pose, allows expositions of Scripture, or else I am sure he condemns himself in what he practises. His book is, in his own thoughts, an exposition of Scripture. That this cannot be done without varying the words and literal expressions thereof, I suppose will not be questioned. To express the same thing that is contained in any place of Scripture with such other words as may give light unto it in our understandings, is to expound it. This are we called to, and the course of it is to continue whilst Christ continues a church upon the earth. Paul spake nothing, for the substance of the things he delivered, but what was written in the prophets; that he did not use new expressions, not to be found in any of the prophets, will not be proved. But there is a twofold evil in these expressions: "That they are invented to detect and exclude heresies, as is pretended." If heretics begin first to wrest Scripture expressions to a sense never received nor contained in them, it is surely lawful for them who are willing to " contend for the faith once delivered to the saints" to clear the mind of God in his word by expressions and terms suitable thereunto; neither have heretics carried on their cause without the invention of new words and phrases.

If any shall make use of any words, terms, phrases, and expressions, in and about religious things, requiring the embracing and receiving of those words, etc., by others, without examining either the truth of what by those words, phrases, etc., they intend to signify and express, or the propriety of those expressions themselves, as to their accommodation for the signifying of those things, I plead not for them. It is not in the power of man to make any word or expression, not grãs found in the Scripture, to be canonical, and for its own sake to be embraced and received." But yet if any word or phrase do expressly signify any doctrine or matter contained in the Scripture, though the word or phrase itself be not in so many letters found in the Scripture, that such word or phrase may not be used for the explication of the mind of God I suppose will not easily be proved. And this we farther grant, that if any one shall scruple the receiving and owning of such expressions, so as to make them the way of professing that which is signified by them, and yet do receive the thing or doctrine which is by them delivered, for my part I shall have no contest with him. For instance, the word iμcoúcios was made use of by the first Nicene council to express the unity of essence and being that is in the Father and Son, the better to obviate Arius and his followers, with their v örav oùx v, and the like forms of speech, nowhere found in Scripture, and invented on set purpose to destroy the true and eternal deity of the Son of God. If, now, any man should scruple the receiving of that word, but withal should profess that he believes Jesus Christ to be God, equal to the Father, one with him from the beginning, and doth not explain himself by other terms not found in the Scripture, namely, that he was "made a God," and is "one with the Father as to will, not essence," and the like, he is like to undergo neither trouble nor opposition from me. We know what troubles arose between the eastern and western churches about the

1 *Ην ὅταν οὐκ ἦν, ὁμοιούσιος. Homo deificatus, etc., dixit Arius. 1. Υἱὸν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων geyevñolas. 2. Eivaí mors örs oùx v, etc.—Sozom. Hist. Eccles. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 215; Theod. Hist. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 3; Socrat. Scholast. Hist. lib. i. cap. iii. etc. Οὐκ ἔλεγε γὰρ ἕνωσιν τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ δύο ὑποστάσεις ἔλεγε, καὶ διαίρεσιν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ θεὸν ἀπέκαλει τὸν Χριστὸν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἔτι ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ τῇ σχέσει, καὶ τῇ οἰκειώσει, κατὰ τὸ ταὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις ἀρέσκειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς φιλίας.—Leont. de Sect. de Nestorio.

* Vide Calv. Instit. lib. i. cap. xiii.; Alting. Theol. Elenct. loc. de Deo.

words "hypostasis" and "persona," until they understood on each side that by these different words the same thing was intended, and that vooracis with the Greeks was not the same as "substantia" with the Latins, nor "persona" with the Latins the same with górov among the Greeks, as to their application to the thing the one and the other expressed by these terms. That such "monstrous terms are brought into our religion as neither they that invented them nor they that use them do understand,” Mr B. may be allowed to aver, from the measure he hath taken of all men's understandings, weighing them in his own, and saying, "Thus far can they go and no farther," "This they can understand, that they cannot;"—a prerogative, as we shall see in the process of this business, that he will scarcely allow to God himself without his taking much pains and labour about it. I profess, for my part, I have not as yet the least conviction fallen upon me that Mr B. is furnished with so large an understanding, whatever he insinuates of his own abilities, as to be allowed a dictator of what any man can or cannot understand. If his principle, or rather conclusion, upon which he limits the understandings of men be this, "What I cannot understand, that no man else can," he would be desired to consider that he is as yet but a young man, who hath not had so many advantages and helps for the improving of his understanding as some others have had; and, besides, that there are some whose eyes are blinded by the god of this world, that they shall never see or understand the things of God, yea, and that God himself doth thus oftentimes execute his vengeance on them, for detaining his truth in unrighteousness.

66

But yet, upon this acquaintance which he hath with the measure of all men's understandings, he informs his reader that "the only way to carry on the reformation of the church, beyond what yet hath been done by Luther or Calvin, is by cashiering those many intricate terms and devised forms of speaking," which he hath observed slily to couch false doctrines, and to obtrude them on us; and, by the way, that "this carrying on of reformation beyond the stint of Luther or Calvin was never yet so much as sincerely endeavoured." In the former passage, having given out himself as a competent judge of the understandings of all men, in this he proceeds to their hearts. "The reformation of the church," saith he, was never sincerely attempted, beyond the stint of Luther and Calvin." Attempted it hath been, but he knows all the men and their hearts full well who made those attempts, and that they never did it sincerely, but with guile and hypocrisy! Mr B. knows who those are that say, "With our tongue will we prevail; our lips are our own." To know the hearts of men and their frame towards himself, Mr B. instructs us, in his Catechism, that God himself is forced to make trial and experiments; but for his own part, without any great trouble, he can easily pronounce of their sincerity or hypocrisy in any undertaking! Low and vile thoughts of God will quickly usher in light, proud, and foolish thoughts concerning ourselves. Luther and Calvin were men whom God honoured above many in their generation; and on that account we dare not but do so also. That all church reformation is to be measured by their line, that is, that no farther discovery of truth, in, or about, or concerning the ways or works of God, may be made, but what hath been made to them and by them,was not, that I know of, ever yet affirmed by any in or of any reformed church in the world. The truth is, such attempts as this of Mr. B.'s to overthrow all the foundations of Christian religion, to accommodate the Gospel to the Alcoran, and subject all divine mysteries to the judgment of that wisdom which is carnal and sensual, under the fair pretence of car

rying on the work of reformation and of discovering truth from the Scripturc, have perhaps fixed some men to the measure they have received beyond what Christian ingenuity and the love of the truth requireth of them. A noble and free inquiry into the word of God, with attendance to all ways by him appointed or allowed for the revelation of his mind, with reliance on his gracious promise of "leading us into all truth" by his holy and blessed Spirit, without whose aid, guidance, direction, light, and assistance, we can neither know, understand, nor receive the things that are of God; neither captivated to the traditions of our fathers, for whose labour and pains in the work of the gospel, and for his presence with them, we daily bless the name of our God; neither yet "carried about with every wind of doctrine," breathed or insinuated by the "cunning sleight of men who lie in wait to deceive,"—is that which we profess. What the Lord will be pleased to do with us by or in this frame, upon these principles; how, wherein, we shall serve our generation, in the revelation of his mind and will, is in his hand and disposal. About using or casting off words and phrases, formerly used to express any truth or doctrine of the Scripture, we will not contend with any, provided the things themselves signified by them be retained. This alone makes me indeed put any value on any word or expression not gras found in the Scripture, namely, my observation that they are questioned and rejected by none but such as, by their rejection, intend and aim at the removal of the truth itself which by them is expressed, and plentifully revealed in the word. The same care

also was among them of old, having the same occasion administered. Hence when Valens, the Arian emperor, sent Modestus, his prætorian præfect, to persuade Basil to be an Arian, the man entreated him not to be so rigid as to displease the emperor and trouble the church, δι' ὀλίγην δογμάτων azgilsiav, for an over-strict observance of opinions, it being but one word, indeed one syllable, that made the difference, and he thought it not prudent to stand so much upon so small a business. The holy man replied, Τοῖς θείοις λόγοις ἐντεθραμμένοι προέσθαι μὲν τῶν θείων δογμάτων οὐδὲ μίαν ἀνέ Korraι ovλλabýv. "However children might be so dealt withal, those who are bred up in the Scriptures or nourished with the word will not suffer one syllable of divine truth to be betrayed." The like attempt to this of Valens and Modestus upon Basil was made by the Arian bishops at the council of Ariminum,2 who pleaded earnestly for the rejection of one or two words not found in the Scripture, laying on that plea much weight, when it was the eversion of the deity of Christ which they intended and attempted. And by none is there more strength and evidence given to this observation than by him with whom I have now to do, who, exclaiming against words and expressions, intends really the subversion of all the most fundamental and substantial truths of the gospel; and therefore, having, pp. 19-21, reckoned up many expressions which he dislikes, condemns, and would have rejected, most of them relating to the chiefest heads of our religion (though, to his advantage, he cast in by the way two or three gross figments), he concludes "that as the forms of speech by him recounted are not used in the Scripture, no more are the things signified by them contained therein." In the issue, then, all the quarrel is fixed upon the things themselves, which, if they were found in Scripture, the expressions insisted on might be granted to suit them well enough. What need, then, all this long discourse about words and expressions, when it is

Theod. Hist. Eccles. lib. iv. cap. xvii. p. 126; Socrat. lib. iv. cap. xxi. xxii.; Sozom. lib. vi. cap. xv.-xvii.

Theod. Hist. lib. ii. cap. xviii.; Sozom. lib. iv. cap. xiii.; Niceph. lib. ix. cap. xxxix.

the things themselves signified by them that are the abominations decried? Now, though most of the things here pointed unto will fall under our ensuing considerations, yet because Mr B. hath here cast into one heap many of the doctrines which in the Christian religion he opposeth and would have renounced, it may not be amiss to take a short view of the most considerable instances in our passage.

His first is of God's being infinite and incomprehensible. This he condemns, name and thing, that is, he says "he is finite, limited, of us to be comprehended;" for those who say he is infinite and incomprehensible do say only that he is not finite nor of us to be comprehended. What advance is made towards the farther reformation of the church' by this new notion of Mr B.'s is fully discovered in the consideration of the second chapter of his Catechism; and in this, as in sundry other things, Mr B. excels his masters. The Scripture tells us expressly that "he filleth heaven and earth;" that the "heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain him;" that his presence is in heaven and hell, and that "his understanding is infinite" (which how the understanding of one that is finite may be, an infinite understanding cannot comprehend); that he "dwelleth in that light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen, nor can see” (which to us is the description of one incomprehensible); that he is "eternal," which we cannot comprehend. The like expressions are used of him in great abundance. Besides, if God be not incomprehensible, we may search out his power, wisdom, and understanding to the utmost; for if we cannot, if it be not possible so to do, he is incomprehensible. But "canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?" "There is no searching of his understanding." If by our lines we suppose we can fathom the depth of the essence, omnipotency, wisdom, and understanding of God, I doubt not but we shall find ourselves mistaken. Were ever any, since the world began, before quarrelled withal for asserting the essence and being of God to be incomprehensible? The heathen who affirmed that the more he inquired, the more he admired and the less he understood, had a more noble reverence of the eternal Being which in his mind he conceived, than Mr B. will allow us to entertain of God. Farther; if God be not infinite, he is circumscribed in some certain place; if he be, is he there fixed to that place, or doth he move from it? If he be fixed there, how can he work at a distance, especially such things as necessarily require divine power to their production? If he move up and down, and journey as his occasions require, what a blessed enjoyment of himself in his own glory hath he! But that this blasphemous figment of God's being limited and confined to a certain place is really destructive to all the divine perfections of the nature and being of God is afterward demonstrated. And this is the first instance given by Mr B. of the corruption of our doctrine, which he rejects name and thing, namely, "that God is infinite and incomprehensible." And now, whether this man be a mere Christian" or a mere Lucian, let the reader judge.

That God is a simple act is the next thing excepted against and de

1 "Solent quidam miriones ædificari in ruinam."-Tertul. de Præsc. ad Hæres. 2" Est autem hæc magnitudo (ut ex iis intelligi potest, quæ de potentia et potestate Dei, itemque de sapientia ejus dicta sunt), infinita et incomprehensibilis."-Crell. de Deo, seu de Vera Rel. præfix. op. Volkel. lib. i. cap. xxxvii. p. 273.

a Simonides apud Ciceronem, lib de Nat. Deorum, lib. i. 22.

Vide passim quæ de Deo dicuntur, apud Aratum, Orpheum, Homerum, Asclepium, Platonem, Plotinum, Proclum, Psellum, Porphyrium, Jamblichum, Plinium, Tullium, Senecam, Plutarchum, et quæ ex iis omnibus excerpsit. Eugub. de Prim. Philos.

cried, name and thing; in the room whereof, that he is compounded of matter and form," or the like, must be asserted. Those who affirm God to be a simple act do only deny him to be compounded of divers principles, and assert him to be always actually in being, existence, and intent operation.1 God says of himself that his name is Ehejeh, and he is I AM,that is, a simple being, existing in and of itself; and this is that which is intended by the simplicity of the nature of God, and his being a simple act. The Scripture tells us he is eternal, I AM, always the same, and so never what he was not ever. This is decried, and in opposition to it his being compounded, and so obnoxious to dissolution, and his being in potentia, in a disposition and passive capacity to be what he is not, is asserted; for it is only to deny these things that the term "simple" is used, which he condemns and rejects. And this is the second instance that Mr B. gives in the description of his God, by his rejecting the received expressions concerning him who is so: "He is limited, and of us to be comprehended; his essence and being consisting of several principles, whereby he is in a capacity of being what he is not." Mr B., solus habeto; I will not be your rival in the favour of this God.

And this may suffice to this exception of Mr B., by the way, against the simplicity of the being of God; yet, because he doth not directly oppose it afterward, and the asserting of it doth clearly evert all his following fond imaginations of the shape, corporeity, and limitedness of the essence of God (to which end also I shall, in the consideration of his several depravations of the truth concerning the nature of God, insist upon it), I shall a little here divert to the explication of what we intend by the simplicity of the essence of God, and confirm the truth of what we so intend thereby.

As was, then, intimated before, though simplicity seems to be a positive term, or to denote something positively, yet indeed it is a pure negation," and formally, immediately, and properly, denies multiplication, composition, and the like. And though this only it immediately denotes, yet there is a most eminent perfection of the nature of God thereby signified to us; which is negatively proposed, because it is in the use of things that are proper to us, in which case we can only conceive what is not to be ascribed to God. Now, not to insist on the metaphysical notions and distinctions of simplicity, by the ascribing of it to God we do not only deny that he is compounded of divers principles really distinct, but also of such as are improper, and not of such a real distance, or that he is compounded of any thing, or can be compounded with any thing whatever.

First, then, that this is a property of God's essence or being is manifest from his absolute independence and firstness in being and operation, which God often insists upon in the revelation of himself: Isa. xliv. 6, "I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God." Rev. i. 8, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is," etc.: so chap. xxi. 6, xxii. 13. Which also is fully asserted, Rom. xi. 35, 36, "Who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? for of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom

xiv.

1 "Via remotionis utendum est, in Dei consideratione: nam divina substantia sua immensitate excedit omnem formam, quam intellectus noster intelligit, unde ipsum non possumus exacte cognoscere quid sit, sed quid non sit."-Thom. Con. Gentes, lib. i. cap. "Merito dictum est a veteribus, potius in hac vita de Deo a nobis cognosci quid non sit, quam quid sit; ut enim cognoscamus quid Deus non sit, negatione nimirum aliqua, quæ propria sit divinæ essentiæ, satis est unica negatio dependentiæ," etc.— Socin. ad lib. ii. cap i.; Metaph. Arist. q. 2, sect. 4.

2 Suarez. Metaph. tom. ii. disput. 30, sect. 3; Cajetan. de Ente et Essen. cap. ii.