sions, which take place in such a condition of Ignorance or Error, are not so great, nor their remedy so hopeless, as when the transgressions proceed more entirely from the internal character, without this influence of external causes. And thus, according to what was said respecting the amount of transgressions (353), offences, arising from such hardly avoidable Ignorance or Error, are diminished in their heinousness, by their being so occasioned.

455. Ignorance and Error may be considered under one other aspect, which it is important to attend to; namely, when they are wilful, or as it is sometimes termed by moralists, affected. Such would be, for instance, these cases: A man who will not examine the Title-deeds of his estate; because he fears to find that it is not his by Right: A man who will not enquire into the amount of his income; because he fears that, when he does so, he will discover the necessity of diminishing his expenses: A man who will not attend to the proofs of the immorality of a practice which he follows; for instance, slave-dealing; A man who, really believing that negroes have human faculties, pretends to believe that they have not, in order to justify his making slaves of them: and generally, A man who either refuses to attend to the proofs of his duties, because he does not intend to perform them; or who denies some proposition, merely because it would tend to establish the proof of such duties. Such wilful and affected Ignorance does not, in any degree, excuse or exculpate the transgressions which it accompanies. Indeed, it seems rather to aggravate them: for it adds to the moral regression which the offence implies, a perversion of the intellect, adopted with a view to a consistency in immorality.

It may be thought, perhaps, that assumed or affected Ignorance or Error should be spoken of as an Offence against Truth; that is, against Truthfulness: and in

many cases it may be so. But in moral doctrines, and especially in those of an abstract and general kind, there is, as we have just said, room for considerable vagueness and incoherency, in the obscure re gion of transition from particular to general proposi tions and hence, it may often be difficult to say whether or not a man really holds the opinion which he asserts. Some of those who assert property to be an immoral institution, have probably rather confused than immoral minds. Those who assert the negroes not to have human faculties, and yet make laws against their human faculties being educated, may perhaps not quite disbelieve their own assertion; though it is inconsistent with their conduct. There is room for some self-deceit on such subjects; and this may, to some extent, liberate a man from the blame of Falsehood. But even if there be not Falsehood, there is often, in such cases as we have described, and in many others, Ignorance and Error which may be called wilful: and such Ignorance and Error are no excuses for transgression.

456. Thus the general result of our view of this subject is, that Ignorance and Error, when unavoidable, are excuses for offences: when difficultly vincible, they diminish the offence; when wilful, they do not at all diminish it. We have seen, too, that on very general and abstract moral doctrines, Ignorance and Error are to be tolerated, out of regard for the imperfection of man's faculties.

CHAPTER XIX.

PROGRESSIVE STANDARDS OF MORALITY

457. NATIONS and Communities, as well as individuals, have their Standards of right and wrong,

which assume the reality of a Universal Standard of right and wrong. They have not only Laws, which determine Rights and Obligations, but also current moral Precepts and Rules, which express the conceptions of Duties and Virtues. The assumed existence of a Standard of right and wrong shows itself in the sentiments which are associated with the conceptions and names of Virtues and Vices. Vices are, in all ages and countries, named only to be condemned. Violence, Fraud, Falsehood, Indecency, are objects of aversion at all times and places. There is no na tion or language, which has not the means of express ing this; and none, which does not express

it.

It is true, the actions, to which this aversion and condemnation are applied, are different in different ages and countries. In some countries, plunder of strangers, slavery, polygamy, have been regarded as blameless; to us, they are offences and vices. This difference arises from the diversity of the Definitions of Rights in different times and places: for, as we have seen, Rights are defined by Law, and Virtues and Duties depend upon Rights. Yet the variety of Laws, in various nations, does not prevent Rights from being a necessary element of man's condition; and in like manner, the diversity of Standards of Morality does not prevent Virtue from being a necessary object of man's approval; nor hinder Conscience, which recognizes Virtue, from being a universal attribute of mankind.

458. There must be, in all cases, a great connexion between the National Laws and the National Standard of Morality. Both the one and the other express that which is deemed right. Laws are enacted, or upheld, because it is considered right that they should be so. Actions also are approved or disapproved according as they are looked upon as right or wrong. And the consciences of individuals accommodate themselves, in a great measure, to the

law. If the national law allow polygamy, or slavery, the individual commonly practises it without self-condemnation. The exhortation of the National Moralist is, in the first place, To obey the Law. The National Moral Precepts take for granted the National Laws. The national conceptions of the various relations of society, as Property, Marriage, the Family, the State, and the like, which are the basis of the Laws, are also the basis of the Morals, of the Nation.

459. But though, in every Nation, Law and Morality are connected, they are, for the most part, not identical. The difference of Law and Morality, which we have noticed (105), is that which is generally understood: Law refers to definite external acts absolutely commanded or prohibited; Morality refers to internal springs of action; and as results of these, to acts of a less definite kind. The Precepts of Law are positive and absolute. The Precepts of Morality respecting actions, are exemplary and relative;—that is, they only exemplify the disposition from which the actions proceed; and they refer to the legal conditions of Society. The Precepts of Law, Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not break thy promise-must be considered, in the first place, as fixed and absolute (105). The injunctions of Morality are to be understood as recognizing the authority of these commands; but as carrying the signification of them much further.

460. Law deals with matters external and visible, such as Objects of desire, (Things,) and Actions, and thus creates Rights. Morality has to do with matters internal and invisible; with Desires and Intentions, as well as with Laws and Rights. Desires and Intentions cannot be defined or described in any way, without some reference to Things and Actions; and therefore, cannot supply a basis of Morality independent of Law: and thus Morality, in the first place, is dependent upon Law. Rights afford the fixed

points by which moral positions are determined. Rights also supply some of the principal forces by which the moral sentiments produce their effect. Law affords a support to the frame-work of society; but Law does not suffice for the social life of man, without Morality. Law and Morality coincide in their general form and outlines; but Law is stiff and hard; Morality of a more flexible, yet more pervadingly active nature. Law is the rigid skeleton which Morality clothes with living flesh and acting muscles. Law supplies the fixed positions, on which the Machinery of Duty can rest, so as to move the world.

461. But though Morality rests upon Law, Law is subject to the Authority of Morality: Law is the Basis of Morality, but yet Morality is the Standard of Law. Law is fixed for the moment, and Morality supposes its fixity: but Morality is a supreme and eternal Rule, which Law must recognize. Law must always attempt to conform to Morality. Thus, though the Law is, in the first instance, assumed to be fixed, and though its commands are accepted as absolute and peremptory; it is not to be considered as entirely and finally unchangeable. The commands of Law are themselves liable to be judged of, as good or bad. They, and their application in particular cases, may be morally wrong, as well as right.

The Law itself acknowledges this. It puts forward its Rules and Definitions of Rights, as not absolutely fixed and universal. They admit of exceptions in extreme cases. In many such cases, there are special moral considerations, which counteract the general Reasons of the Rule, and suspend its operation. The Law, Thou shalt not kill, admits of exception in cases of self-defence, burglary, and the like (117): the Right of Property gives way in cases of necessity (156): and, in its general administration, the National Law either itself aspires to be the voice of Natural Justice, as the Roman Law did; or has, as in England, a