peruse a late work of M. Degerando; in which I find that the same analogy has presented itself to that most judicious philosopher, and has been applied by him to the same practical purpose of exposing the false pretensions and premature generalizations of some modern metaphysicians.

"It required nothing less than the united splendour of the discoveries brought to light by the new chemical school, to tear the minds of men from the pursuit of a simple and primary element; a pursuit renewed in every age with an indefatigable perseverance, and always renewed in vain. With what feelings of contempt would the physiologists of former times have looked down on the chemists of the present age, whose limited and circumscribed system admits nearly forty different principles in the composition of bodies! What a subject of ridicule would the new nomenclature have afforded to an alchemist!"

"The Philosophy of Mind has its alchemists also; men whose studies are directed to the pursuit of one single principle, into which the whole science may be resolved, and who flatter themselves with the hope of discovering the grand secret, by which the pure Gold of Truth may be produced at pleasure."1

Among these alchemists in the science of mind, the first place is undoubtedly due to Dr. Hartley, who not only attempts to account for all the phenomena of human nature from the single principle of association, combined with the hypothetical assumption of an invisible fluid or ether, producing vibrations in the medullary substance of the brain and nerves; but indulges his imagination in anticipating an era, "when future generations shall put all kinds of evidences and inquiries into mathematical forms; reducing Aristotle's ten Categories, and Bishop Wilkins's forty Summa Genera, to the head of quantity alone, so as to make Mathematics and Logic, Natural History and Civil History, Natural Philosophy and philosophy of all other kinds, coincide omni ex parte." If I had never read an

1 [Degerando, Hist. des Systèmes, tom. ii. pp. 481, 482.]

other sentence of this author, I should have required no further evidence of the unsoundness of his understanding.1]

I have only to add that, although I have retained the phrase of the Association of Ideas in compliance with common language, I am far from being completely satisfied with this mode of expression. I have retained it, chiefly that I might not expose myself to the censure of delivering old doctrines in a new form.

As I have endeavoured to employ it with caution, I hope that it has not often misled me in my reasonings. At the same time, I am more and more convinced of the advantages to be derived from a reformation of the common language in most of the branches of science. How much such a reformation has effected in chemistry is well known; and it is evidently much more necessary in the philosophy of mind, where the prevailing language adds to the common inaccuracies of popular expressions, the peculiar disadvantage of being all suggested by the analogy of matter. Often, in the composition of this work, have I recollected the advice of Bergman to Morveau: "In reforming the nomenclature of chemistry, spare no word which is improper. They who understand the subject already, will suffer no inconvenience; and they to whom the subject is new, will comprehend it with the greater facility." But it belongs to such authors alone as have extended the boundaries of science by their own discoveries, to introduce innovations in language with any hopes of success.

[The foregoing observations I have formerly introduced in a different work; but they now seem to me to belong more properly to this elementary treatise.See Philos. Essays, p. 12, et seq.]

2 "Le savant professeur d'Upsal, M. Bergman, écrivoit à M. de Morveau dans

les derniers temps de sa vie, Ne faites graces à aucune dénomination impropre. Ceux qui savent déjà entendront toujours; ceux qui ne savent pas encore entendront plutôt."-Méthode de Nomenclat. Chémique, par MM. Morveau, Lavoisier, &c.

CHAPTER VI.

OF MEMORY.

SECT. 1.-GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON MEMORY.

AMONG the various powers of the understanding there is none which has been so attentively examined by philosophers, or concerning which so many important facts and observations have been collected, as the faculty of Memory. This is partly to be ascribed to its nature, which renders it easily distinguishable from all the other principles of our constitution, even by those who have not been accustomed to metaphysical investigations; and partly to its immediate subserviency not only to the pursuits of science, but to the ordinary business of life, in consequence of which, many of its most curious laws had been observed long before any analysis was attempted of the other powers of the mind, and have for many ages formed a part of the common maxims which are to be found in every treatise of education. Some important remarks on the subject may, in particular, be collected from the writings of the ancient rhetoricians.

The word Memory is not employed uniformly in the same precise sense; but it always expresses some modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up and preserve for future use the knowledge we acquire-a faculty which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty implies two things; a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use.

express the speak of a

The word memory is sometimes employed to capacity, and sometimes the power. When we retentive memory, we use it in the former sense; when of a ready memory, in the latter.

The various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are, from time to time, recalled to our thoughts in one of two ways; sometimes they recur to us spontaneously, or at least without any interference on our part, in other cases they are recalled in consequence of an effort of our will. For the former operation of the mind we have no appropriated name in our language distinct from Memory. The latter, too, is often called by the same name, but is more properly distinguished by the word Recollection.

There are, I believe, some other acceptations besides these, in which the word Memory has been occasionally employed; but as its ambiguities are not of such a nature as to mislead us in our present inquiries, I shall not dwell any longer on the illustration of distinctions, which to the greater part of readers might appear uninteresting and minute.1 One distinction only, relative to this subject, occurs to me as deserving particular attention.

The operations of memory relate either to things and their relations, or to events. In the former case, thoughts which have been previously in the mind, may recur to us without suggesting the idea of the past, or of any modification of time whatever, as when I repeat over a poem which I have got by heart, or when I think of the features of an absent friend. In this last instance, indeed, philosophers distinguish the act of the

1 [In the French tongue there are several words connected with this operation of the mind, marking nice shades of meaning which cannot be expressed in our language without circumlocution. Such (according to Girard) are the words Mémoire and Souvenir, the former referring to the understanding alone, the latter to things which also touch or affect the heart. This distinction

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was plainly in the view of Diderot, in a passage which it is scarcely possible to translate into English without impairing somewhat of the beauty of the original. Rapportez tout au dernier moment; à ce moment où la mémoire des faits les plus éclatants ne vaudra pas le souvenir d'un verre d'eau présenté par humanité à celui qui avoit soif."]

mind by the name of Conception; but in ordinary discourse, and frequently even in philosophical writing, it is considered as an exertion of memory. In these and similar cases, it is obvious that the operations of this faculty do not necessarily involve the idea of the past.

The case is different with respect to the memory of events. When I think of these, I not only recall to the mind the former objects of its thoughts, but I refer the event to a particular point of time, so that of every such act of memory, the idea of the past is a necessary concomitant.

I have been led to take notice of this distinction, in order to obviate an objection which some of the phenomena of memory seem to present against a doctrine which I formerly stated, when treating of the powers of Conception and Imagination.

It is evident that when I think of an event in which any object of sense was concerned, my recollection of the event must necessarily involve an act of conception. Thus, when I think of a dramatic representation which I have recently seen, my recollection of what I saw necessarily involves a conception of the different actors by whom it was performed. But every act of recollection which relates to events, is accompanied with a belief of their past existence. How then are we to reconcile this conclusion with the doctrine formerly maintained concerning conception, according to which every exertion of that power is accompanied with a belief that its object exists before us at the present moment?

The only way that occurs to me of removing this difficulty, is by supposing that the remembrance of a past event is not a simple act of the mind, but that the mind first forms a conception of the event, and then judges from circumstances of the period of time to which it is to be referred; a supposition which is by no means a gratuitous one, invented to answer a particular purpose, but which, as far as I am able to judge, is agreeable to fact: for, if we have the power, as will not be disputed, of conceiving a past event without any reference to time, it follows that there is nothing in the ideas or notions which memory presents to us, which is necessarily accompanied with