drawn from whatever source, is, that in reasoning, we should take into account the INFLUENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE ON BELIEF. The weight of evidence in producing conviction is relative, according to the scales in which it is weighed. That may be light as a feather, in the estimation of one man, which has the power of demonstration to another. Without attempting here to analyze the reasons of a fact so wonderful, and yet so unquestionable, no man whose business it is to urge the truth on others, should forget that the affections and habits have a strong ascendency over the judgment. Solomon had his eye on this principle, when he represented the slothful man as saying-"There is a lion in the way-I shall be slain in the streets." And Shakspeare, the philosopher of poets, whose knowledge of human nature was remarkable, thus describes the partiality with which worldly favour regards the same action in different circumstances — "Plate sin with gold, "And the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks; Prejudice is a complex term, by which we designate the state of a man's mind, which is unfavourable to conviction, arising from interest, habit, previous opinion, pride, or other passions. We never trust the judgment of any one in his own cause, or in that of a near friend.1 Urge the timid man to an act of courage, or the proud man to an act of condescension, or the covetous man to an act of generosity, and his heart will furnish an answer to all your arguments. Or if you carry the point with him by assault, the victory is but momentary; the next day he could defy your reasoning. 1 Quod volumus, facile credimus. The application of these principles, to the work of the preacher, is easy. It is not enough, in any case, that his proof is good; it must be adapted to circumstances; to the time, and the state of the hearers. If they are already settled in an opinion, which it is his object to overthrow; especially, if that opinion is fortified by ignorance, or interest, or education, or party spirit, he must proceed with caution and wisdom. Such a case calls not for the bold onset, the language of denunciation, or severity, or even for great earnestness, particularly at the commencement. These bar the door, which would still be left open to a more discreet and gentle approach. There are the subjects on which we know, that our hearers are strongly prejudiced against the truth. In discussing these, there are special advantages in the analytic method, by which the point to be proved, is concealed at first; certain undeniable principles are made prominent; the assent to these, step by step, is rendered unavoidable; till the result we wish to establish comes out with a clearness of evidence, which cannot be questioned. These hints I know are capable only of a limited application; but for want of judgment, in adapting ourselves to circumstances, the best talents may be employed in a fruitless effort. Power, I repeat, is relative. A child may undermine a rock, which no giant could heave from its base. LECTURE XIII. RULES OF ARGUMENT. A THIRD rule respecting arguments is, that they be SIMPLE, NOT COMPLICATED AND refined. I refer not here to abstract terms, nor to dark construction of sentences, nor to style in any respect, but to sentiment. Systematic thinking implies a mental labour to which most men are little accustomed. We cannot expect that they will follow a train of argument, derived from such sources, and consisting of so many parts, as to demand a discriminating and close attention, for any long time. Hence the cumulative form of argument, when so conducted that the train of thought is complex, and so that the hearer must fail of reaching our conclusion, if he lose a single step of our process, is too refined for common understandings. To this reluctance, and this incapacity to think intensely, must be ascribed, in some degree at least, that general feeling of dissatisfaction, excited by what is called metaphysical discussion in sermons. To some extent doubtless this is a mere prejudice, very improperly encouraged by those preachers, whose compliant practice seems to allow, that no subject befits the pulpit, which requires thinking from themselves or their hearers. This would set aside the most important doctrines of revelation. In the indefinite reproaches cast on metaphysics, a very plain distinction seems to be forgotten. In one respect or more, a truth may be incomprehensible, and yet the proof that it is a truth be perfectly plain. For example; that God is eternal, that he created the world, that man acts under divine influence, and yet is free and accountable-that a sinner, to be qualified for heaven, must be renewed by the Holy Ghost, are points that I can prove at once from the Bible; and every child can understand the proof, though the subjects are in themselves deep and mysterious. So far, I am on plain ground. But if I undertake to explain the eternity of God, or to tell how matter could be created or modified by a spirit, or how the will of man, though free, is controlled by motives, or how the Holy Ghost operates in renewing the heart, my reasoning must be obscure and useless, because I attempt to go beyond the province of argument. Now while it is clear to me, that the preacher should be conversant with the science of metaphysics, so far as to understand the powers of the human mind, and the principles of logical analysis, it is equally clear, that this kind of knowledge, as well as every other, should be under the guidance of good sense in the pulpit. He who engages in the ministry, with the weak ambition of being reputed a profound thinker, will probably acquire the habit of choosing abstruse subjects for his sermons, or of rendering plain ones abstruse. The love of paradox, that controverts first principles, and delights to puzzle, rather than instruct, is as far from the true spirit of the pulpit, as the vapouring of declamation, or the raving of fanaticism. Speculation may be called instructive preaching; but whom does it instruct? and in what? It cannot build men up in the most holy faith. It cannot interest them, till the mind is new modelled. A man of distinguished common sense said; I honour metaphysicians, logicians, critics,-in their places. But I dare not tell most academical, logical, frigid men, how little I account of their opinion, concerning the true method of preaching to the popular ear. They are often great men, first-rate men, in their class and sphere, but it is not their sphere to manage the world.' It comes directly within the design of this head, to compare the abstract and dialectical kind of reasoning, with the analogical and rhetorical. On this subject, however, at which I have repeatedly glanced already, there is room here but for a few additional remarks. How then do men spontaneously think and reason, on common subjects? In the abstract mode? Not at all. From the constitution of man, the language, written or spoken, by which he expresses his feelings, is primarily a sort of painting. It is a representation, of emotions, arising within himself, or suggested from the external world. Hence, every language, in its infancy, is necessarily a species of poetry. Not rhyme nor metre, which are only artificial and circumstantial appendages of poetry; but poetry in essence, that is, imagery and metaphor. To the mere philologist, as well as to the man of refined taste, it would be a subject of curious interest, should he ascertain to what extent, language is originally formed, by figures taken from objects of sight. But the ear, and the other senses, are made auxiliary to this mode of conception;-thus we say, Conscience will speak to the guilty in accents of thunder.' When we compare rage to a storm, and benevolence to the gentle zephyr, we speak a language perfectly simple and significant, and much more energetic, than when we employ mere words, which are totally unmeaning, except as arbitrary signs. In this manner we transfer the attributes |