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and eve

ons of fenfe. There is no heart's ease like to that which rifeth from fenfe of reconciliation to God, and walking in ways of righteoufnefs. For, in thefe ways, mens hearts never check them, nor occafion them any difquiet. For, let the world fay what they will, to be challenged by the reason of a man's mind, goes nearer to a man's heart than the cenfure of all the world befides. To act contrary to the reason of one's own mind, is to do a thing most unnatural and cruel: it is to offer violence to a man's felf; and to act against a man's trueft ufe and intereft. For, all manner of wickednefs is a burden to the mind ry man that doth amifs, doth abuse himself. For, it is not poffible for any man to run away from himself, or to forget what he hath done. He muft ftand to the bargain that he hath made; and abide by the choice that he hath taken and, in the whole world, there is nothing fo grievous for a man to think of, as that, when he did amiss, and made a mad choice, he went against the sense of his own mind; for, in this cafe, he is not heart-whole. There is no man who knows himself, but knows what I now speak is true. Tho' I know it is common in the world, for men to do against reafon, and to live by chance and not to pursue any true intention, or follow any worthy defign: but, as it happens; and, as company and occafion leads them; fo they act, be it better or worse; not confidering, that what matter of difeafe is to the body (which many times is very grievous, and fo indifpofes a man, as to put him quite out of felf-enjoyment) the fame is, malignancy in the mind, guilt in the confcience. Nay, I may fay, that these are much

more

more troublesome and grievous to be born, than any malignant matter of disease can be to the body.

They make no true judgment of religion, that take it to be a limitation, and restraint úpon man's liberty. Yet, fome are so foolish as to think, that, if God would, we might have lived as we lift, and have been released from those many obligations that religion feems to lay upon us. Whereas, this is as great a lie as ever the father of lies could invent. For, religion is not a burdenfome and troublesome thing; which, if God had not commanded, might have been forborn, and all things have been as well. No; there is nothing in real and true religion, that is of that nature. And, this I dare defend against the whole world; that there is no one thing in all that religion which is of God's making, that any fober man in the true use of his reason, would be released from, tho' he might have it under the feal of heaven. For, fuch a difpenfation would be greatly to his lofs and prejudice as much as if the physician, instead of giving wholesome phyfick to his patient, fhould give poifon. For, all things in real religion tend either to conferve, or restore the foundness and perfection of our minds ; and to continue God's creation in the true ftate of liberty and freedom. So that if a man did understand himself, and were put to his choice; he would rather choose to part with the health and foundness of his body, than with the purity and integrity of his mind. For as much as the one is his far greater concern: and he had much better live with a diftempered crazy body, than with a troubled difquiVOL. IV. N

et

et mind, and guilty confcience. But, on this fubject, I have many things to fay; and therefore will digest them into five heads.

First, Man by his nature and conftitution, as God made him at first, being an intelligent agent, hath fenfe of good and evil, upon a moral account. All inferior beings have fenfe of convenience or inconvenience, in a natural way: and, accordingly, all inferior crea tures do choose, or refufe. For, you cannot get a mere animal, either to eat or drink that which is not good and agreeable to its nature. And, whereas we call this inftinct; it is moft certain that, in intelligent agents, this other is instinct, at least. And, for this reafon, man is faulty, when either he is found in a naughty temper, or any bad practice. For, he hath judgment and power of difcerning he is made to know the difference of things: and he acts as a mad man, that knowing what is better, chooseth the worse. This is the ground and foundation of man's being truly miferable; for, to be happy, or miferable, is mainly in his intellectual nature. Inferior natures may fuffer wrong: but they are not capable of happinefs or mifery, as intellectual agents are; because they are not acquitted or condemned from within 3 nor have any thing to challenge or reprove them.

Secondly, Man being made to know God; hath sense of his own privation, in the lofs of fo great and univerfal a good as God is. For, he is made happy in the enjoyment, and miserable in the lofs of him. And, tho' diverfion, and other enjoyments, may give fome entertainment, for a while; yet when a man ftays at home, or returns to himself by confideration,

he

he feels inward perplexity in himself; because some neceffary good is wanting to him. His own knowledge makes him capable of good and evil; and fenfible of being miserable, if he be deprived of that good which God made him capable of. Such is the nature of our fouls, that they cannot be happy, but in this way, and by the ufe of their intellectual faculty. Otherwife, the foul will be fenfible of its privation and lofs.- Virtue, and vice, are the foundations of peace and happiness, or forrow and mifery, there is inherent punishment belonging to all naughtiness: and no power can divide or separate them; but they will follow one another. For, tho' God should not; in a pofitive way, inflict punishment; or any inftrument of God punish a finner; yet he would punish himfelf: because he cannot be fatisfied in what he doth contrary to reafon, and the fenfe of his own mind. There is no fecurity to a finner: the leaft that will attend him, is fear, and fufpicion of danger. Diverfion (which is the way that many men take,) going to fome pleasure, or into company; is but a put-off, for a while and when they retire, it will return upon them, with greater force and violence. For, all moral evil is against the nature of man, and condemned by the reason of the mind and can ǹo other way be prevented but by the motion of repen tance and application to God,.

Thirdly, Our fouls acting upon God, difcover their virtues; and difplay their powers; and fhow their mettle and sprightfulness. Whereas, if a man be diverted from God, the reafon of his mind is as much without employment, as the eye which is in the dark, N 2

for;

for, it is the prefence of the object, that puts the faculty upon acting. So, if God be withdrawn; our minds cannot be drawn forth; for, they are without their proper object; for, other-where, fave only in God, our fouls are not matched, fo as to make proof of themselves. We know not our powers and faculties, but by their acts: and we cannot act, but in the prefence of the object; if a man be separated from God; his mind and understanding are without their proper object; and, fo, are as little to him, as his fight is to him, when he is in the dark. I am apt to think, that in the heavenly ftate hereafter, when God fhall otherwise declare himself to us, than now he doth; those latent powers which now we have, may open, and unfold themselves; and thereby we may be made able to act in a far higher way, than we are at present. Now, we have many avocations and diverfions: but, when we fhall come to have nearer approaches to God; we shall have more use of ourselves; and fhall find ourselves more able, than we are at present, in this limited and contracted state. For, this we have prefent experience of; that if we give ourselves up to meditation upon God, and employ our minds in fincere intention of him, and his fervice; we do thereby ennoble and enlarge our faculties, which otherwife would fhrivel up, and grow every day lefs and lefs. I am very confident, that by religious motion men are a thousand times more improved, than by any worldly drudgery whatsoever.

Fourthly, Because of the vaft defires that are in man, there is great diffatisfaction in all things below a man's felf: and that, all worldly things are. The