1 culture; and are an implicit confession that it is necessary to degrade their minds, in order to keep their bodies in slavery. When such practices and such Laws prevail, to defend negro slavery by asserting the inferiority of the negro race, can hardly be free from the guilt of wilful blindness of conscience, persisted in, in order to uphold conscious wrong. 529. The Moralist, then, must pronounce Slavery to be utterly inconsistent with Humanity; and with Principles, which, being derived from the universal nature of man, may be deemed fundamental Principles of Justice. Slavery is utterly abhorrent to the essence of Morality, and cannot be looked upon as a tolerable condition of Society, nor acquiesced in as what may allowably be. Whenever Slavery exists, its Abolition must be one of the great objects of every good man. 530. It will, of course, be understood, from what has already been said, that this Abolition is to be sought by legal and constitutional means only. When Slavery exists, its annihilation is an end which must be constantly kept in view; but to which we must sometimes be content to approach by degrees. It is an Idea to which we must endeavour to make the Fact conform; but the conformity may not be immediately brought to pass. The Laws of the State are to be observed, even when they enact Slavery; for the Moralist cannot authorize the citizen to choose what Laws he will obey, and what he will not. Natural Rights must yield to Civil Rights, in the hope that Civil Rights will be more and more made to harmonize with Natural Rights. Slavery is never to be acquiesced in, always to be condemned; but we may, and must, tolerate a gradual transition from Slavery to Emancipation, such as the conditions of Legislation and even the benefit of the slave, render inevitable. Still, on the other hand, we are to recollect, that delay is to be tolerated, only so far as it is inevitable and that to quicken the course of Emancipation is no less humane and just, than it is to give Legislation this direction, and to prepare both slaves and masters for the change. 531. It may be hoped, by the Moralist, that the emancipation of the negro race will go on with accelerated rapidity; for every State in which free negroes live, as moral and rational beings, is a refutation of the solitary argument in defence of negro slavery, drawn from the asserted unfitness of the negro for freedom. When the free negro population of cultured communities have, by the manifestation of their moral and rational nature, made themselves recognized as brethren by their white fellow-citizens, it cannot be that their black brethren will long be kept in slavery in neighbouring States professing a like reverence for freedom. 532. Slavery nowhere exists in Europe in a form so repugnant to Humanity as is negro slavery. But there are, in some parts, many vestiges of slavery, and classes intermediate between slaves and freemen. The Serfs, who have existed and still exist in different countries, may be considered as holding such an intermediate place; and in different countries in different degrees. In Russia, serfage is hardly distinguishable from slavery. The labourers are bound to the soil by the Law: they are prædial serfs (128). By the general custom of the country, they are bound to work on the demesnes of the landowner three days in the week; and have land allotted to them from which they extract their own subsistence. But the peasant is, with all his family and descendants, at the disposal of the lord. In some parts, the Serfs have been allowed the privilege of acquiring and transmitting personal property; and in some, they may even purchase or inherit land. In other parts of Europe, Serfage has assumed a less slavish character. In some parts of Germany, the peasant is no longer attached by the law to the soil: and his labour which he owes to his landlord is definite in kind and amount. Such peasants are called Leibeigener. In other parts this labour-rent is commuted for a cornrent or a money-rent, though the tenant is still liable for some trifling services. Such tenants are called Meyer*. 533. The social structure of England has gone through these several forms. For two centuries after the Norman Conquest, a large proportion of the body of cultivators was in the situation of the Russian serf; they were termed Villeins. During the next three hundred years the unlimited labour-rents paid by the Villeins were gradually commuted for definite services, still payable in kind; and they had a legal Right to their lands which they occupied, which legal Right was called Copyhold. It is only about two. hundred years, since the personal bondage of the Villeins ceased to exist in England. 534. The contemplation of the change which has taken place in this country, and which appears to be taking place elsewhere, from a condition in which men are little better than Slaves, to one in which they are Freemen; and of the manifest and immense advance in moral and intellectual culture, which such a change has brought with it; must strongly stimulate the Moralist to recommend and promote the progress of social freedom and the removal of every law and custom that contains any trace of Slavery. 535. We distinguish social from political freedom; the former depending upon the domestic or prædial relation of Servant and Master (128); the latter, upon the relation of Subject or Citizen, and Government. If men have Rights of the Person, of Property, and the like; they may be socially Freemen; however despotic the established government * Jones On Ren. be. They are politically free, when each Class has such a share in the Government, as enables it to assert and secure its Rights. But Social Freedom can hardly exist, without Political Freedom: the Lowest Class can hardly have and retain Rights, without possessing some political power of maintaining them. In countries where Serfage prevails, the Serfs have no political power. The landlords form an Aristocracy; and the Sovereign and they, possess, between them, the powers of the State. When Serfage gives place to Social Freedom, there must be, in the Constitution, an Estate of the People, or some other Political Authority, representing and protecting the general body of free citizens. But the subject of Political Freedom must be considered hereafter. CHAPTER XXV. PLEASURE, INTEREST, HAPPINESS, UTILITY, EXPEDIENCY. 536. We may follow the subject of Humanity or Benevolence somewhat further. Humanity is, as we have said, a Principle, in virtue of which we represent to ourselves other men as of the same nature with ourselves, and enter into their feelings, hopes, and prospects, as if they were our own. We desire the good of others as we desire our own good. But the Good which we desire for ourselves is contemplated under various aspects. We may have, as the Object of our desires in a general form, Pleasure, Enjoyment, or Gratification; we may have Interest, or Advantage; we may have Happiness. And as our desires point to one or other of these general Ob jects for ourselves, they may also aim at the like Objects for others. Our Benevolence may urge us to give pleasure to others, or to promote their interest, or to make them happy. In order to see how these views affect the Duties of Benevolence, we may examine further the Conceptions of Pleasure, Interest, and Happiness. 537. Pleasure arises from our attaining the objects of our Desires. It is what we feel, when our Desires are satisfied, or in some measure gratified. All actions which are not directed by the Reason, may be conceived as performed in order to obtain Pleasure, or to avoid its opposite, Pain. Actions directed by Reason, may also be directed to Pleasure. They may be directed to the objects of Mental Desires, which Reason presents to us under general abstract forms; as Wealth, Power, and the like: and to obtain such objects, may give us Pleasure. But Pleasure is more especially considered as the object of less abstract and reflective Desires, as Bodily Pleasure, and the like. Pleasure is sought simply and for itself; not as a means to an end, nor in obedience to a Rule. If we seek Wealth or Power as means to an end, we do not seek them merely as pleasure. 538. Since Pleasure is sought, not in obedience to a Rule, but simply for itself, to make Pleasure our object, is not consistent with the Supreme Rule of Human Action. To make Pleasure the object of human action, is to reject the supposition of a Supreme Rule, and a Supreme Object. For if Pleasure be the Highest Object, it is also the Lowest. If Pleasure be the Highest Object of Human Action, nothing can be absolutely right; nor can be right in any other sense, than as the right road to Pleasure. If Pleasure be the object of human action, we must reject Duty as the guide of Human Actions. The good man makes Pleasure his object, only so far as it is con |