that is even more expressive of his conception of the pace at which the events of a battle proceed and the consequent necessity of quick decision. He never says a battle "begins," he always says, rather strangely, "a battle is off," using the word properly applicable to horses starting in a race (une fois la bataille partie). But it is some of the subsequent discussions that took place between Fooh and Cadorna that show the faults of the Allied system more than the battle itself. The eleven Anglo-French divisions in Italy were a definite diminution of the Allied forces in France, but they were a definite loss only because of the insufficient railroad communication between France and Italy. Foch had begun entraining soiously, he always uses a word French troops to go to Cadorna's help: 6 French followed by 5 English divisions had hurried there. Even with this assistance Cadorna intended abandoning the line of the Piave, fearing the position could be turned from the Alps, and retreating to the line of the Mincio. Foch hastened to his headquarters and, as Major Grasset politely puts it, "persuaded Cadorna that he had not suffered definitive defeat, and that the enemy could be cheeked on the Piave." Had Fooh's decision not been so rapid-for he had given orders for the French divisions to be moved towards Italy before Cadorna asked for help-the line of the Piave would eertainly not have been retained. But the next line, that of the Mincio, gave a very long front to the Italians, instead of the short line of the Piave from the Alps to the sea: as Cadorna was never tired of repeating when he went to Versailles, not eleven, but twenty or thirty Anglo-French divisions would have been required to hold the line of the Mincio. This would have been so serious a diminution of the Anglo-French forces in France, that it might have seemed preferable to abandon the Italians altogether. Only Foch's promptitude prevented Caporetto from being a blow fatal to Italy. Fooh insists in his 'Principles of War' that a battle is a "orisis, a bloody and terrible drama." But in his ordinary language and uncon So defective were these that some of the French divisions coming to the help of Cadorna had had to oross the Alps on foot, or else they would have arrived too late. When the whole Western front was treated as one, this defect was evident at once: an indefinite number of Italian divisions could have come to France, or Anglo-French divisions to Italy, if the railroad communications had been improved sufficiently to shift them back again shuttle-wise whenever and wherever they were wanted. A few weeks before the 1918 campaign began it was too late to start construction; whenever Weygand, Fooh's Chief of the Staff, and Cadorna at Versailles discussed the subject, they used to lament and shrug and sigh over its being too late. But if a central military organ of command for the whole front between the North Sea and the Adriatic had existed before, the necessity for the improvement would have appeared as soon as they started discussing, and it could easily have been carried out in the early part of the war. Caporetto decided Mr Lloyd George. At a conference held at Rappallo in the beginning of November, the Supreme War Council was founded as a central directing political body for the whole alliance: it was a monthly meeting of the principal Ministers of each country at Versailles. There was a permanent staff of Military Representatives at that place to act as their military advisers. These military advisers were Sir Henry Wilson; Weygand, Chief of the Staff to Fooh in Paris; General Cadorna; and later, General Bliss, American Chief of the Staff. This, as Major Grasset says, "was a hesitating but not less decisive step towards unity of command." The plans elaborated between Fooh and Sir Henry Wilson at Versailles can be better understood if the forces in opposition, as they were to be between the middle and end of February 1918, when the fighting was expected to begin, are known. By the flow of divisions from the East, the Germans in France then had 178 divisions-estimated at 1630 battalions, 1,232,000 rifles, and 24,000 sabres; 8800 field-guns and 5500 heavy guns. The allies had available 97 French, 57 British, 10 Belgian, 1 American, and 2 Portuguese-altogether 167 divisions, estimated at 1585 battalions, 1,480,000 rifles, 74,000 sabres; 8900 field-guns and 6800 heavy guns. So the Allied totals were still superior to the German, the German units, divisions and battalions, being smaller than the Allied. The rate at which their divisions could be brought from the East, where they still had 58, of rather inferior quality, was about 10 a month. Of those, perhaps 40 at the most could be expected to appear in France, and so their maximum strength, between 200 and 210 divisions, would be reached in May, But the American divisions (of which one only was now in the line and counted) were beginning to come in; so that at no time would the German superiority in number over the Allies be near great as the Allied superiority over the Germans had been for at least one and a half years. There ought therefore to have been no cause for anxiety. 80 On the Italian front there were still the 11 Angle-French divisions sent there after Caporetto, and 50 Italian divisions: 764 battalions, 633,000 rifles, 6400 sabres; 3700 fieldguns and 2100 heavy guns. The enemy had only 43 Austrian and 3 German, a total of 46 divisions: 439,000 rifles, 3400 sabres; 3000 fieldguns and 1500 heavy guns. On the Italian front therefore we were still 6 to 4 in spite of Caporetto. In the East the Austrians had 34 divisions, some of which might be expected to come to Italy; but, on the other hand, the Italians had not yet put into the line all the divisions they had reconstructed out of their defeated troops during the winter, out of which they were ultimately to form the Sixth Army. In the Balkans there were 23 Bulgarian, 2 German, and 2 Austrian divisions, a total of 27: 294 battalions, 228,000 rifles, 3000 sabres, 972 fieldguns, and 353 heavy guns. On our side, 8 French, 4 British, 11 Italian, 3 Greek, 6 Serbian, 1 Italian in Albania, 23 divisions in all: 271 battalions, 219,000 rifles, 7000 sabres, 1100 fieldguns, and 380 heavy guns, Here the enemy was slightly superior; but the Greek mobilisation was not finished. Later in the spring the size of their contingent would be doubled er trebled; this would leave the advantage to the Allies again, In Palestine and Mesopotamia the Allies were overwhelmingly larger than the Turks, whose battalions, by the time they reached the front, were all reduced to 200 or 300 by desertion. General Allenby in Palestine had 7 British and 1 Indian divisions: 117 battalions, 100,000 rifles, 16,000 sabres, 410 field-guns, and 93 heavy guns. Facing him were 11 Turkish divisions and 1 second-class German division at and south of Damasous: 107 battalions, but only 29,000 rifles and 3000 sabres, and perhaps 200 or 300 guns. We were 3 to 1. In Mesopotania, 1 British and 5 Indian divisions: 101 battalions, 125,000 rifles, 9000 sabres, 300 field-guns, and 50 heavy guns. Against these the Turks had nominally 5 divisions and 47 battalions, but these only amounted to 18,000 rifles, 1000 sabres, and no more than 100 guns. Here we were 6 to 1. This survey would not be complete without a mention of Lettow - Vorbeck in East Africa, with his 250 Europeans and 1500 Africans. A British and native force of 12,000 rifles, with a ration (not a combatant) strength of 55,000 were kept busy chasing him. So the Allies, in spite of losing the Russians and Roumanians, kingdoms of millions of men, who had thrown into the balance more than 120 divisions in spite of not having more than one Amerioan division at their side from a country which had actually registered 25 million men as capable of military service-in spite of these deductions, at the beginning of 1918, still had the advantage. War abstracts the world into a chess-board where each piece is measured in divisions. the first meeting of the Supreme War Council, M. Venizelos harangued it for an hour on the past, present, and future glories of Hellas; but when he stopped drenching his audience with his eloquence, the only voice raised was by General Robertson, who asked, and shrug and sigh over its being too late. But if a central military organ of command for the whole front between the North Sea and the Adriatio had existed before, the necessity for the improvement would have appeared as soon as they started discussing, and it could easily have been carried out in the early part of the war. Caporetto decided Mr Lloyd George. At a conference held at Rappallo in the beginning of November, the Supreme War Council was founded as a central directing political body for the whole alliance: it was a monthly meeting of the principal Ministers of each country at Versailles. There was a permanent staff of Military Representatives at that place to aot as their military advisers. These military advisers were Sir Henry Wilson; Weygand, Chief of the Staff to Fooh in Paris; General Cadorna; and later, General Bliss, American Chief of the Staff. This, as Major Grasset says, was a hesitating but not less decisive step towards unity of command." 66 The plans elaborated between Foch and Sir Henry Wilson at Versailles can be better understood if the forces in opposition, as they were to be between the middle and end of February 1918, when the fighting was expected to begin, are known. By the flow of divisions from the East, the Germans in France then had 178 divisions-estimated at 1630 battalions, 1,232,000 rifles, and 24,000 sabres; 8800 field-guns and 5500 heavy guns. The allies had available 97 French, 57 British, 10 Belgian, 1 American, and 2 Portuguese-altogether 167 divisions, estimated at 1585 battalions, 1,480,000 rifles, 74,000 sabres; 8900 field - guns and 6800 heavy guns. So the Allied totals were still superior to the German, the German units, divisions and battalions, being smaller than the Allied. The rate at which their divisions could be brought from the East, where they still had 58, of rather inferior quality, was about 10 a month. Of those, perhaps 40 at the most could be expected to appear in France, and so their maximum strength, between 200 and 210 divisions, would be reached in May. But the American divisions (of which one only was now in the line and counted) were beginning to come in; so that at no time would the German superiority in number over the Allies be near so great as the Allied superiority over the Germans had been for at least one and a half years. There ought therefore to have been no cause for anxiety. On the Italian front there were still the 11 Anglo-French divisions sent there after Caporetto, and 50 Italian divisions: 764 battalions, 633,000 rifles, 6400 sabres; 3700 fieldguns and 2100 heavy guns. The enemy had only 43 Austrian and 3 German, a total of 46 divisions: 439,000 rifles, 3400 sabres; 3000 fieldguns and 1500 heavy guns. On the Italian front therefore we were still 6 to 4 in spite of Caporetto. In the East the Austrians had 34 divisions, some of which might be expected to come to Italy; but, on the other hand, the Italians had not yet put into the line all the divisions they had reconstructed out of their defeated troops during the winter, out of which they were ultimately to form the Sixth Army. In the Balkans there were 23 Bulgarian, 2 German, and 2 Austrian divisions, a total of 27: 294 battalions, 228,000 rifles, 3000 sabres, 972 fieldguns, and 353 heavy guns. On our side, 8 French, 4 British, 11 Italian, 3 Greek, 6 Serbian, 1 Italian in Albania, 23 divisions in all: 271 battalions, 219,000 rifles, 7000 sabres, 1100 fieldguns, and 380 heavy guns, Here the enemy was slightly superior; but the Greek mobilisation was not finished. Later in the spring the size of their contingent would be doubled or trebled; this would leave the advantage to the Allies again. In Palestine and Mesopotamia the Allies were overwhelmingly larger than the Turks, whose battalions, by the time they reached the front, were all reduced to 200 or 300 by desertion. General Allenby in Palestine had 7 British and 1 Indian divisions: 117 battalions, 100,000 rifles, 16,000 sabres, 410 field-guns, and 93 heavy guns. Facing him were 11 Turkish divisions and 1 second-class German division at and south of Damascus: 107 battalions, but only 29,000 rifles and 3000 sabres, and perhaps 200 or 300 guns. We were 3 to 1. In Mesopotania, 1 British and 5 Indian divisions: 101 battalions, 125,000 rifles, 9000 sabres, 300 field-guns, and 50 heavy guns. Against these the Turks had nominally 5 divisions and 47 battalions, but these only amounted to 18,000 rifles, 1000 sabres, and no more than 100 guns. Here we were 6 to 1. This survey would not be complete without a mention of Lettow - Vorbeck in East Africa, with his 250 Europeans and 1500 Africans. A British and native force of 12,000 rifles, with a ration (not a combatant) strength of 55,000 were kept busy chasing him. So the Allies, in spite of losing the Russians and Roumanians, kingdoms of millions of men, who had thrown into the balance more than 120 divisions—in spite of not having more than one Amerioan division at their side from a country which had actually registered 25 million men as capable of military service-in spite of these deductions, at the beginning of 1918, still had the advantage. At War abstracts the world into a chess-board where each piece is measured in divisions. the first meeting of the Supreme War Council, M. Venizelos harangued it for an hour on the past, present, and future glories of Hellas; but when he stopped drenching his audience with his eloquence, the only voice raised was by General Robertson, who asked, |