able native centre some eighty miles from Berbera, he raided the wealthy Habr Yunis tribe, and forced a section of the Dolbahanta to join him. After the raid, his fighting men were estimated to number 3000.

If one would understand the full meaning of the Mullah's movement in Somaliland, it is desirable to pause here to examine more closely its leader's original motives. In the initial stages the politieal and racial object of the movement was the substitution of the Mullah's authority for that of the tribal headman and the infidel overlord. In other words, it was a nationalist movement. Such a project could not but appeal to the Somali. Semitic in origin, of a high standard of intelligence, and imbued with more than his fair share of that useful but dangerous gift of self-confidence, he boasted strong nationalist tendencies -up to 1910. In that year, however, the British Government evacuated the interior of Somaliland, leaving the tribesmen to their own devices. Three years of Somali self-government and the most terrible carnage ensued, during which it is estimated that onethird of the total population was exterminated, with the result that since the reoccupation of 1913 the Somali has exhibited a very keen appreciation of the benefits conferred on his country by an impartial British administration. At the time of the Mallah's rise, however, the call to a national banner was well calculated to make an eloquent appeal to

the Somali's spirit of independence.

Then there was the religious plank to the Mullah's platform, While one would yield to no one in admiration of the excellent moral qualities possessed by the Somali, and although it is undeniable that his high code of morality is partly attributable to his religion, one is constrained to admit that superstition plays the largest part in his religious concepts. It was on this superstition that the Mullah traded when he first embarked on his mission rather than on any readiness to accept new beliefs for old. At the same time, there is no

reason to doubt the sincerity of the Mullah's conversion to the Mohammed Salih doctrines, or the sincerity of his desire to impose the sterner teaching of this seot upon his fellow - countrymen in replacement of the milder tenets of the Kadariyah. But unquestionably he was at far greater pains to encourage a belief in the sanctity of his own person. Nor was be ill-advised. Throughout the twenty-one years of his revolt it has been to him an invaluable and an inalienable asset. Many are the stories of his miraculous powers which are told and believed, not by his followers only but by all Somalis alike. Before his rise, he was once seen reclining outside Berbera, pushing the town into the sea with his feet. At the instance of one of his followers, however, he refrained from giving the town a final kick into the Gulf of

Aden-to the everlasting regret of those who are now compelled to reside in Berbera's unpleasant climate. He was generally believed to possess an amulet, with secret lifesaving powers, presented to him by a well-known shaitan, or devil, at the request of a lady lizard whose life he had magnanimously spared. Or, again, when "Z" Squadron of the Royal Air Force arrived in Somaliland to join the recent expedition, on dit in the town of Berbera that the Mullah was quite undismayed; that, on hearing the news, he had pointed out six hawks which were circling around his haroun at Medishe, and at a word from him they had fallen dead at his feet. So would he deal with the infidel airmen! If such stories gained oredence among his enemies, one might well ask what his followers may not have believed.

When once the nationalists and the superstitious had been gathered to his banner, the Mullah had nolens volens to appeal to yet another quality possessed by his fellow-countrymen-their pugnacity. Intertribal fighting and raiding constitute the Somali's national sport. To live, it was necessary for the Dervishes to have cattle and camels, sheep and goats, to give meat and milk. This could only be achieved by looting the friendly tribes which espoused the infidel's cause. Such a prospect was irresistible to the poor and bellicose Somali, to whom a share in such raids would

spell affluence; while to the rich and timorous Somali, whose grazing grounds were in the vicinity of the Mullah's activities, adherence to his cause was in the first years of the rising almost the only form of life and property insurance available.

The Dervishes, thus collected from motives good and bad, were ruled by a terrible discipline. For the most trivial offences, mutilation and torture and death were the recognised punishments. Death, indeed, was meted out to those who were only suspected of offences. On one Occasion 66 men were murdered because it was thought that they contemplated desertion. On another occasion, 300 women were mutilated and executed because the Mullah dreamt they would not pray. Whenever a Dervish succeeded in deserting, all his family, and possibly all his section, would be killed. But terrible as were the punishments which the Mullah inflicted on his peccant Dervishes, they were surpassed by the atrocities perpetrated by the Dervishes on the friendly tribes-men, women, and children-whose villages were suocessfully raided. None escaped the most revolting mutilation; none escaped death. Yet, in the House of Commons, a distinguished Nationalist once desoribed the Mullah and his Dervishes as "brave men striving to be free."

It is noteworthy that, as the years passed by, the political, racial, and religious motives which originally inspired the

movement became less and less prominent; and that the Dervish horde was kept together only by the sure knowledge that desertion would entail the murder of their women and children and relatives, as well as the less of their stook, and by the generally accepted belief, carefully fostered in the haroun, that successful deserters were subjected by the British Government to tortures even more terrible than those practised in the Dervish camp. Although the similarity is more apparent than real, it is difficult to consider the Dervish movement in Somaliland without making some comparison with Mahdism in the Sudan, The rebellion of the Mahdi was primarily a revolt against the injustices and corruption of the Egyptian officials, which had turned fertility into soareity, and the native content of the savage into the misery of the oppressed.

The Dervish movement in Somaliland was also a revolt against the rule of the foreigner, but against a foreigner who had come to to give peace to warring tribes, to replace corruption by justiee, and penury by prosperity. The political revolt in the Sudan was only made possible by the fire of religion or fanaticism, call it what you will, which the Mahdi kindled in the humble breasts of his starving and naked followers, uniting them proudly under his inspiring leadership. The Somaliland Mullah also invested his political object, the expulsion of the foreigner,

with the glamour of a divine mission. In the Sudan, the Mahdi turned indifferent Mohammedans suffering from political oppression into fanatios and patriots. In Somaliland, the Mullah traded upon the superstition and independent spirit of his fellowcountrymen to convert them into robbers and out-throats. In short, Somaliland dervishism was but a despicable imitation of a genuine patriotic and religious revolt.

the Mullah

To resume, followed up his first coup of April 1899 by & further successful foray against the Habr Yunis in August, and he reoccupied Burae with a force estimated at 5000 men. He gave himself out as the Mahdi; and ominous rumours spread foretelling an advance on Berbera. The ConsulGeneral urged an expedition on the Home Government, but our commitments elsewhere, more particularly in South Africa, were such as to preclude the immediate adeption of this course. During the first seven months of 1900, the Mullah was comparatively inactive, but in August he suddenly swooped down upon the Aidegalla tribe and caused all the friendly tribes evacuate the Haud in confusion. Next month the Habr Awal tribe suffered severely at his hands.

to

It would be superfluous to discuss here in any detail the campaigns which followed. They are exhaustively described in the 'Official History of the Operations in Somaliland, 1901,

04,' published by the War Office in 1907; and it will be suffioient for the purposes of this paper to outline very briefly the general course of events.

The first expedition started in April 1901, and operations terminated in the following July. The force employed consisted of a locally-enlisted and hurriedly-trained levy of 1500 men, of whom 500 were mounted. The casualties inflioted on the Dervishes were estimated at some 1200 killed and wounded, and, in addition, 800 prisoners were taken, inoluding some notable head

men.

The Mullah's power had thus been appreciably shaken, and for a time he remained quiescent. But not for long. In October 1901 he renewed his activities, and, thanks to the illicit arms traffic, he had, by January 1902, not only recovered from his losses, but had forced the majority of the Dolbahanta tribe to return to his standard. By the time our second expedition was launched in June 1902, his following was estimated at 15,000, of whom 12,000 were said to be mounted and 1500 armed with rifles. Against this, our Expeditionary Force consisted of some 2000 rifles, partly King's African Rifles, but principally locally-enlisted and locally-trained Somalis. During this expedition, which culminated in the severe but successful action fought at Erigo in October 1902, the Dervishes sustained some 1400 casualties, lost a large number of prisoners and some 25,000

VOL, CCVIII,-NO. MCCLVII.

camels, in addition to many sheep, cattle, and horses. But disorganised transport and the shaken moral of the Somali levies prevented the pursuit of the Mullah to his retreat in the Mudug district.

It was now evident that the situation was such as to demand regular and seasoned troops. At the time of the action of Erigo, the force in Somaliland had consisted of 2400 rifles, of which no less than 1500 were local levies. This force was immediately increased by a further contingent of 900 King's African Rifles, and by 300 Indian infantry. A strong column was to advance from Obbia in Italian Somaliland and occupy the Mudug. Another column was to operate on the Berbera-Bohotleh line. And, simultaneously, an Abyssinian force of 5000 rifles, accompanied by British officers, was to advance along the Webi Shebeli, to prevent the Mullah's retreat westward. The advance from Obbia commenced on the 22nd February 1903; and the enemy immediately fell back on Walwal and Wardair, deny. ing us an opportunity of trying conclusions with his main force. On two occasions, however, small advance parties engaged large forces of Dervishes. At Gumburu, a reconnaissance of two companies of the 2nd King's African Rifles and 48 rifles of the 2nd Sikhs came up with the Mullah's main force, commanded, so it is said, by their chief in person. The fight which ensued appears to have lasted two and a half hours. The Dervishes charged the Brit

H

ish square from dense bush some 300 to 600 yards distant, their horsemen and riflemen being driven back time and again with oruel losses. The square was eventually broken by a rush of spearmen, but not before all our ammunition had been exhausted, The Dervish casualties, estimated by some at 2700, are unknown: for no British officer survived to tell the true story of Gumburu. Our casualties were all officers (9) and 187 men killed and 29 men wounded. Another action at Daratoleh-in which were engaged some 800 Dervishes, flushed with their victory at Gumburu, with their leaders wearing the uniforms of the dead British officers-resulted in the infliction of heavy casualties on the enemy, our losses amounting to 2 officers and 13 men killed, and 4 officers and 25 men wounded. In the meantime the Abyssinians inflicted a orushing defeat on the Dervishes, claiming to have killed 1000 of their spearmen. Immediately after this engagement, which took place on the 31st May 1903, the Mullah made a daring but successful movement eastward to the Nogal valley. Unfortunately, however, it was impossible to intercept this movement, as, owing to camel transport and other difficulties, our troops were being withdrawn to Bohotleh.

His Majesty's Government now decided on a further increase to our force in Somaliland in view of the Mullah's position in the Nogal and its proximity to our sphere.

More than 8000 troops, of which 1000 were British, were employed, in the hope that the Mullah's power would be permanently shattered. The enemy's force, which numbered between 6000 and 8000 fighting Dervishes, was concentrated at Jidballi, where the Mullah, deciding to make a stand, received a most crushing defeat. His casualties in the actual fight at Jidballi (10th January 1904) must have been very large; but far greater were his losses during the course of his subsequent flight northwards to Jidali, and thence eastward into Italian territory. On the other hand, our casualties were slight, except in officers, of whom 3 were killed and 9 wounded, out of a total of 27 killed and 37 wounded of all ranks. It appears that the Mullah only sought sanctuary in Italian territory after receiving solemn assurances of a safe passage from Osman Mahmoud, the Sultan of the Mijjertein, the Italian Somali tribe, who was equally solemnly pledged to us to prevent him from crossing the Italian frontier. Had it not been for this breach of faith, the Mullah would doubtless have had no alternative but to surrender.

Thus, this fourth expedition was completely successful in all but bringing the Mullah himself to bay, and so putting an end to his movement. The greater portion of his wealth, which among a desert dwelling nomad people consists of the flocks and herds upon which their very existence depends,