precept, here omitted, was the subject of grave discussion in the opposite rabbinical schools. Why, then, should not Jesus adopt a stricter interpretation of words, thus apparently ambiguous? If we justly regard Him as a Prophet expounding the law, and not as a Lawgiver, it is at least obvious that He cannot be " a higher witness for the sanctity of marriage" than Moses, on whose testimony He argues, and whose words were the commands of God.§

In times of innocence, divorce, of course, could not have occurred. Its necessity arose from the entrance of

66

* Deut. xxiv. 1. "If she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness (or, matter of nakedness) in her.” Boothroyd renders, some unpleasant defect," that is, some very great bodily blemish, or some base immoral habit.". But such vagueness in enunciating a law, which the husband might carry out at pleasure, seems scarcely intelligible. The adulteress might have been put to death; but probably this sentence was seldom executed; (cf. Matt. i. 18, 19,) and may not Moses have legislated for such cases? Their constant occurrence is pre-supposed in the rule of Jesus. Possibly lewd and indecent conduct, where the overt act of sin has not been committed, but something more than suspicion is necessarily excited by undoubted improprieties, may have been implied. Any reference to mere bodily defects seems to be precluded by the supposition in the context, that the woman might be married to another, and afterwards recalled by her first husband.

† See M'Caul's Old Paths p. 514-525. Josephus asserted that Moses permitted husbands to divorce their wives on any pretence, and himself acted accordingly. Antiq. iv. 8, 25; vit. Joseph.

‡ As Mr. Trench supposes. Augustine thought that both legislated in the same direction; and that to require a bill of divorcement was not to encourage divorces, but to throw impediments in the way. See p. 166 and 314. § As appears Matt. xv. 4.

sin into the world, and from that untractable disposition of mankind, and not of the Jews only, which under such circumstances would render the continued inviolability of the contract intolerable, or a cause of fresh sin; and on this account it is still permitted. Justice, at least, requires that the innocent party should be released from the bonds of a covenant, no longer holy, and no longer conducive to the ends for which it was instituted, because virtually dissolved by "the fornication," or impurity of the woman; and this is the case to which the Lord here limits the permission.

Milton, indeed, contended with much force and eloquent declamation for liberty of divorce in all cases of gross misconduct or irreconcileable disagreement, and boldly maintained that the language of the Lord must be explained in a figurative sense, in order to reconcile it to the voice of reason and of charity. Even Augustine thus regarded the word "fornication," as implying “every graver sin which corrupts and defiles the soul." But, as Luther observed, no trope can be admitted in Scripture, unless where the context manifestly requires it, or the literal sense is evidently false or absurd. Nay, the poet himself elsewhere maintains, that in drawing up a law, or in composing a definition, the most exact and appropriate words must be used, and that these must be interpreted, not in their metaphorical, but in their proper signification.* This unquestionable axiom

* Christian Doctrine c. 10, p. 227: ed. Bohn.

sufficiently refutes a theory, which wholly ignores the distinct contrast in the present Scripture, and the fact that no limitation whatever occurs in the parallel passages of St. Luke and St. Mark.* And where could we draw the line, if a figurative interpretation were once adopted? What "cruel abuses" would inevitably result from "the vagueness and uncertainty," in which it is necessarily involved.†

The law of the early church limited the right of divorce to the case of adultery. Some, indeed, sought to reconcile the institutions of Christ and of Rome, and to make the usual compromise between the strictness of the one, and the laxity of the other; but Chrysostom expressly refuses to recognise human legislation on the subject, because God alone is our Judge.§

So

The disciples understood the Lord literally, and therefore exclaimed, "if the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry." low was the estimation in which females were then held amongst the Jews; so frequently was married life embittered by the occurrence of "irreconcileable

* Luke xvi. 18; Mark x. 11, 12. †Trench p. 211, 212.

Bunsen Hippol. V. iii. p. 357.

§ Op. T. v. p. 280, 281; 748. The absurdity and injustice of our own law seem to be generally acknowledged; though with many other recognised evils left without a remedy.

|| Matt. xix. 10.

See references to the Talmud in Old Paths p. 24, 25; 495, &c. Joseph. Antiq. iv. 8, § 4: 15; Philo Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. § 18, &c.

enmities," arising from intolerable waywardness, or incompatability of temper. Hence, no doubt, the disciples concluded with Maimonides, that divorces are necessary under such circumstances to preserve peace and domestic quiet; and therefore thought that, if the possibility of obtaining such a release was cut off, the idea of contracting a marriage would be intolerable. It is true that the disciples sometimes grossly mistook the meaning of their Lord; but then He never left them in error; so that if they had misapprehended his meaning on this occasion, some intimation would have been given of the nature of their mistake, and a further explanation of the subject would have rendered its recurrence impossible.* This, however, has not been done, because they were not now in error.

§ 4.

Again ye have heard that it hath been said To THE ANCIENTS, thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths; but I say unto you, swear not at all: neither by heaven; for it is God's

* Professor Lee thus interprets Malachi ii. 16; (quoted Chrysost. T. v. p. 280, 281.) "When one hates, he dismisses (saying) Jehovah, the God of Israel, has (so) commanded. And so he conceals violence with a cloak." (Hebr. Lex.) Boothroyd translates,-"I hate him that putteth away his wife, saith Jehovah, the God of Israel, and him that covereth violence with his garment, &c." That divorces ought not be granted with too great facility, Sir W. Scott forcibly argues in his celebrated judgment in the case of Evans v. Evans. 1 Hagg. Rep. p. 36-40.

throne: nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great king. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let* YOUR COMMUNICATION BE YEA, YEA; NAY, NAY; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." (v. 33-37.)

The sin of neglecting to perform contracts or engagements, made with an oath, was probably the point indicated by the Elders; but the Lord would have his disciples enter into all their mutual contracts without any such solemn adjurations. They are altogether unnecessary, where strict love prevails, as that necessarily involves implicit faithfulness in every social relation of life.t

The language of the Alexandrian Philo on the subject of oaths strikingly illustrates the deep reverential feeling of the Jews, though not free from superstition, with reference to that awful Name, which they scrupled even to repeat. The Essenes never swore at all, and regarded the habit of abstaining from oaths as involving

* Rather, "let your yea be yea, and your no, no." (Boothroyd.) This is the reading of Chrysostom T. vii. p. 178; T. viii. p. 527.

Chrysostom strangely accounts for the omission of any direct reference to the law of theft, by saying that the thief sometimes swears; but that he who neither swears nor lies would never steal; so that it is partly on this account that the Lord here denounces the sin of swearing, because falsehood arises from theft! T. vii. p. 177.

The law is explicit, Exod. xx. 7; forbidding all irreverent, as well as untruthful, mention of the name of Jehovah.