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had been captured. The moral of his Dervishes as a fighting body had been utterly destroyed; and their numbers, estimated at 6000 to 8000 before Jidballi, could not have exceeded 800 on the conclusion of the campaign. Above all, the Mullah's personal prestige was temporarily shattered; and the discredited refugee in Italian territory must have cut a poor figure as compared with the defiant enemy who, during the third expedition, indited the following letter to the British people:

"I wish to rule my own country and protect my own religion. If you will, send me a letter saying whether there is to be peace or war. I intend to go from Burao to Berbera. I warn you of this-I wish to fight with you. I like war, but you do not. God willing, I will take many rifles from you, but you will get no rifles or ammunition from me. I have no forts, no houses, no country. I have no cultivated fields, no silver, no gold for you to take. I have nothing. If the country were cultivated or contained houses or property, it would be worth your while to fight. The country is all jungle, and that is of no use to you. If you want wood and stone, you can get them in plenty. There are also many ant-heaps. The sun is very hot. All you can get from me is war-nothing else. I have met your men in battle, and have killed them. We are

greatly pleased at this. Our men who have fallen in battle have won paradise. God fights for us. We kill, and you kill. We fight by God's order. That is the truth. We ask for God's blessing. God is with me when I write this. If you wish for war, I am happy; and, if you wish for peace, I am content also. But if you wish for peace, go away from my country back to your own. If you wish for war, stay where you are. Hearken to my words. I wish to exchange a machine-gun1 for ammunition. If you do not want it, I will sell it to some one else. Send me a letter saying whether you desire war or peace.'

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In March 1905, the Illig or Pestalozza Agreement was conoluded between the Italian Government and the Mullah, whereby peace was declared between the Dervishes on the one hand and the British and Italian Governments on the other. The Mullah was assigned a port and certain territories in Italian Somaliland, beyond which he and his Dervishes undertook not to encroach.

The Mullah also agreed to become an Italian protected subject. This agreement was, however, nullified soon after it was concluded, as the Mullah left Italian territory, and by 1907 had re-established himself on the British side, raiding and looting far and wide.

In 1909 the Home Government decided upon a change

1 Scil., a machine-gun lost by the King's African Rifles at Erigo in October 1902, and recovered by them in January 1920.

Such a state of affairs could not be permitted to continue indefinitely; and in 1912, with a view to keeping the main trade routes in the vicinity of the coast towns clear, it was decided to form a small Somali Camel Constabulary, 150 strong, to maintain order among our friendlies within a radius of fifty miles or so of Berbera. This expedient proved an immediate success, and comparative peace was restored among the friendly tribes-80 much so that the force, encouraged by initial successes, was subsequently based Burao, eighty miles inland. But in August 1913 they encountered at Dalmadoba and engaged a party of Dervishes estimated at 2000 rifles. The heaviest casualties-estimated at between 200 and 600-were inflicted on the enemy; but 50 per cent of our small force, including the Commandant, were killed.

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of policy in regard to Somali- vanquished, he resuscitated the land. The administration, old dread of the Dervish name. military and political, was entirely withdrawn from the interior, and all direct control was abandoned. Active administration was limited to the three coast towns; and the friendly Somali tribes in the interior were given arms and ammunition with which to defend themselves against the Mullah, This policy had been carried into fall effect by March 1910. Disorder, which beggars description, ensued. The friendly tribes abandoned themselves to an orgy of internecine warfare, using against each other the arms which had been given them to defend themselves against the common enemy. The motive was not a desire for supreme control on the part of any one tribe, but the Somali's besetting sin of acquisitiveness, which impels him to raid his neighbour's flocks and herds-if he can. It was impossible to control such a situation from Berbera. Loss of confidence in the British Government, the disaffection of Somali Government servants in the coast towns, and a collapse of trade, were the immediate sequelae of this state of unchecked anarchy. In the meantime, the Mullah was not slow to take advantage of so deplorable a situation. By sudden and unexpected attacks upon the friendly tribes, whom he found scattered and unprepared, he obtained the stook, food, clothing, and ammunition which he so urgently required; and by the ineffable atrocities and mutilations which he practised upon the

After this set-back the Camel Constabulary was reorganised on military lines and its numbers raised to 500, and the Indian contingent was also increased to 400 strong. This addition to the military establishment at the disposal of the Protectorate Government was sanctioned for the purpose of enabling the friendly tribes to avail themselves of their grazing grounds and water without molestation by the Mullah. The objects in view in Somaliland were defined in the House of Lords on the 13th April 1914 by Lord Emmott, then

Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, as being "to keep order in the West, and to prevent the further advance of the Mullah in the East."

Immediately after the action at Dalmadoba the Mullah sent some of his Yemeni Arab masons to erect forts at Shimber Berris, whence the Dervishes could dominate the Ain valley, which provides the chief grazing grounds of our friendly tribes. Six doublestoried blockhouses were constructed with considerable skill, and from this stronghold several successful raids were carried out. Operations against the Shimber Berris position were undertaken by the local troops, and despite a stubborn resistanee by the Dervish garrison, all the forts were captured and demolished. The Dervishes were completely driven out of the Ain valley, and retired to their main positions at Tale (the Mullah's headquarters) and Jidali.

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Oar preoccupations where during the war preoluded the necessary reinforcements and auxiliary services being made available for a further active offensive against the Dervishes, to drive them back or to effect their final overthrow, and for nearly five years the local troops were on the defensive, the object being to confine the Dervishes to a limited area and to protect the grazing grounds of the friendlies from Dervish incursions. The initiative thus remained with the enemy; but, despite

the fact that our troops had a 300-mile front to defend, from the Makhir coast to Galadi, a very considerable

measure

of success was

achieved. Very seldom were Dervish raiding parties allowed to gain their objective, and on several occasions the severest punishment was meted out to them. To the extreme mobility, endurance, and gallantry of the Somaliland Camel Corps this success was due.

In the meantime, the civil administration was far from idle. From 1914 onwards the interior was gradually reocoupied. The Somali proved himself responsive to an administration which was 80 clearly bent on furthering his interests, and his confidence was gained to a degree which had never previously been thought possible. Often desoribed as the "Irish of the East," the Somali is notoriously difficult to handle, and the evacution of 1910 eertainly did not decrease his truculent tendencies. Moreover, there was the Turko-German propaganda from the neighbouring Abyssinian province of Harrar to counteract-propaganda which was well calculated to estrange a somewhat fanatical Mohammedan people from their Christian rulers. various departments of government were reorganised to deal with ever-expanding activities; the local revenue was quadrupled, and the highest effioienoy possible with the very small funds available was

The

1 Some £50,000 annually for all civil services-i.e., staff, pensions, district administration, medical, police, prisons, customs, public works, post offices, telegraphs, education, &c.

achieved. There was a spirit of enthusiasm abroad among the dozen civil and political officers stationed in Somaliland which could not but spell success in their arduous and difficult task.

Such briefly was the political and military situation in Somaliland when in the autumn of 1919 His Majesty's Government sanctioned offensive operations for the following January, with a view to the final overthrow of the Dervish power. The forces at the disposal of the Protectorate Government for this purpose consisted of one flight of aeroplanes (D.H. 9), Royal Air Force, known as "Z" unit, the Somaliland Camel Corps, (700 rifles), a King's African Rifles Contingent (700 rifles), 1st/101st Grenadiers, Indian Army (400 rifles), and his Majesty's ships Odin, Clio, and Ark Royal.

The operations commenced on the 21st January with an aerial attack on the Mullah's haroun1 at Medishe, near Jidali. It seems that the Dervishes were as unaware of the termination of the Great War as they were of the existence of aviation. Many were the conjectures as to what the aeroplanes might portend. A few guessed the truth, but feared to communicate their guess to the Mullah, death being the recognised punish ment for the bearer of evil tidings. A certain Turk suggested that they were a Turkish or German invention from Stamboul come to tell the

Mullah of their victory in the war, and to pay their respects to him. Others, with the Oriental's native penchant for flattery, suggested that they were the chariots of Allah come to take the Mullah up to heaven. However that may be, the flight failed to locate the haroun, the paramount necessity for seoreoy having prevented any aerial reconnaissances, and the Mullah sat watching them with his Dervishes around him in a circle. When the machines had passed by, he returned to his house; but no sooner had he entered than news was brought that one machine had returned and was flying very close to the haroun. Thinking that this speedy return indicated that the occupants of the machine wished to speak with him, he left his house, leaning on the arm of his uncle and Prime Minister, Amir. Then the first bomb fell, Amir was killed, and the Mullah's garments were singed. Thus the first shot all but ended the campaign. For the death of the Mullah would have led to the immediate disintegration and surrender of the Dervish forces, except, perhaps, for a few die-hards. On the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th January Medishe and the neighbouring fortress of Jidali were bombed twice daily, but the Mullah found sanctuary in a cave in the hills behind Medishe. On the 27th January he heard that the King's African Rifles were in possession of his fort at Baran. His escape eastward into Italian

1 I.e., armed encampment.

territory was thus blooked. On the same day he learnt that the Camel Corps had captured his forts at Jidali. The news of these two events was the first intimation he received of the proximity of the ground troops. It was surprising that our intentions were concealed from him so completely, and that his intelligence department failed him so dismally. On hearing of the fall of Baran and Jidali, the Mullah decided to move southwards. Two bandoliers were issued to every Dervish, and instructions were given for the packing and transport of the ammunition, treasure, and machine-guns. On the 28th January, with about 700 riflemen and all the lares and penates that he could muster, he embarked upon his hegira. Two days later the Camel Corps received news of his flight and immediately started in hot pursuit, covering 150 miles in seventytwo hours. During the pursuit and the days that followed no reliable intelligence as to the whereabouts of the Mullah could be obtained, although a large number of his leaders and relatives and followers fell into the hands of the troops or the Somali irregular levy, which was most ably organised and commanded by a political officer, assisted by a well-known Somali native officer. On the 9th February, however, news was received that the Mullah was in Tale, his capital, a walled citadel surmounted by thirteen forts (constructed by the Dervishes between 1907 and 1919, and not by the Egyptians 2000 BC., as sug

gested elsewhere). But on the same day, before the troops were in position, he left this stronghold with a small following. The Camel Corps bivouacked about one mile from the main Tale fortress, the whole of which fell into the hands of the tribal levy that night. By dawn, on the next day, the Camel Corps had picked up the Dervish tracks, and a hot pursuit ensued, during which all the remnants of the Dervish force were accounted for except the Mullah himself, his eldest son, a brother, and three trusty followers. Time and again small parties of Dervishes were caught up and annihilated; but the Mullah, seeking safety in isolation, had struck off with one or two others on a line of his own. If a fugitive leader is prepared to abandon his family, his followers, and all his possessions, and seek refuge in the African bush, he becomes a wellnigh impossible objective for a military pursuit.

The march of the Camel Corps from Jidali to the southern border of the Protectorate was a magnificent feat of endurance which deserved to be rewarded by the capture of the Mullah himself. Men and animals were often on half rations-and towards the end on no rations-for their camel transport had been abandoned early; but the pursuit was maintained until there was nothing more to pursue. Ne plus ultra.

The Mullah and his four or five followers found their way into uncontrolled Abyssinian territory. Negotiations for his

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