To what this bias of our nature is owing, it is not material for us to inquire: the fact is certain, and it is an important one to our happiness. It supports us under the real distresses of life, and cheers and animates all our labors and although it is sometimes apt to produce, in a weak and indolent mind, those deceitful suggestions of ambition and vanity, which lead us to sacrifice the duties and the comforts of the present moment, to romantic hopes and expectations; yet it must be acknowledged, when connected with habits of activity, and regulated by a solid judgment, to have a favorable effect on the character, by inspiring that ardor and enthusiasm which both prompt to great enterprises, and are necessary to ensure their success. When such a temper is united (as it commonly is) with pleasing notions, concerning the order of the universe, and in particular concerning the condition and the prospects of man, it places our happiness, in a great measure, beyond the power of fortune. While it adds a double relish to every enjoyment, it blunts the edge of all our sufferings; and even when human life presents to us no object on which our hopes can rest, it invites the imagination beyond the dark and troubled horizon which terminates all our earthly prospects, to wander unconfined in the regions of futurity. A man of benevolence, whose mind is enlarged by philosophy, will indulge the same agreeable anticipations with respect to society; will view all the different improvements in arts, in commerce, and in the sciences, as co-operating to promote the union, the happiness, and the virtue of mankind; and, amidst the political disorders resulting from the prejudices and follies of his own times, will look forward with transport, to the blessings which are reserved for posterity in a more enlightened age. NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. Note (A.) page 3. I AM happy in being able to quote the following passage, in illustration of a doctrine, against which I do not conceive it possible to urge any thing, but the authority of some illustrious names. "Puisque l'existence des corps n'est pour nous que la permanence d'êtres dont les propriétés répondent à un certain ordre de nos sensations, il en résulte qu'elle n'a rien de plus certain que celle d'autres êtres qui se manifestent également par leurs effets sur nous; et puisque nos observations sur nos propres facultés, confirmées par celles que nous faisons sur les êtres pensants qui animent aussi des corps, ne nous montrent aucune analogie entre l'être qui sent ou qui pense et l'être qui nous offre le phénomène de l'étendue ou de l'impénétrabilité, il n'y a aucune raison de croire ces êtres de la même nature. Ainsi la spiritualité de l'âme n'est pas une opinion qui ait besoin de preuves, mais le résultat simple et naturel d'une analyse exacte de nos idées, et de nos facultés.”—Vie de M. Turgot par M. Condorcet. Des Cartes was the first philosopher who stated, in a clear and satisfactory manner, the distinction between mind and matter, and who pointed out the proper plan for studying the intellectual phenomena. It is chiefly in consequence of his precise ideas with respect to this distinction, that we may remark, in all his metaphysical writings, a perspicuity which is not observable in those of any of his predecessors. Dr. Reid has remarked, that although Des Cartes infers the existence of mind, from the operations of which we are conscious, yet he could not reconcile himself to the notion of an unknown substance, or substratum, to which these operations belonged. And it was on this account, he conjectures, that he made the essence of the soul to consist in thought; as, for a similar reason, he had made the essence of matter to consist in extension. But I am afraid, that this supposition is not perfectly reconcilable with Des Cartes' writings; for he repeatedly speaks with the utmost confidence of the existence of substances of which we have only a relative idea; and, even in attempting to show that thought is the essential attribute of mind, and extension of matter, he considers them as nothing more than attributes or qualities belonging to these substances. "Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quæ ita existit, ut nullâ aliâ re indigeat ad existendum. Et quidem substantia quæ nullâ plane re indigeat, unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursûs Dei existere posse percipimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiæ non convenit Deo et illis univoce, ut dici solet in scholis; hoc est, nulla ejus nominis significatio potest distincte intelligi, quæ Deo et creaturis sit communis. "Possunt autem substantia corporea, et mens, sive substantia cogitans, creata, sub hoc communi conceptu intelligi; quod sint res, quæ solo Dei concursu egent ad existendum. Verumtamen non potest substantia primum animadverti ex hoc solo, quod sit res existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit: sed facile ipsam agnoscimus ex quolibet ejus attributo, per communem illam notionem, quod nihili nulla sunt attributa, nullæve proprietates aut qualitates. Ex hoc enim, quod aliquod attributum adesse percipiamus, concludimus aliquam rem existentem, sive substantiam cui illud tribui possit, necessario etiam adesse. "Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantia cognoscitur: sed una tamen est cujusque substantiæ præcipua proprietas, quæ ipsius naturam essentiamque constituit, et ad quam aliæ omnes referuntur. Nempe extensio in longum, latum, et profundum substantiæ corporeæ naturum constituit; et cogitatio constituit naturam substantia cogitantis.”—Princip. Philosoph. pars i. cap. 51, 52, 53. In stating the relative notions, which we have of mind and of body, I have avoided the use of the word substance, as I am unwilling to furnish the slightest occasion for controversy; and have contented myself with defining mind to be that which feels, thinks, wills, hopes, fears, desires, &c. That my consciousness of these and other operations is necessarily accompanied with a conviction of my own existence, and with a conviction that all of them belong to one and the same being, is not an hypothesis, but a fact; of which it is no more possible for me to doubt, than of the reality of my own sensations or volitions. Note (B.) page 50. Doctor Reid remarks, that Des Cartes rejected a part only of the ancient theory of perception, and adopted the other part. That theory," says he, " may be divid ed into two parts: the first, that images, species, or forms of external objects, come from the object, and enter by the avenues of the senses to the mind: the second part is, that the external object itself is not perceived, but only the species or image of it in the mind. The first part, Des Cartes and his followers rejected and refuted by solid arguments; but the second part, neither he nor his followers have thought of calling in question; being persuaded that it is, only a representative image in the mind of the external object that we perceive, and not the object itself. And this image, which the peripatetics called a species, he calls an idea, changing the name only, while he admits the thing." The account which this passage contains of Des Cartes' doctrine concerning perception, is, I believe, agreeable to his prevailing opinion, as it may be collected from the general tenor of his writings; and the observation with which it concludes is undoubtedly true, that neither he, nor any of his followers ever called in question the existence of ideas, as the immediate objects of our perception. With respect, however, to the first part of the ancient theory, as here stated, it may be proper to remark, that Des Cartes, although evidently by no means satisfied with it, sometimes expresses himself as if he rather doubted of it, than expressly denied it; and at other times, when pressed with objections to his own particular system, he admits, at least in part, the truth of it. The following passage is one of the most explicit I recollect, in opposition to the ancient doctrine. "Observandum præterea, animam nullis imaginibus ab objectis ad cerebrum missis egere ut sentiat, (contra quam communiter philosophi nostri statuunt,) aut ad minimum longe aliter illarum imaginum naturam concipiendam esse quam vulgo fit. Quum enim circa eas nil considerent, præter similitudinem earum cum objectis quæ repræsentant, non possunt explicare, quâ ratione ab objectis formari queant, et recipi ab organis sensuum exteriorum, et demum nervis ad cerebrum transvehi. Nec alia causa imagines istas fingere eos impulit, nisi quod viderent mentem nostram efficaciter picturâ excitari ad apprehendendum objectum illud, quod exhibet: ex hoc enim judicârunt, illam eodem modo excitandam, ad apprehendenda ea quæ sensus movent, per exiguas quasdam imagines, in capite nostro delineatas. Sed nobis contra est advertendum, multa præter imagines esse, quæ cogitationes excitant, ut, exempli gratiâ, verba et signa, nullo modo similia iis quæ significant."-Dioptric. cap. 4. § 6. In his third meditation (which contains his celebrated argument for the existence of a Deity) the following passage occurs. "Sed hic præcipue de iis est quærendum quas tanquam a rebus extra me existenti bus desumptas considero, quænam me moveat ratio ut illas istis rebus similes esse existimem; nempe ita videor doctus a naturâ, et præterea experior illas non a meâ voluntate nec proinde a me ipso pendere, sæpe enim vel invito obversantur, ut jam, sive velim sive nolim, sentio calorem, et ideo puto sensum illum, sive ideam caloris a re a me diversâ, nempe ab ignis, cui assideo, calore mihi advenire, nihilque magis obvium est, quam ut judicem istam rem suain similitudinem potius, quam aliud quid in me immittere; quæ rationes an satis firmæ sint, jam videbo. Cum hic dico me ita doctum esse a naturâ, intelligo tantum spontaneo quodam impetu me ferri ad hoc credendum, non lumine aliquo naturali mihi ostendi esse verum, quæ duo multum discrepant; nam quæcumque lumine naturali mihi ostenduntur, (ut quod ex eo quod dubitem sequatur me esse, et similia,) nullo modo dubia esse possunt, quia nulla alia facultas esse potest, cui æque fidain ac lumini isti, quæque illa non vera possit docere; sed quantum ad impetus naturales, jam sæpe olim judicavi me ab illis in deteriorem partem fuisse impulsum cum de bono eligendo ageretur, nec video cur iisdem in ullâ aliâ re magis fidam. Deinde quamvis ideæ illæ a voluntate meâ non pendeant, non ideo constat ipsas a rebus extra me positis necessario procedere ; ut enim |