all God's creatures, and God hath made us capable of himself, and of doing him fervice; and therefore God by our make, hath a due of obedience from us, and a demand from us; and if we fail, then God hath jus pænarum for his juft fecurity, whereby he may exact from us his due of obedience. But now if God be mafter of his own right, then he may remit and forgive fin; if he may not, he is not fo much master of his right as if he might; for every owner may depart from his right if he will, and abate and cut himself short of his right if he please. It is juft, if a man requires what is owed him; it is not unjust, if he do not: therefore we must not deny this to God; for he is not mafter of his right fo far as he might, if he have no power to use it; but God being master of his own right, hath power to ufe it if he please; and there is no fuch attribute in God, as neceffitates him to punifh fin whether he will or no, or to punish fin repented of; and it will confift with goodness for God fo to do; and this it is, that when we confider a wicked world, we wonder at divine patience; for if God were under a neceffity of punifhing the world condignly, the world would not stand one moment; but this is what we refolve it into ; none of us knows the length of divine patience. I confefs it is juft, and it is good, that obftinacy and contumacy in fin, and impenitency be controuled and chaftized; for a malefactor not to receive juftice, is a very great evil, because it doth countenance and encourage fin; but if there be repentance, I am perfuaded God is not bound to punifh; for repentance, where-ever it is, doth alter the case; and God is not

bound

bound to punish fin condignly, if the finner repent and condemn himself, and deprecate God's just difpleasure, and return to duty and obedience; for then there is the effect of punishment before punishment; for punishment is the medicine and cure of wickednefs; punishment is only where monition will not take effect to bring a creature to repentance and a better mind, to confider and know his duty, and to obey it. Therefore they are too severe, who insist upon the rule of juftice, to exclude mercy, goodness, compaffion, and power to forgive: they rob God of the honour of his grace, and make him less mafter of his own right; they difcourage converfion and endeavourings to return to God, to duty, and to obedience; yea, they lay a foundation of desperation.

Therefore it is thus. That which we call the rule or law of justice, requires that to be done which justly ought to be done; but it doth not require every thing to be done which juftly may be done; it justly may be, that a finner, as a finner, be punished; but you cannot say that, of right, God ought to punish, though a finner do repent. If of right it ought to be, that every fin ought to be punished; then our Saviour engaged in a cafe that is not feafible; he hath fhewed his good-will indeed, but we can receive no relief from him ; and if God's righteousness did compel him not to forbear a finner in order to reformation, then he were only as a judge determined by a law, which he cannot vary from, but he muft execute it : but to every fupremacy of power and authority (as undoubtedly it is in God) there is annexed a power of indulging, qualifying, moderating, and (if he sees caufe)

caufe) forgiving. Therefore though it may be done of right, to punish all delinquents, yet it is not of right that all must be punished; because God is fupreme and hath power to moderate, remit and abate. This I will grant that upon delinquency or an evil act done, there is a defert and worthinefs of punishment, there is a potential guilt contracted, and the person is virtually under an obligation to punishment but not actually under an obligation to be punished; for the actual obligation may be prevented and taken off by the clemency, benignity, and goodness of God; he being mafter of his own right, and under no law at all, but the law of his own nature, and the law of his own will. So you fee there is great use of this distinction; just, that of right may be done; and just, that of right must be done. And this I have here interposed, because this is very satisfactory to tender minds, that are afraid that their fins cannot be pardoned; and because it is highly neceflary for men that are serious and confiderate, and do weigh how they fhall be discharged of the guilt of fin, and fecured from the justice of God because of their faultinefs, to know and understand that the law of justice obliges a righteous perfon to do that which ought to be done, but not to do every thing that juftly may be done.

But now to proceed: I fhall show next, how just and equal are ftated; what makes juft, and what makes equal.

fuft is determined two ways; either by the proportion of things one to another; or by pofitive conflitution of perfons, who have right and power.

1. Just

1. Juft or right, is determined by the proportion of things one to another; and this you have refolved well by Tully. " Right and juft is not determined by "particular fancy or arbitrary will, but by the nature "and reafon of things." That is right, which the right of the matter doth refolve and determine itself to.

2. Other things are juft or right, by positive conftitution or voluntary determination; and that is either by a proprietor, or a law-giver; for where a man hath right of property, he may refolve in his own property as he himself fees caufe; and he that hath power to make laws, may conftitute and make laws, and determine in the fphere of his activity as he thinks fit. I will give you two inftances. 1. It seems to me reasonable, that murder fhould be punished with death; and this not only because God hath faid it, but becaufe God hath declared it from principles of reafon: for if you obferve, when God forbids murder, he did not forbid it upon the account of his will, but upon a moral reafon, becaufe God made man in his own image therefore whofoever sheds man's blood, by man fhall his blood be fhed; for God requires blood for blood. 2. But now for every felon to be punished with death, the right of this depends upon human conftitution ; for this is the reafon that we go upon; rather a mischief in particular, than a general inconvenience; rather a particular perfon who indeed is a malefactor, rather he be feverely dealt with, than all fober perfons fhould be abufed and difturbed. So here is an inftance of both the one just by the reason of proportion, the other by pofitive conflitution; which takes in alfo a general reafon to govern itself by.

Now

Now this fame pofitive conftitution is either general or particular; if general, it is that which we call the law of the place; if particular, then what every man will, in the ordering of his own right; yet both of these, the proprietor and the law-giver, though they have privilege fo far as privilege takes place, yet both of them are to be determined by the reason of things; for this, both in heaven and on earth, is the fupreme and fovereign law the reafon of things is an univerfal law, to which every body's liberty ought to vail and fubmit: now taking this for the rule, I confefs other-where every body is free, and may make use of his own right and property as himself fees caufe: for these are two maxims; every man may difpofe of his own; and every man may abate and remit of his right, if he himself will. Now the former of the forementioned inftances, namely things that are determined by their relation each to other, are thofe that we call the great rights of the world, that govern above and below, and are never to be controuled, never to yield or give place; for they are a law with God, and according to the nature of God; they are as unchangeable and as unalterable as God himfelf. The latter inftance, are the leffer and particular rights which depend upon human conftitution; these are variable and changeable. The former are of easy determination and universal confent; but about this latter is all the difference. And now because it is a matter of great importance, I will make thefe appear in particular examples.

And it. There are things that are in themselves refolved and determined by their relation each to other. Thus,