the object. This feeling, being strongly confirmed by Piety, came to be called Pity. Such a Disposition, as it prompts us to abstain from adding to the pain felt, is Mercy, or Clemency; as it prompts us to remove the pain or want which we see, it is Charity. But this word has also a wider sense, in which it describes Benevolence, as it makes us abstain from judg ing unfavourably of other men. All these are virtuous Affections, and lead to the performance of Dubies of Benevolence.

243. Admiration can hardly be called a benevolent affection towards its object; for we admire what does not draw our Love; as when we admire a great geometer. But if we admire a man as a good man, we also love him (91). Esteem is the benevolent affection which we entertain towards that of which we approve. Persons whom we esteem, but to whom we are not drawn by love, we respect. When, with such a Disposition, we look at them as our Superiors, we reverence them; in a higher degree, this Affection is Veneration; when combined with Fear, it is Awe. Reverence assumes, in its object, Authority and Power, combined with Justice and Goodness.

244. The irascible Affections are, for the most part, opposed to the virtue of Benevolence; and therefore are to be repressed and controlled. Yet these Affections also have their moral office, and give rise to Virtues. They act as a Defence against harm and wrong; and hence, in their various modifications, they may be termed Defensive Affections. As opposed to harm, inflicted or threatened, they are Resentment; as directed against wrong, they are Indignation (56). And these Emotions may be blameless or praiseworthy; as when we feel natural and proper Resentment, or just Indignation. Such Sentiments are an important and necessary part of Virtue; not of Benevolence, strictly speaking, but of Justice. Without Indignation against cruelty, fraud, falsehood.

foulness, disorder, the Virtues have not their full force in the mind.

But Anger, in order to be virtuous, must be directed solely against moral Wrong. Malevolent Affections directed towards Persons are Vices; Antipathy, Dislike, Aversion to any person, independently of his bad character and conduct, are vicious. It is vicious to be displeased, irritated, incensed, exasperated at any person, merely because his actions interfere with our pleasures and desires. The proneness to such Anger is Irascibility. Still more vicious are our Emotions, when they swell into Rage and Fury, or settle into Malice and Hatred. The term Rancour denotes a fixed Hate, which, by its inward working, has, as it were, diseased the Soul in which it exists. Spite implies a vigilant desire to depress and mortify its object. All these malevolent Feelings are vicious.

245. Moderate Anger, arising from pain inflicted on us, is Offence; which term is also used for the offensive Act. A person commits an offence, or offends, in the latter sense; and takes offence, or is offended, in the former. If the Act be one which violently transgress common rules, it is an Outrage. Anger at pain received, impelling a man to inflict pain in return, is Revenge. This term also implies the object or aim of the feeling, as well as the feeling itself. A man is stimulated by Revenge, and seeks his Revenge. The same may be said of the word Vengeance, another form of the word, but of the same origin. The man who admits into his heart this Af. fection, and retains it, is revengeful, vengeful, vindic

tive.

246. The Malevolent Feelings, as manifested in the external behaviour, have various names. As they affect our disposition to a person, without necessarily leading to action, they are Ill-will. When they disturb the usual current of cheerful thoughts, they are Ill-humour. When malevolent feelings lead

us to speak or act with a view of giving pain to others, they are Ill-nature. When they make us re joice in another person's pain, they are Malignity. If the pleasure, which a malignant man takes in another man's pain, be unchecked by compassion, when the pain is evident, he is cruel; and as such a disposition shows a deficiency in the common feelings which bind men together, he is inhuman. If this character be strongly marked, the man is savage; he approaches to the character and temper of wild beasts; he is brutal.

The Malevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object of them, as compared with our own circumstances. Malevolent Pain at the Good which happens to another, and at our own Want of this Good, is Envy.

247. Contempt can hardly be called a malevolent feeling; for we may despise persons without hating them. Contempt consists rather in an estimate of a man as below a certain Standard of Character, to which our Esteem is given. We despise a man for Cowardice, because we admire Courage. The verb despise (despicio, to look down upon,) shows that such a view is implied. The word Scorn implies a condemnation of this kind, so strong that it approaches to Indignation. The expression of contempt, in a marked manner, is an Insult. If the discrepance of the contemplated character with the assumed standard be extravagant, so as to excite a sudden and poignant feeling of Incongruity, our Contempt expresses itself in Laughter. The character is regarded as ridiculous.

248. There are various modifications of character and conduct which arise from the greater or less Energy of the affections, and appear as Virtues or as Vices. The feelings of Love of Right, and Anger at Wrong, in a permanent and energetic form, are virtuous Zeal. Courage, the habit of mind which rejects Fear, is allied to this virtue; as is Fortitude, the

habit of not yielding to Pain. From such dispositions of mind, arise Energy and Activity in action; which are important virtues when the action is virtuous.

249. Though Hope and Fear are not Affections, they operate in increasing or diminishing our energy and activity, as the Affections do. The Disposition in which the emotion of Hope predominates is also termed Hope, or Hopefulness. Joy and Joyfulness describe rather Delight produced by some special event, than any permanent Disposition; but Cheerfulness, like Hopefulness, is rather an habitual Disposition; and when governed by Rules of Duty, is an auxiliary Virtue. A tranquil yet cheerful flow of the spirits keeps the thoughts and feelings in a condition suitable to virtuous action. The want of activity and energy is Sluggishness, Sloth, Idleness, Laziness, Indolence; which are habits alien to virtue, and connected with the Vice of Apathy, the absence of lively affections and desires. As the influence of Fear predominates, the character becomes timid, and tends to Cowardice, the opposite of Courage. Such habits are at variance with the Rules of Duty; for these Rules often direct us in a course which leads through danger, either to the Person or Fortune of the Actor, or to the Good-will which others feel for him. In order that a man may act rightly, he must act freely, independently. Men wanting in Independence of Character, and seeking the favour of others, without regard to moral Rules, are slavish, servile, obsequious, cringing, fawning; they are Flatterers and Sycophants. Such dispositions make men abject and base. want of cheerfulness and hopefulness is Despondency, Dejection, Sullenness, Melancholy, Gloom; which are habits of mind adverse to active virtue. The theo logical moralists have made Acedia (avnía), Apathy with regard to Good, one of their seven deadly sins.

The

250. We have placed here the Virtues and Vices which are connected with Energy or Zeal, be

cause these qualities depend very much upon the strength of the Affections. They depend also, however, upon the Habits of Mind by which the intention is directed. The energetic man decides soon and conclusively what course to take. This is Decision. Energy also manifests itself in Fixity of Purpose. When the purpose is once formed, the energetic man's course is determined; his doubts are resolved; and he goes on in spite of difficulty and danger. This is Determination, Resolution. A man who adheres to his purpose, in spite of strong motives to draw him away, is firm; but if the motives which he resists are reasonable, he is obstinate. Firmness implies a good cause; Obstinacy a bad one. Energy and Zeal may also become extreme, so as to trespass upon Benevolence. In this case they are Overzeal, Vehemence, Harshness, Impatience.

Zeal, operating through the Reason, is Earnestness, which leads to Seriousness. With this quality, Cheerfulness is not inconsistent, but Levity is. Care sometimes implies only so much attention as Earnestness requires; at other times, it implies more than is consistent with Cheerfulness. It is right to take Care, but it is not necessary to be full of Care. It is wrong to be careless, reckless. A disposition to attend to Trifles only is Frivolity.

251. Connected with the pleasures of Cheerfulness, there are pleasures which show themselves externally in good-humoured Laughter; as the pleasures of Jesting and the like. These arise from intellectual acts, and may be spoken of hereafter; but we may here remark, that under the influence of Levity, they lead to mere Merriment, Buffoonery, Folly.