portant object, which this study is designed to advance, the study of rhetoric alone will never effect this important result. Let the mind but be directed for a moment to what is meant by style, as already stated in this lecture, and it will be seen, that it is something depending on the intellectual habits and acquisitions generally, a consummation of all that is effected by the discipline of the powers and the various attainments in knowledge. To expect, then, that the acquisition of a good style will necessarily follow from a course of rhetorical study, is to expect more than rhetoric professes to confer.

And in this connexion I remark that too much is wont to be expected generally from rhetorical studies. Quinctilian professed to take the child ab incunabulis, and to train it up for the forum. But in the division of labor, which has obtained in more advanced states of society, the designs of rhetoric are far more limited. She does not profess to inspire genius, to strengthen the intellect, and store the mind with knowledge. It is her office, as has been already stated, to guide the efforts of the improved mind, to cherish its susceptibilities of pleasurable emotions, and to arrange and display its stores of knowledge.

Let, then, just impressions exist as to the nature and design of rhetorical studies, and the prejudices, of which I have spoken, will pass away.

Another erroneous impression which exists on this subject, is, that the rules of rhetoric are restraints on genius, fetters to confine and limit the free action of the soaring powers of the human intellect. He who regards them must be content to 'dwell in decencies forever,' and never can exhibit that originality and vigor of thought and expression, which are indications of a superior mind.

I would ask those who have such views, to consider, for a moment, the origin and design of these rules. So far as they are founded on conventional agreement, which is the case in respect to all rules which relate to the use of language, they must exist, and be observed, whether found in systems of rhe

toric or not. They are restraints to genius no further than the use of imperfect means for the expression of the thoughts and conceptions of the mind, are restraints; and while man is compelled to use symbols for the conveyance of his thoughts, such restraints must exist.

Those rules which belong to literary taste, rest, it is true, on a different basis, but still on ong which has solidity and fixedness. They are not, as they are sometimes supposed to be, the a priori decisions of men, who have assumed to themselves unauthorised power. Derived as they are from those writings, which, in different ages and nations, have been objects of admiration, they are in consonance with the general feelings of men-with what is found in the constitution of the human mind. The loftiest genius, untaught, may conform to them; it cannot with impunity transgress them.

It may be further added, that the restraints which leave room for the genius of an Irving and a Scott, will not keep down those who make the complaint we are considering, from rising to any height, to which it is safe for them to venture.

But if the prejudice we are considering, be without just foundation, it must still be allowed, that there is some ground. for it, looking at our old systems of rhetoric. This art we know was cultivated with great assiduity, both in Greece and in Rome, and among the literary relics of those ancient times, are standard rhetorical works of high authority. Now it has been too far the case, that our modern systems have been based on these ancient standard works. What is required by a difference of language, and the different intellectual habits, and other peculiarities of communities so widely removed from each other, has not been kept sufficiently in view. As illustrations of this remark, I will just refer to the long chapter in some of our systems of rhetoric, on harmony of sentences, a subject of importance in a transpositive language, but far otherwise, as requiring rules and directions for its attainment, in our own. I mention also the explanations and directions respecting the different parts of a discourse,

the introduction, proposition, narration, confirmation, confutation, and peroration, all of which, with our modes of thinking and reasoning, are but of little value. And it is from directing the attention to these useless parts of rhetoric, that the prejudice we are considering has arisen. I readily grant, that such rules are restraints, and unnecessary, injurious restraints, on genius; at the same time, I assert, that what remains, after these parts have been omitted, is highly important and useful.

Another prejudice, which rhetoric in company with her sister branches is called to encounter, is, that she has to do with mere words,—those words which we are told are the 'daughters of earth, while things are the sons of heaven.' This objection to the study of rhetoric, which, indeed, is not always, or most frequently, m: de by those who are most familiar with these sons of heaven, has influence on many minds. There is, in fact, a feeling of pride, which is nourished by its indulgence. To answer it, however, is easy. No one asserts, that mere words, however well chosen and marshalled, however harmonious and flowing, are objects worthy the attention of thinking, reflecting men. Neither is there, on the other hand, any question, that thoughts alone, however valuable, would be of but little use to the world at large, without that clearness and power of expression, which it is the province of rhetoric to furnish; so that, continuing the illustration, we might ask, what would be the worth of these vaunted sons of heaven, without the daughters of earth to make them known, and adorn them?

In concluding my remarks on this head, I would say, let rhetoric be taught in the manner recommended in this lecture; let there be distinctly in the mind the several advantages proposed to be attained by this study, without too high raised expectations of immediate and necessary benefits; let the nature of the rules and principles it inculcates be fully understood, and I have no fear that it will continue to be regarded as a study of little practical advantage.

Let me next, for a moment, direct your attention to the qualifications of a competent instructer in rhetoric.

1. He should possess some knowledge of intellectual philosophy. The art of rhetoric, like other arts, is founded on science of mind. It is from a knowledge of what is in man, of the constitution of the human mind, its susceptibilities of emotion, and the various influences it feels, that the skilful writer is enabled to address himself with success to his readers, and subject them to his power. And further, many of the rules of rhetoric, based as they are on principles unfolded in the science of mind, are but aids for the effecting of this purpose. How absolutely necessary, then, that he who attempts to explain and illustrate these rules, and to assist in cultivating the taste and forming the style, should possess some knowledge of that science whose principles are thus applied.

2. An instructer in rhetoric should possess some acquaintance with the most prominent writings in his native language. Familiarity with good writers will evidently prove highly serviceable in illustrating the rules and principles, which he has occasion to bring to the notice of his pupils. With this familiarity, also, will most probably be associated some skill in literary criticism, and some refinement of the taste, both of which are highly conducive to the success of an instructer.

I further add, what indeed is not confined to this branch of study, that he who attempts to instruct in rhetoric, should possess an aptness to teach. As we have seen, there are parts of the art which are difficult, hard to be understood, and requiring much explanation and illustration, on the part of the instructer. But on this head, I will not further enlarge, lest I seem unduly to magnify my office, and at the same time to condemn myself. Let it however be remembered, that not every one who has read a work on rhetoric, and who can ask questions out of a book, is fitted to instruct in this department of study.

Permit me next to offer one remark on the most suitable time for studying rhetoric.

There is some difficulty in determining the most suitable period for this branch of study. To comprehend in any good degree the philosophy of rhetoric, or to become skilful in literary criticism, requires maturity of mind. Hence, there seems a propriety in deferring the study till late in the course. Again, the student needs the aid which the study of this art affords, in the formation of his style, and its favorable influence on his literary taste; and these are reasons for placing rhetoric earlier in the course.

There are two ways in which this difficulty may be obviated. The attention may first be directed to some parts of rhetoric, particularly to what refers to the cultivation of the taste and to skill in the use of language, leaving to a later period what requires more maturity of mind. Another mode, and that which I am more disposed to recommend, is, to adopt a mean as to the time of studying rhetoric,-late enough to have the mind come to the work with a good degree of maturity, and early enough to derive benefit both to the taste and the style. I am more inclined to recommend the latter mode, because I do not approve of very early attempts in writing. I speak on this point from my own observation. Students in the college with which I am connected, begin to write themes the last term in the Sophomore year, having devoted their attention, during two preceding terms, to translations. At this time, a student has maturity of mind enough to 'look a subject into shape;' and till he can do this, my own opinion is, that he should not attempt to write. All the benefit to be derived from earlier attempts, relates to ease of expression, and this may better be acquired by translation. Those who attempt to write when very young, almost invariably acquire habits of desultory thinking. They learn to write without connexion or point, and thus all the ease of expression acquired, is dearly paid for. I much prefer, that a student should never have attempted the work of composition, than that he should have become desultory in his habits of thought. In the one case,