not satisfy. This is the unhappy consequence of making an immoral Promise.

In other cases, where the Promisee is aware that the act promised is immoral, he did wrong in accepting, as I in making, the promise. He ought to release me from the promise, not as an act of grace, but as an act of Duty. If he do not, my shame at not satisfying his claim upon me, is rightly lost in my shame at having given him such a claim.

382. When the Act promised was not immoral at the time of promising, but becomes so afterwards, it is not to be performed. For since we are asking what virtuous men would do, we are to suppose that they would not have made the promise, if they had known that performance would be immoral; and that they will release each other, now that it appears to be immoral. That the act should be lawful at the time of performance, was a part of the understanding which the promise conveyed. If a merchant promises his foreign correspondent to send him a ship-load of corn at a time appointed, and before the time arrive, the exportation of corn is forbidden by law; he is liberated from his engagement. Both parties must have understood that the promise was made, on the supposition that the act would be lawful; and that the engagement was annulled, when it became unlawful, and therefore immoral.

383. In the case where one party sees that the performance is immoral, and the other does not, the difficulty is greater; but the Rule by which we may direct ourselves is, that the promise must be understood as a promise made between virtuous men, and involving such a conditional engagement as may morally be made: and so understood, must be ful

filled.

Thus, if I promise to vote for an unworthy candidate, the promise was immoral, and is not to be kept, as we have said. But if I promise to vote for a car.

didate who, after my promise, becomes unworthy, not having been so before, am I bound? We say, No; for I promised on the supposition of his worthiness; and he, who ought to regard me as a moral man in making my promises, must have understood that this supposition was implied. But yet my refusal to fulfil my promise may give him ground to say, that it is not his worthiness, but my intentions, which have changed. And this must be a matter difficult of proof; at least to him; and therefore it will be difficult to show him that I have not violated my Relative Duty to him. The prospect of such difficulties, is a strong reason for not making promises respecting elections, in cases where the worthiness of the candidates, at the time of voting, ought alone to decide the election.

384. But there may be cases, in which an unconditional promise to vote for a candidate at an election may morally be given; and then it must be kept. There are cases in which the matter is left much to the discretion of the elector; and in such cases, though merit may determine his choice, he may fix his own time for making up his mind; and may promise when he has decided. Any candidate who offers himself after this, comes too late.

385. Or again, the Promise may imply an informal Contract: as when a person is elected to act on behalf of the Electors; or on the belief that he and they have a common purpose. This is the case, when the Representative of a body of men is to be elected. They look out for a person whose character fits him to act for them, and they promise to vote for him. He, on the other hand, by his conduct and his professions, pledges himself to follow a course of action which they approve. Promises thus made, are not immoral. Such a mutual understanding is requisite, between the Electors and their Representatives; and can only be established, by their promising him

their votes. The Electors are bound to elect the fittest person; but the Candidate with whom they have come to this understanding is thereby and thenceforth the fittest. The election is like the election of an Agent; and as we have said, is rather of the nature of a Contract, than of an election on the ground of merit only.

But then, in order that this Contract may morally be made, it must be for moral purposes. Such would be an understanding between the Electors and the Candidate, that he, acting as their Representative, shall aim to preserve the Constitution, or to reform the Abuses, of the body into which he is elected. But if the understanding be, that he shall give them money in return for their votes, the Contract is an immoral one. The power of electing a Representative is in their hands for the sake of some public good; it is a violation of Duty, to turn such a powe, into a means of private gain (311).

386. It is sometimes made a Question, Suppos ing such an informal Contract immorally made, wheth er, when the immoral end is answered, it is a Duty to perform the rest of the Contract; for instance, if a person were elected to an office of public trust on promise of sums of money to the electors, whether, after the election, it is his duty to pay these sums. We may remark, that the question, here, is not What he is to do as an innocent man; for by the supposition he is a guilty one; having been concerned in an immoral bargain. If the question be, What is he to do as a repentant man, convinced of his guilt, and wishing henceforth to do what is right, the answer is, that he must pay. There is no reason why he should add, to the violation of his absolute duty, the violation of his Relative Duty to the Promisees. If, in his repentance, he wishes not to complete an immoral transaction, he is to recollect that the immoral transaction is completed by his election. If he wish to mark

his hatred of the offence, he may signify his meaning more clearly, by expressing his repentance, and paying the money, than by keeping it; which may be interpreted as adding avarice and falsehood to the violation of public Duties.

387. Promises are immoral, which contradict a former Promise, and therefore are not to be kept; but here, as in other cases, there is a violation of the Relative Duty to the promisee; and a ground for shame and repentance, so far as regards him. And here we have another warning, of the need of being cautious in making promises.

388. Promises which it is impossible to perform, are evidently not to be kept; but then, it can hardly be that such Promises can be made, without some want of due consideration and forethought on the Part of the Promiser, which gives the Promisee good ground for complaint. If the Promiser was aware of the impossibility at the time of making the promise, he is guilty of fraud; for by making the promise, he implied his belief of the possibility of performing it.

When the Promiser himself occasions the impossibility, it is a breach of promise.

389. Are Promises extorted by Fear or Violence binding? This is a question which has been much debated among Moralists. We must apply to it the Rule which we have already laid down; that the Promise, if morally made, must be kept. If I ought not to keep the Promise, I ought not to have made it. The question, therefore, will be, whether I could morally make such a Promise. And it may be remarked, that if I could not morally make the Promise, I cannot morally derive advantage from any contract which was combined with the Promise; for to do this, is a part of the same Act, as to make the Contraci. I cannot morally derive advantage from one part of the Contract, and refuse to perform another part. If I find the Contract to have been immoral, I

must undo, as far as I can, its effects; and go back, in my condition, to the state in which the Contract was made.

390. These Maxims may be applied to a case of this kind often discussed. A man falls into the power of a band of robbers, and, in fear of violence, promises them that if they will set him free, he will afterwards send them a certain sum of money. He is liberated on his promise: is he bound afterwards to send the money? According to the above considerations, if it was not immoral to make the Promise, it is a Duty to keep it. And this Rule is so obvious a one, and its application so direct, that we may wonder that any other should have been taken.

The reasons given for doubt, or for the opposite decision, are various. Thus Cicero says*, that with robbers, we have no tie of common faith or obligation. But we shall, of course, answer, that we keep our word, not as what is due to robbers, but as what is due to ourselves, and necessary to our character of truthful men: not as what is an act of obligation to them, but an act of reverence to truth. We may add, that we can hardly say that we have no ties of common obligation with them, when we have made them a promise, and have received life and liberty as a consideration for it. We make a Contract with them, though it may be an informal one. They fulfil their part of the Contract: if we do not fulfil ours, we shall take a very strange way of exemplifying our asserted moral superiority over them.

It has also been alleged, as a reason why the Promise thus given should not be kept, that their confidence in Promises will thus greatly facilitate the perpetration of such robberies;-that in this way, such Contracts may be made the means of almost unlimited extortiont. Upon this we may remark, that it is right to regard the probable consequences of our * Off. 111. 29. + Paley, B. III. c. 5