order to make the concealment greatest, manifestly depends on the general colour of the soil of the country in which the army is called to operate; but any mixture of them appears good for all soils. Is it to enter too curiously into the question to say that, cæteris paribus, that of two fields of battle should be chosen to whose general colour the colour of the uniform of the soldiers is best adapted for their concealment ?

On MEANS 6.-As a first rule in employing this means, prisoners of war, deserters, and travellers, are to be questioned apart one from another, in order to discover, by comparing their statements, whether they are attempting to deceive by false information.

Though it will be sometimes difficult to find a direct contradiction between the statements of two of such persons, or between the statements of two of such persons separately interrogated, a man who possesses natural tact, and has had some experience, will almost always be able to decide, by various indications, whether the witness is telling what he believes to be the truth. In examining prisoners, whether officers or privates, it is not right to expect from them what it is unreasonable to suppose they can know, and this must be taken into consideration; for example, a private infantry soldier cannot be expected to know anything beyond the movements of his battalion.

On MEANS 7.-That is, on the consideration of all the best and most probable plans which the enemy can form in the circumstances in which all the knowledge of him, and information received about him, when most carefully weighed, leads to the belief he is placed, as a means to acquire information.

In order, then, to consider and discuss this means of obtaining information, it is to be supposed, as data, that the enemy is known to be occupying, or that all the information which can be obtained leads, when most carefully weighed, to the belief that the enemy is occupying a certain strategical position, at a certain time, with certain numbers and resources, and under certain circumstances How then, from this data, is information as to the enemy's future projects and plans to be obtained? As a matter

of course, what are the good or probable courses open to the enemy in the position and circumstances in which he is believed to be,-in fact, all the plans which oneself would think of undertaking, and pass in review as good or feasible, in order to decide between them, supposing oneself to be in the enemy's place?

On the authority of Jomini, the number of the plans which are open to an army, under any circumstances, is very limited (say 6 at most), hence there cannot be many plans which the enemy can adopt, and consequently few for one to pass in review in order to divine which is the enemy's plan. To give an illustration of this, the following translated quotation from Jomini's "Précis de l'Art de la Guerre" will be given :

"In 1806, when it was as yet doubtful in France whether a war would take place with Prussia or not, I made a note on the chances of a war, and the operations which, in the case of a war, would take place. I laid down the 3 following hypotheses as to the conduct the Prussians would

pursue:

"1. The Prussians will await Napoleon behind the Elbe, and operate defensively between the Elbe and the Oder, to gain time for the cooperation of Russia and Austria.

"2, Or they will advance to the Saale, supporting their left on the frontier of Bohemia, and defending the outlets of the mountains of Franconia.

"3. Or, awaiting the French by the great road of Mayence, they will advance imprudently to Erfurt.

"I do not think there were any other possible hypotheses to be made, unless one supposed the Prussians sufficiently ignorant to divide their forces, already inferior in number, in the two directions of Wesel and Mayencea useless fault, since by the former of these two routes no single French soldier had appeared since the Seven Years' War.

"Supposing, then, they advanced on Erfurt, by directing themselves on Hof and Gera, they were cut from their line of retreat and thrown back on the Lower Elbe and North Sea. Did they occupy the line of the Saale, by attacking their left by Hof and Gera they would be partially over

whelmed, and might be intercepted at Berlin by the Leipsig road. Did they remain behind the Elbe it was equally by directing themselves on Hof and Gera that they were to be found. What was the importance, then, of knowing the details of their movements, since one's course was in all cases the same. So, well convinced of these truths, I did not hesitate to announce, a month before the war, that that would be what Napoleon would undertake, and that if the Prussians passed the Saale, it would be at Jena and Naumbourg that the battle would be fought.”

It is not generally possible for the most able spy to penetrate the secrets of the enemy's general, and discover his plans, nor will any of the other 8 means of obtaining information effect this. All that can be learned by any of the other 8 means, is where a body of the enemy of a certain number was at a certain time, the direction from which it came, and the direction in which it was going; in fact, the dispositions, strategical and tactical, of the enemy as they exist at a certain time; but from these the enemy's project and plan does not appear, but still remains to be found out. Hence the great value of considering what are the good and feasible plans for the enemy to undertake in the position and circumstances in which he is; in fact, all the plans which oneself ought to think of undertaking as good and feasible as a means of obtaining information. But, in order to determine what these good and feasible plans are, it is necessary to know how to determine. Hence the great value of a knowledge of the correct principles and maxims of war, and a good knowledge of military history, for it is only by means of these that it is possible to determine and know what are the good and feasible plans to pursue in any position and circumstances. And it is clear of how great assistance well-made hypotheses containing the several good and feasible plans an enemy can undertake in a given position, under given circumstances, are, not only directly towards ascertaining what his real plan is, by finding out and indicating several definite plans, one of which the enemy must, to a very high probability, indeed take, and of which the information, as it arrives, has only to indicate the actual one the

enemy is pursuing, but pieces of information, and information generally, which, without these hypotheses, based on and constructed from a knowledge of the Principles and Maxims of Strategy and Tactics, and an acquaintance with military history, which embodies the experience and instructions of the Past, would be not comprehended and understood, or misunderstood, and therefore unprofitable, now become explained and comprehended in their proper bearings, acquire peculiar significance, and indicate which is the enemy's real plan. Hence it follows, that not only are the Principles and Maxims of War, and a Knowledge of Military History, of the greatest use in forming able plans, based on the best knowledge which can be acquired of the position and circumstances of the two armies, but also as a most important means of verifying, interpreting, comprehending, and obtaining information, and consequently, that best knowledge of the positions and dispositions of the two armies.

To make a summary of this Means 7, it is

From the enemy's position and circumstances, according to all that can be learned, well weighed, to determine, by means of the Principles and Maxims of Strategy and Tactics, and a Knowledge of Military History applied to the enemy's position and circumstances, and the configuration of the theatre of war, what are the good or probable plans for the enemy to pursue. Having determined these plans, view every new piece of information which may be received by any of the other 8 means, or by any other means not categorized here, (all of which should be kept rapidly and incessantly at work,) as it comes to hand in conjunction with them; comprehend, understand, verify, and interpret it by means of them and by a knowledge of the Principles and Maxims of War and Military History, and determine therefrom, if possible, between the hypothetical plans which is the enemy's real one, or see at least if the number of hypothetical plans is diminished, the new piece of information just come to hand having rendered one or more of them now unwarrantable.

It may be here stated, it is hoped à propos, that a plan for a campaign ought at any time during the campaign to

contain within itself, in addition to an offensive part, the means of defeating all the good or probable plans which at that time remain open to the enemy. Thus, if 2 good plans remain open to the enemy at any time during a campaign, the plan of the campaign should contain within itself, as its defensive part, the means of defeating both these, and in addition a purely offensive part; but when new information arrives, and the enemy's plan is so far developed as not to be mistaken, then the plan of the campaign must contain the means of defeating the enemy's plan by striking him offensively so as to parry his blow.

The value of a Knowledge of the Principles and Maxims of War and of Military History, as a means to obtain information, understand it, and deduce therefrom, may be illustrated by the game of Chess. An enemy's move which may to one player indicate a beautiful plan of attack, and the necessary defensive and offensive operations, will to another ignorant of the art have no significance whatever. The following translation of a despatch of Napoleon's to his brother Joseph, the King of Spain, copied here from Sir W. Napier's "History of the War in the Peninsula,' is of so striking a character that its value seems to require its insertion in a treatise on war. It is placed here because the latter part of it refers to the subject of reconnaissances, and as well, the writer of this treatise, in placing it here, offers it to the kind consideration of the reader as a test to the extent it goes of the principles, maxims, and views of war advanced by the writer in his "Elementary Treatise on Strategy," and this "Elementary Treatise on Tactics." "This despatch of Napoleon's," says Sir W. Napier, " evinces his absolute mastery of the art of war." As the translation of the despatch in the "History of the Peninsular War" is accompanied with a valuable observation, it is copied verbatim from the text of that most valuable work.

"It was too late,' he said, 'to discuss the question, whether Madrid should have been retained or abandoned; idle to consider if a position covering the siege of Zaragoza might not have been formed; useless to examine if the line of the Duero was not better than that of the Ebro for the