western boundary of our Indian Empire, is a chain of mountains of the highest branch; a branch, indeed, of mountains the highest in the world, and higher even than the Andes. Yet no portion of this country is in possession of the inhabitants of the Indian Empire or Government, and through its passes invading armies may make their raids, or wild and turbulent tribes ravage the fertile plains which are entrusted to your Government in that part of the world. Well, then, my lords, I ventured to say

that the inconvenience and the injury of such a boundary were felt by the Government of India, and had been more than once the subject of their consideration, and the noble viscount who moves this amendment expressed upon that subject his incredulity with respect to my observations. He told us that he had much acquaintance with the Governors of India, and that he could not recall any Viceroy who had experienced a feeling or conviction of that kind.

Well, now, my lords, let us look for a moment to the facts of the case. We have been in possession of this boundary for, I believe, twenty-eight years. During that period we have been obliged to fit out nineteen considerable expeditions to control its inhabitants, between fifty and sixty guerilla enterprises, and have employed upon these expeditions between 50,000 and 60,000 of Her Majesty's troops. All I can say is that if none of the Viceroys of India who are the acquaintances of the noble lord have felt the inconvenience, or if they have been insensible to the injury, of such a boundary, they were not fit to be Viceroys. But I cannot believe that that is the case. My information would lead me to a very different result. The government of India is not merely a concern of Viceroys, but it is a concern of statesmen, both eminent civilians and military leaders of world-wide renown. And it was the information which I derived from one of the most eminent individuals of that character and class that influenced me to make that observation which I made. That eminent personage was for a considerable time a member of the Indian administration. He was not prejudiced in favour of the views adopted by Her Majesty's Government. For a considerable period, notwithstanding his sense of the inconvenience and the injury of this boundary, he was one of those who opposed any change, because he believed it was better to incur that inconvenience and injury than to embark on the difficult office of making a fresh boundary and disturbing arrangements which were necessarily of a political character. Remembering the possibility of some Power equal to our own attacking us in that part of the world, and remembering also that some ten years ago that Power was 2,000 miles distant from our boundaries, a man might con

sistently have upheld the arrangement that then existed, and yet might by the force of circumstances and the lapse of time be now a sincere supporter of the policy which Her Majesty's Government now recommends.

That, for instance, is the case of Lord Napier of Magdala. It was only recently that I received a telegram from him in which he says, 'A careful study of our frontier convinces me that a rectification of our frontier is necessary.' Those are the words of one of great experience and of consummate ability and judgment, who for a long time was opposed to that which he now finds is absolutely necessary. He does not shrink from the use of the word 'rectification,' although definitions of that word have been given by many noble lords opposite which are not to be found in any dictionary. The noble earl who resumed the debate to-night spoke of rectification as though it were another phrase for spoliation and annexation. I expected those cheers and wished to receive them. Another noble earl who spoke in the debate yesterday—I wrote down his words, because, unfortunately, on a previous occasion he seemed to accuse me of misquoting him-said, 'I hate the word "rectification." It seems to me to savour of the worst traditions of the French Empire a word to conceal wrong and robbery.' A noble earl1 described it as a dark word, and he seemed to tremble as he uttered it. For my own part I cannot agree in any of these definitions. The rectification of our frontier is a correct diplomatic term which is accepted by the highest authorities and which has a precise and a definite meaning. The rectification of frontiers, instead of being a word of the French Empire, had been long adopted, and your lordships will be surprised to find that the peace of the world very much depends upon those treaties. If all the treaties for the rectification of frontiers were destroyed as instruments of the terrible kind described by noble lords opposite and by the noble earl on the cross benches, the peace of the world would be endangered, and might be destroyed.

Well, my lords, after that observation the other night, I took a note of some treaties for the rectification of frontiers,

1 Earl of Carnarvon.

war.

and I took them on conditions which I am sure your lordships will agree are fair. First of all they are all modern-I would not produce old specimens. Secondly, they are not only modern treaties, but treaties none of which were entered into or negotiated after a war. Therefore they are not the consequences of force or fraud. Now, I find that from 1856 to 1868-quite in our own time-there were five treaties between France and Spain for the rectification of frontiers, and I have no hesitation myself in saying that if any of those treaties had not taken place, there would have been war between France and Spain, and that the existence of those treaties prevented Between France and Switzerland there was a treaty for the rectification of frontiers in December 1862-a treaty of some celebrity-one which was certainly not a dark instrument. It was a treaty which certainly has contributed to the maintenance of peace. There is a treaty between Great Britain and France for the rectification of frontiers, and it might surprise one to find a treaty of that kind between an island and a continent; but it had reference to their possessions in the East Indies. That is a modern treaty. There is a treaty for the rectification of frontiers between Italy and Switzerland, and one between Portugal and the Transvaal, of which I believe the noble earl on the cross benches has some knowledge. To make it complete, there is a treaty for the rectification of frontiers between Great Britain and an Oriental kingdom like Afghanistan-the kingdom of Siam.

Now, I believe the number of those treaties I have mentioned -some dozen-might be doubled or even trebled if it were necessary. The observation of the noble earl1 deserves remark. A rectification of frontiers does not necessarily involve a diminution of territory. Many such treaties are carried on by an equivalent. I made no application of those treaties to any case like Afghanistan. I have not touched upon that point yet. The noble earl is impetuous. It has been said that I stated the object of the war to be a rectification of frontier-the substitution of a scientific for a haphazard frontier. But in the first place I never said that was the object of the war T 1 Earl Grey.

treated it as a possible consequence of the war, which is a very different thing. Our application to the Ameer was, in fact, founded upon the principle of rectifying our frontier without any disturbance of territory whatever.

What was our difficulty with regard to Afghanistan? We could gain no information as to what was going on beyond the mountain range or what was preparing in the numerous valleys of Afghanistan. What we wanted, therefore, was eyes to see and ears to hear, and we should have attained our object had the Ameer made to us those concessions which are commonly granted by all civilised States, and which even some Oriental States do not deny us-namely, to have a minister at his capital-a demand which we did not press-and men like our consuls-general at some of his chief towns. That virtually would have been a rectification of our frontier, because we should have got rid of those obstacles that rendered it utterly impossible for us to conduct public affairs with any knowledge of the circumstances with which we had to deal as regarded Afghanistan. Therefore, the noble earl is precipitate in concluding, because I am in favour of a rectification of frontier, that necessarily any change would occur. I only say that abstractedly there is no absolute necessity for any change, because you may rectify a frontier in different ways-by equivalents and so forth.

But, my lords, my observations on that subject in another place were made rather with reference in my mind to certain wild ideas that were prevalent, to the effect that it was the intention of the Government to conquer Afghanistan and annex it to our Empire. I explained that that was not our object, and that a scientific rectification of our frontier would effect for us all the results we desired. And, my lords, what is a scientific frontier compared with a haphazard one? Why, it is, as a great military authority has said, this-a scientific frontier can be defended with a garrison of 5,000 men, while with a haphazard one you may require an army of 100,000 men, and even then not be safe from sudden attack. It is not for us now to consider what arrangements may be made with this

1 Speech at Guildhall, Nov. 9, 1878.