s of the ated and ces, Che ne, le, as il e S mination of the decisive point of a field of battle. Exam- The next definition is of great importance. Def. 10.-Interior tactical lines are such tactical lines that the several portions of an army moving on them are more easily uniteable, so as to lend one another a mutual support for defending, or act unitedly and simultaneously in attacking, and be in amply superior numbers on any point which may be made the decisive point of the field of battle, than the portions of the enemy are on the lines on which he is moving. Hence Interior Lines are defined relatively to those of the enemy. That which is required of tactical lines in order to be interior is, to use somewhat different words to those employed in the definition, that they should allow the army moving on them to have a decisive numerical superiority, the configuration of the ground and relative value of the troops being taken into consideration, on any point which may become a point of collision. Since Interior Tactical Lines are defined relatively to the tactical lines of the enemy, the lines of either army are interior or exterior according to the relation they bear to those of the other; and the same tactical lines may be interior or exterior according as the enemy chooses his own. Examples will be given of interior tactical lines in the accounts of the battles of Rivoli, Dresden, Albuera, and Austerlitz. The British tactical lines were manifestly interior at Salamanca. Def. 11.-A line of natural or artificial obstacles, presenting more than ordinary difficulties to an army attacking it, and greater advantages to one defending it, and employed in manoeuvres, in which it plays an important part during the time that Tactics presides, is called a Tactical Base of Manœuvres. Ex.-The portion of the large brook in the field of Austerlitz (see Plan 4), between Kobelnitz and Telnitz, with the two ponds of Kobelnitz and the tactical pivots along it, viz. the villages of Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and Telnitz, and the chateau and wood of Sokolnitz, and the ridge of hills running along in rear of it, formed for the French a tactical base of manœuvres, of which Napoleon made a most brilliant use. Def. 12.-When an army advances or retires from the several points on a strategical or tactical front occupied by its several separated portions towards the same point, each of the portions taking a different strategical or tactical line of its own leading to the point, such point is called a Point of Concentration. Ex. The fortress of Brunn was the French Point of Concentration before the battle of Austerlitz. Def. 13. The tactical front with the ground generally slopes on its front and on its flanks, is defined to be a Position. Def. 14.-The whole area of ground in any point of which the information which has been obtained by one or other of the different means of obtaining information leads to the conclusion that the enemy may be able and ready to deal a blow, is defined to be the Circle of the Enemy's Activity. It appears expedient, that before the Chapter of Definitions is closed, the strict meaning of the terms in front, in écharpe, in reverse, in rear, should be explained. Let (Plan 6, fig. 1) o be the centre of a battalion a b deployed in line. Through o draw the straight line fr perpendicular to a b, and also the straight lines c d, eh inclined at 45 degrees to a b. Let the front of the battalion be towards the extremity f of fr, and the rear towards the other extremity r. Then, when the enemy directs his attack on the front of the battalion in any direction more nearly inclined to fr than to cd, eh, or ab, i.e. within 22 degrees on either side of fo, the attack is said to be in front. When the attack is on the front of the battalion, but more nearly inclined to cd or eh than to ab or fr, i.e. within 22 degrees on either side of o c or o e, the attack is said to be made in écharpe. When the attack is more nearly inclined to ab than to either of the other lines, whether the attack be made on the front or rear of the battalion, i.e. within 22 degrees on either side of o a or o b, the attack is said to be made in flank. When the attack is on the rear of the battalion, and more nearly inclined to either of the straight lines ho, do than to ab or fr, i.e. within 221 degrees on either side of oh, od, the attack is said to be made in reverse. When the attack is on the rear of the battalion, and more nearly inclined to or than to either of the other lines, i.e. within 22 degrees on either side of or, the attack is said to be made in rear. The parallelogram a b has been supposed to represent a battalion deployed in line; but it may with equal propriety be a battalion in column or in square, or a line of battle, or any portion of a line of battle formed in any way whatever. Nor is it necessary that the point o should be taken in the centre; for wherever o be taken, the directions of the lines remain the same; and it is with the directions alone that we are concerned in the matter; hence what has been said is perfectly general, and the exact meaning of the five terms in front, in écharpe, in flank, in reverse, and in rear explained. The preceding definitions are all that it appears necessary to place together in the Chapter of Definitions. Others not exclusively tactical will, however, occur in the course of the treatise; and whenever any new name or expression is introduced which seems to call for a definition, one will be given, that obscurity and ambiguity may be replaced by distinctness, definiteness, and certainty. CHAPTER II. ON THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF TACTICS, AND ON SEVERAL MAXIMS OF WAR. THE leading Principles and Maxims of Tactics will now be given together in a series. Each will afterwards receive what appears to be the necessary or expedient explanation, discussion, and illustration, by examples from Military History, in the order in which it stands in the series. The Principles and Maxims are thus all presented together, because, while discussing, and notably while presenting historical examples of one of the principles and maxims, several others will of necessity be illustrated and exemplified at the same time. It is hardly possible to select a portion which shall illustrate and exemplify one military principle or maxim only; and certainly it would be highly inexpedient, and contrary to the object in view to do so. Besides, by illustrating and exemplifying several principles and maxims by a single portion of military history, the treatise is shortened; and it will not be questioned by any true soldier that every man ought both to speak and write whatever he has to express in the fewest possible words. Other principles not included in this series, will be enunciated in the course of the treatise. They are not included in the series, because they are too intimately connected with the particular operation or portion of tactics to which they belong, to admit or require a separate discussion. List of the Principles and Maxims of Tactics. PRINCIPLE I. Operate always on Interior Tactical Lines. The following are 9 Particular Cases of this Principle: Particular Case 1.-Avoid allowing the columns, when in the neighbourhood of the enemy, or when coming on to the field of battle,-in other words, when in the circle of the enemy's activity-to be separated by insurmountable natural obstacles, or by obstacles so difficult to be surmounted as to allow the enemy time to overwhelm with the mass of his forces, and destroy one column before the others can come to its assistance, or, worse still, to overwhelm with the mass of his forces several of the isolated columns successively. Case 2.-Take care that the tactical front is not intersected by any natural obstacles running at right angles to or across the direction of its length; but that the tactical front is, on the contrary, furnished with excellent communications running along its length. And take care that, if possible, the contrary is the case with the enemy's tactical front. Case 3.-Take the utmost care to ensure that the columns, when arriving on the field of battle in face of the enemy, shall arrive simultaneously. Case 4.-Take care not to leave either so large a gap, or so large a very weak interval or intermediate portion of the line, that the enemy suddenly and vigorously attacking may enter at it, and so take each of the separated portions of the army in flank, which will enable him to engage both advantageously, and probably (which has often been the case) contain the one portion by a much smaller portion of his own army; which he is enabled to do, either because the tactical front he occupies with the containing portion of army across the flank of the contained portion of the separated army is strong and good, or because a change of front in the presence of an enemy, and under fire, is an operation which requires time, and presents immense difficulty; while with the rest of his army he attacks the other separated portion in front and flank as vigorously as possible, and overwhelms it by the great superiority of numbers, which consideration will show he is thus enabled to bring on it. his Case 5.-When the army is moving in separated columns from the different points which its portions occupied on a strategical front, or on a tactical front, either in |